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MIND AGAINST MATTER: 
ISOLATING CONSCIOUSNESS IN AMERICAN FICTION, 1980-2010 
 
Mind Against Matter uses cognitive literary theory to explore a set of 
contemporary texts that emphasize characters’ feelings of alienation and isolation from 
their social and material worlds. Focusing on novels by Nicholson Baker and David 
Markson, short stories by David Foster Wallace, and the film The Truman Show, I 
consider how these texts focus on characters’ individual, subjective experiences while 
deemphasizing their physical environments and social contexts. I argue that by 
privileging subjectivity in this way, these texts portray their characters as independent, to 
varying degrees, from their material and cultural surroundings. The texts isolate 
individual consciousness, causing their characters to live in mental worlds of their own 
making. While the novel, as a genre, often depicts alienation as a condition deriving from 
a character’s status as a social outcast, the texts featured in this study treat it as a 
condition inherent to consciousness, derived from what their creators envision as an 
inevitable separation of mind from world. Rather than bemoan alienation as a loss of 
social connectedness, these texts portray it as inherent to mental life. 
 
The chapters of this dissertation explore the particular visions of alienation that 
emerge in each of these texts. In a chapter on Nicholson Baker’s The Mezzanine, I argue 
that Howie, the novel’s protagonist, views his mind as a machine that operates according 
to self-sufficient, automatic processes. My analysis of David Markson’s final novels 
demonstrates that Markson portrays artistic creation as a process through which 
individual consciousness is isolated from society. David Foster Wallace’s Oblivion treats 
alienation as a general human condition, as Wallace’s interests in loneliness and 
solipsism derive, I argue, from his assumptions about the individualized nature of 
consciousness. Finally, in a chapter on The Truman Show, I argue that the film’s sense of 
paranoia stems from its protagonist’s sense of being alone in his worldview. I thus 
present a corpus of works that maintain a close, limited focus on singular fictional minds, 
shutting out social and physical environments in order to depict the mind as a cloistered, 
self-enclosed entity. My analysis highlights the ways in which the philosophical 
underpinnings of these narratives render consciousness as an isolating force, stranding 
fictional characters on mental islands of their own making. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Mind Against Matter 
 
 
Speaking extremely broadly, fictional narratives both explore and rely on the 
tension between individual characters’ private thoughts and the external worlds in which 
those characters exist. These external worlds consist of both fictionalized physical 
settings (environment, landscapes, objects, etc.) and social milieus (dialogue, along with 
abstractions such as class, moral codes, etc.). Characters’ internal, private thoughts are 
determined, to varying degrees, by their physical and social surroundings, while those 
internal thoughts simultaneously motivate those characters to act on their surroundings. 
As a basic example, we can look at this extended passage from Salinger’s The Catcher in 
the Rye, in which protagonist Holden Caulfield narrates an argument between him and his 
roommate, Stradlater: 
 “Hey” Stradlater said. “Wanna do me a big favor?” 
 “What?” I said. Not too enthusiastic. He was always asking you to do him 
a big favor. You take a very handsome guy, or a guy that thinks he’s a real hot-
shot, and they’re always asking you to do them a big favor... 
 …“I got about a hundred pages to read for history for Monday,” he said. 
 “How ’bout writing a composition for me, for English? I’ll be up a creek if I 
 don’t get the goddam thing in by Monday, the reason I ask. How ’bout it?” 
 It was very ironical. It really was. 
 
 
 “I’m the one that’s flunking out of this goddam place, and you’re asking 
 me to  write you a goddam composition,” I said. (27-8, italics original) 
This passage, like many found in novels narrated in the first person, marks a very clear 
distinction between internal thoughts and external dialogue, as the passages in quotation 
marks are, obviously, dialogue, and the passages lacking quotation marks represent 
Holden’s internal thoughts. At the same time as it marks this distinction, the passage 
highlights the causal relationship between thought and speech. Holden’s snarky, private 
asides about Stradlater are responses to his roommate’s apparently presumptuous requests 
for help, and Holden’s dialogue is determined by his internal thoughts about his 
roommate (or at least by the underlying emotions of irritation expressed in those 
thoughts). 
Passages such as this rely on a push and pull between the external world and 
internal thought, and the dramatic action and thematic resonance of novels such as 
Catcher consist not only in the deterministic quality of this push/pull, but in the tensions 
generated by the schisms between inner thought and the external world. Holden Caulfield 
is a famously alienated character, and his sense of alienation is expressed largely through 
the incommensurability of his internal wishes and desires with the reality he observes 
playing out in the world outside of his mind. Countless examples of narratives that rely 
on this schism can be found in literary history, from Hamlet to Jane Eyre to Invisible 
Man. In all such cases, narrative is largely a function of this internal/external divide. 
Compare this passage from Catcher with Nicholson Baker’s The Mezzanine, a 
novel narrated by a young office worker named Howie as he goes about a typical work 
day. In Baker’s novel, Howie’s thoughts often turn to past conversations, but unlike 
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Holden Caulfield, his conversations are recounted in such a way as to eschew others’ 
direct speech. For example, describing the milk allergies of his ex-lover L., Howie says 
that “she ascribed her dislike to her father’s influence: he, she told me, associated dairy 
products with a certain kind of cheerful brutishness” (46). Even when Howie recounts 
L.’s thoughts and statements, Baker’s style makes clear that L.’s statements exist only, 
within the novel’s diegesis, as parts of Howie’s memory. Unlike Salinger, Baker is not 
trying to place his readers within a conversation between Howie and L. as much as he is 
allowing them access to Howie’s thoughts about that conversation.  
Howie’s narration does, of course, demonstrate a clear causal connection between 
his internal thoughts and his surrounding physical and social world; after all, his 
memories are about and are determined by (as memories must inevitably be) events that 
he has experienced. The distinction that I mark between novels like The Mezzanine and 
Catcher, however, has less to with content and more to do with temporality and process. 
In Catcher’s narration, Holden’s internal thoughts, though distinguished from his 
dialogue, are embedded temporally within his experiences. Baker’s novel, however, 
highlights the personalized idiosyncrasy of Howie’s thoughts and memories by 
emphasizing their separation, in space and time, from their real-world sources. While 
those real-world sources remain readily apparent in the content of Howie’s thought, he 
processes those memories apart from the time and place during which they originally 
occurred. Whereas in Catcher, conversation is presented as though occurring in real time, 
in The Mezzanine, conversation is presented only as a component of memory, of an 
internal thought process that operates relatively independently of the event memorialized. 
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This independence leads the novel toward an overall emphasis on the capacity for 
memory and thought to personalize reality, to take concrete phenomena and process them 
in a distinctly individual way. This kind of personalization is common, I argue, to a 
particular strain of contemporary fictional texts. The Mezzanine, along with David 
Markson’s tetralogy, David Foster Wallace’s Oblivion, and the film The Truman Show, 
portrays its protagonist’s mind as inherently distinct from his social and physical 
surroundings. This distinctness is, of course, a matter of degree. I want to emphasize that 
complete severance of a character’s internal thought from those surroundings is 
theoretically impossible, since without those surroundings, characters would have 
nothing to think about, and their internal thoughts would be completely lacking in 
content.1 What these texts do, however, is tilt the balance of narrative emphasis away 
from external events and toward internal thought to such an extreme degree as to 
emphasize the relative independence of those characters’ internal lives from their 
surroundings.  
This mental distinctness leads these texts to portray their protagonists as alienated, 
to varying degrees and in varying ways, from their social worlds. Unlike a novel such as 
Catcher, however, these texts are largely stoic about this alienation, treating it as an 
inherent and unavoidable component of mental life. The passage from Catcher cited 
above draws its humor and dramatic tension from the schism between internal thoughts 
and external events, and the novel as a whole famously centers on Holden’s feelings of 
despair and isolation from his peers and from society at large. The Mezzanine, however, 
is relayed almost exclusively through the prism of Howie’s narration, largely excising 
1 A particularly extreme example of this cognitive separation in postmodern fiction is Joseph McElroy’s 
Plus, in which a brain is literally disembodied and shot into space. Even as the brain is physically separated 
from its surroundings, however, it retains faint traces of memory from the time when it inhabited a body.  
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this internal/external divide from the narrative. The distinctness and idiosyncrasy of 
Howie’s thought are presented simply as bare facts of his reality, not conditions against 
which to struggle. In fact, Baker’s novel presents Howie’s mental isolation in a largely 
optimistic light. Much of his narration consists of extended meditations on not only social 
relationships, but on quotidian consumer products such as straws and shoelaces. While 
such things function as fairly mundane objects in the physical world, in the private 
mental world that Howie constructs for himself, they take on a new level of personal 
significance and interconnectedness. The novel repeatedly foregrounds these feelings of 
interconnectedness, but Howie achieves such feelings, paradoxically, through the private 
mental world in which he exists. 
Baker achieves these effects at least in part through his use of unattributed 
dialogue and his sustained focus on a single, individual fictional consciousness. David 
Foster Wallace creates a similar effect by embedding unattributed dialogue into long, 
descriptive paragraphs. To take one example, in the middle of the short story “Good Old 
Neon,” the narrator Neal describes a series of thoughts that he has had during a 
conversation with his therapist about his feelings of “fraudulence.” Neal states,  
I’m aware that it’s clumsy to put it all this way, but the point is that all of this and 
more was flashing through my head just in the interval of the small, dramatic 
pause Dr. Gustafson allowed himself before delivering his big reductio ad 
absurdum argument that I couldn’t be a total fraud if I had just come out and 
admitted my fraudulence to him just now. (150) 
 By having Neal describe Gustafson’s words in his own voice, Wallace maintains the 
story’s ever-present sense of being cloistered, to an extreme degree, within Neal’s 
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conscious mind. The use of unattributed dialogue is, of course, nothing new in literature, 
but it is indicative of Wallace’s investment in portraying individual consciousness as 
distinct from its physical surroundings. As in The Mezzanine, the causal relationship 
between Neal’s private thought and public experience is clear, yet the story’s narrative 
style isolates Neal’s private thought in space and time, treating his public experiences 
primarily as memories and mental phenomena. 
In such novels and stories, characters’ first-person musings tend to make up so 
much of the narrative that those characters’ singular perspectives overwhelm, and 
occasionally even drown out, the events being narrated. When Baker and Wallace excise 
direct transcription of dialogue from their fiction, they render conversations as 
components of characters’ memories, rather than as events that carry significance on their 
own. Even when they include direct dialogue in their fiction, that dialogue tends to take 
up so little space that it becomes far less significant than the first-person monologues that 
contextualize it. For example, Chapter Four of The Mezzanine contains an extended 
conversation between Howie and a co-worker named Tina. This conversation only takes 
up about two of the chapter’s ten total pages, with the rest of the chapter devoted to 
Howie’s musings about his conversation with Tina. The conversation itself is ultimately 
less important to the novel than the way it is transformed, within Howie’s mind, into part 
of a tapestry of subjective, individualized thoughts about the world. 
Even more significant than these works’ formal choices and narrative styles is 
their thematic content, which often centers, in ways that are sometimes subtle or implicit, 
around characters’ mental isolation, the stark boundaries that exists between their 
thoughts and their social and material surroundings. For example, the 1998 film The 
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Truman Show lacks the cloistered formal qualities that lend Baker’s and Wallace’s fiction 
their distinct senses of isolation. In fact, the film follows a three-act dramatic structure 
fairly standard for a mainstream Hollywood film. However, the film’s premise allows it 
to depict the distinctness and idiosyncrasy of its protagonist’s thoughts. This protagonist, 
Truman Burbank, lives in a fictional, media-created world in which his family, friends, 
and acquaintances are all characters played by paid actors. The film thus enacts a 
scenario in which Truman’s thoughts, perspectives, and entire worldview are entirely 
distinct from those of the rest of the film’s characters, as he believes to be real a world 
that others are all too aware is artificial. The film’s dramatic tension arises from the actor 
characters’ collective need to keep Truman tethered to his singular mindset even as he 
develops a broader understanding of his surroundings. 
Other texts address these themes of isolation in more direct ways. David 
Markson’s late novels, for example, center on protagonists who are lonely artists. The 
artists’ stories function as meditations, for Markson, on the ways in which the creative 
process entails enacting an imaginative world, and by extension a point of view, that is 
unique from that of the social mainstream. Markson’s characters exist in mental worlds of 
their own making, in part because of the creative paths that they have chosen. He 
develops thematic connections between these artists’ failures, which range from the 
creative to the financial, and their inability to form relationships with other people. Art 
and life are related, in Markson’s work, through the mental isolation that the author sees 
as inherent to both. 
 These writers thus adhere to a particular model of consciousness that emphasizes 
the ways in which it operates independently from the social and physical worlds. Their 
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texts make clear the causal relationships between internal thought and external 
phenomena while severing or isolating internal thought in space and time, portraying it as 
private and personal. This conception of the nature of conscious experience exists not 
only in fiction, but in contemporary criticism as well. For instance, Patrick Colm Hogan, 
in “Literature, God, & the Unbearable Solitude of Consciousness,” argues that “utter, 
unbreachable isolation” is “an aspect of consciousness that is a central, if implicit concern 
in literature” (117). Hogan refers to this isolation as a “universal state,” an enduring, 
inevitable condition of conscious life (119). For Hogan, literature is both a medium 
through which writers address the theme of mental isolation and a way, for readers, to 
“manage[] ordinary loneliness” and “put us in intimate company” (138). Hogan thus 
espouses a narrative about consciousness that is echoed by the novelists treated in this 
study. In fact, his perspective is remarkably similar to the statements of David Foster 
Wallace, who said in an interview with Laura Miller, “there is this existential loneliness 
in the real world. I don't know what you're thinking or what it's like inside you and you 
don't know what it's like inside me. In fiction I think we can leap over that wall itself in a 
certain way” (62). 
While Hogan marshals a substantial amount of evidence to support his views of 
consciousness, I want to stress here that the narrative that he sketches about 
consciousness is only one possible story among many. Hogan notably cites 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to help explain the isolation that he sees as inherent to 
consciousness. However, Wittgenstein himself notably became critical of the Tractatus 
later in his career, modifying many of its ideas for his later Philosophical Investigations. 
In particular, rather than emphasizing the isolation of subjectivity, Wittgenstein, in 
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Philosophical Investigations, argued against the possibility of a “private language,” a 
language intelligible only to a single person. For the Wittgenstein of Philosophical 
Investigations, language and thought were not private things, but were instead shared by 
communities of speakers. Numerous other philosophers and theorists of consciousness 
have emphasized the role of socialization and community in shaping thought. For 
example, Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, summarizing their views of the 
evolution of consciousness, state that “The acquisition of a growing lexicon of [mental] 
symbols through social interactions, probably initially based on the nurturing and emotive 
relationships between mother and child, allowed for the discrimination of a self within 
each individual consciousness” (195). Edelman and Tononi emphasize the role of 
community and communication in shaping selfhood, as opposed to the isolation 
highlighted by Hogan. Their description notably uses warm “feeling” talk—“nurturing,” 
“emotive”—to sketch their theoretical version of history, further emphasizing the role of 
community in their conception of the conscious mind. 
In pointing out this “community-based” model of conscious subjectivity, I am not 
attempting to argue for its correctness, or even for its superiority over the “isolation 
model.” I am, however, emphasizing that there are a variety of ways to describe and 
theorize the nature of subjectivity, and the view that subjectivity is inherently isolating is 
only one such way. I argue that it is this particular view that has, by and large, been 
enacted in the wing of literary fiction that forms the object of this study. These fictions 
portray their characters’ minds as interpreters of the worlds that surround them that are 
distinct, to varying degrees, from those worlds. While these works certainly contain 
social elements and character interactions, their formal contours lead them to emphasize 
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the privacy of their characters’ mental worlds, treating the social realm primarily as a 
component of those individual characters’ thoughts and memories. 
 This emphasis on individual, private thought constitutes a turn, within this strain 
of late postmodern literature, away from “systems novelists” like Pynchon, Gaddis, and 
DeLillo. Such novelists, who make up a characteristic sub-genre of late-20th century 
fiction that Mark McGurl terms “technomodernism,” emphasize the ways in which 
disparate individuals are connected to one another through vast, far-reaching 
technological, social, political, and cultural mechanisms. The works I analyze in this 
dissertation certainly do not elide such considerations; however, they do tend to place less 
of an emphasis on widespread systems than they do on the particulars of individual 
conscious experience. Moreover, what truly defines this as a distinct strand of fiction is, I 
argue, the extreme degree to which this focus on individual experience treats such 
experience as something that can be seen to operate with a level of independence from 
such systems. This is, of course, a matter of degree. Markson’s novels, for example, 
explicitly address the role of history in shaping their protagonists’ experiences. However, 
those novels’ unique forms evoke a clear distinction between history and individual 
experience by rigidly separating them on the printed page, segregating them into distinct 
paragraphs divided by large swaths of blank space. Baker’s Mezzanine explicitly 
addresses the dual, interlocking roles of history and commerce in shaping its 
protagonist’s conscious experiences. However, the novel also takes care to reduce broad, 
systemic elements of its diegesis to abstract, personalized traces of individual memory. 
 These writers’ emphases on the private mind also evoke a level of epistemological 
certainty that suggests a turning away from the disorder and ideological relativism that 
10 
 
often characterize postmodern literature. Wallace, Baker, Markson, and The Truman 
Show all define the contours of their protagonists’ identities to extremely precise degrees. 
However, critical discussions of postmodern fiction tend to define its approach to 
subjectivity as one emphasizing diffuseness of identity and an inability to clearly define 
the limits of subjectivity and individual consciousness. For example, in her introduction 
to the critical reader Postmodernism, Patricia Waugh notes that the book’s essays share a 
“suspicion of subject-centered reason or philosophies of consciousness” (2). Alan Palmer 
suggests a similar definition of postmodern fiction when he notes that in postmodern 
novels, “The notion of subjectivity is problematical because the self is viewed as a 
construct and a fiction” (“Ontologies,” 275). Such critics, among countless others, define 
postmodern literature according to its resistance to clear definitions of characters’ 
subjectivity.2 When critics define late-20th Century literary fiction in such terms, they 
likely have in mind novels such as Thomas Pynchon’s V, in which the mysterious 
character known as “V” is presented in a number of guises, none of which is privileged as 
her “real” identity. Such critics also frequently mention metafiction as characteristic of 
postmodern literature, as key meta-fictional texts such as John Barth’s “Lost in the 
Funhouse” create explicit uncertainty over whether their characters are, within the story-
world, actual characters or mere literary constructs.  
 The texts explored in this dissertation lack such uncertainty, instead featuring 
clearly defined character identities. In this way, they have more in common with 
2 Such critics include Linda Hutcheon, who states that in postmodernism, “The perceiving subject is no 
longer assumed to be a coherent, meaning-generating entity” (252). Irving Howe writes that “the theme of 
personal identity, if it is to take on fictional substance, needs some kind of placement, a setting, in the 
world of practical affairs. And it is here that the ‘post-modern’ novelists run into serious troubles: the 
connection between subject and setting cannot always be made, and the ‘individual’ of their novels, 
because he lacks social definition and is sometimes a creature of literary or even ideological fiat, tends to 
be not very individualized” (29). Character’s such as Howie and Truman are, by contrast, extremely 
individualized. 
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traditional realist fiction than with the more avant-garde branches of postmodernism. 
They differ from traditional realism, however, in the extreme degree to which individual 
subjectivity is emphasized. In fact, they demonstrate avant-garde tendencies, but these 
tendencies are used in service to deep explorations of character subjectivity, rather than 
toward the depictions of systems that form much of the content of Pynchon’s and 
DeLillo’s respective oeuvres. For example, David Foster Wallace’s “The Soul Is Not a 
Smithy” is narrated from the perspective of a child who is preoccupied with an elaborate 
series of imagined fantasy scenarios as he sits in his grade-school classroom. The story’s 
narration mainly focuses on these fantasies, even as the child’s teacher begins threatening 
to murder the children in the class. Wallace’s story thus elides the tenets of traditional 
realism by ignoring the most important events of the story and instead delving deeply into 
the distracted mind of its protagonist. 
 Wallace’s story, in fact, highlights an important feature that these texts share with 
postmodernism, as traditionally conceived: the use of formal technique to implicitly 
disavow objectivity. Numerous critics cite this as one of, if not the, defining 
characteristics of postmodern aesthetics, echoing Jean-François Lyotard’s definition of 
“postmodern[ism]” as “incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv). Gerald Graff, for 
example, wrote in 1979, “In its literary sense, postmodernism may be defined as the 
movement within contemporary literature and criticism that calls into question the 
traditional claims of literature and art to truth and human value” (32). Jeremy Green has 
more recently reiterated the centrality of this skepticism to critical definitions, writing in 
2005 that postmodernism has often been defined according to its association with 
“‘antifoundationalist’ thinking in philosophy” (2). He writes that “this approach [to 
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defining postmodernism]…questions the basis of metaphysical certainty and challenges 
many of the presuppositions of Anglo-American analytic philosophy” (2).  
Wallace’s story, like the other texts discussed in this dissertation, demonstrates a 
commitment to this kind of questioning uncertainty; however, it approaches uncertainty 
from the opposite direction than do Pynchon, Gaddis, et al. Whereas those writers’ epic 
novels emphasize the mutability of personal identity and the power of globalizing 
economic and political systems to disrupt traditional claims to knowledge, Wallace’s 
story is so invested in a single, solidly defined personal identity and point of view that it 
almost completely elides information that, within the story-world, would be considered 
objective fact. In other words, where the most acclaimed works of avant-garde 
postmodernism once questioned objectivity by going big, these texts do so by going 
small. Even The Truman Show, a film whose setting and characters are mostly 
functionaries of a massive entertainment company bent on controlling the life of Truman, 
centers its monolithic entity’s aims around a single man’s consciousness. In fact, the 
film’s characters and setting are often meant to serve, for the viewer, as external 
manifestations of Truman’s psychology, making the film analogous to Baker’s and 
Wallace’s fictions, which overwhelm their narratives with the musings of individual 
characters’ minds. 
Ultimately, what I will demonstrate through this approach is that the authors in 
this study are largely preoccupied with what they see as the mind’s inherent idiosyncrasy, 
its tendency to create a vision of social and/or physical reality that is on some level 
distinct from that reality. Like Hogan, they portray the mind as connected to, but able to 
operate with a degree of independence from, its external surroundings. While the 
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prospect of this kind of “cognitive independence” is often bleak, suggesting as it does 
alienation and solipsism, some of the works under examination actually take an 
optimistic perspective. Baker’s novel is one example, portraying the isolation of the mind 
as an opportunity to develop personalized experiences of the world, ways of privately 
intuiting the minutiae of one’s surroundings that bring the author, as well as his 
characters, a strange kind of joy. By and large, however, the mind’s perceived isolation is 
a means toward exploring themes of loneliness, alienation, and paranoia. My argument 
posits that these thematic strains, which run through much of contemporary literary 
fiction, are products of a widespread conceptual distinction between mind and world.  
In arguing for this conceptual separation, I employ a method of criticism 
influenced by insights gleaned from cognitive science and the study of the mind. My 
approach thus bears similarities with other recent studies of fiction that focus on fictional 
minds, including Kay Young’s Imagining Minds, Robert Chodat’s Worldly Act and 
Sentient Things, and Brook Miller’s Self Consciousness in the Modern British Novel. 
These books all focus primarily on the particular ways in which minds are portrayed in 
different literary movements. My arguments similarly analyze the fictional minds 
contained in novels and film in order to understand the particular ways in which they are 
shaped by their creators.  
 I begin exploring these fictional minds in my first chapter, using David Markson’s 
final four novels (1996, 2001, 2004, 2007), which form a loose tetralogy, as an 
illustrative example of cognitive independence. These novels employ an innovative 
hybrid form that combines fiction and non-fiction, a combination which, I argue, leads to 
the kind of cognitive independence described above. While the novels combine fiction 
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and non-fiction, Markson keeps their fictional and non-fictional materials rigidly 
separated on the printed page, inserting large blocks of blank space between the novels’ 
fictional stories and non-fictional facts. He thus evokes a conceptual division between, on 
one hand, the minds depicted in the novels’ fictional material, and, on the other, the 
physical, material world evoked by the novels’ inclusion of non-fictional facts. I argue 
that Markson employs this conceptual distinction in order to depict the interrelatedness of 
text and history. His novels’ fictional narratives shape the presentation of non-fictional 
material at the same time as the non-fictional facts that they present shape the progression 
of the fictional narratives. Markson thus creates a fictional world in which the mind and 
the physical world are deeply symbiotic, yet conceptually separate. 
The dissertation continues with a study of Nicholson Baker’s The Mezzanine 
(1988). While critics of the novel have argued that Baker portrays a world of depthless, 
mass cultural “surfaces,” I counter that The Mezzanine demonstrates a deep engagement 
with character psychology by emphasizing the ways in which the mind of Howie, its 
young, white-collar protagonist, is distinct from the surrounding material world of his 
workplace. I argue that Howie views the mechanical nature of the objects that surround 
him as an ideal toward which to aspire. He admires the mechanical ingenuity of mass 
cultural products, and he desires to transform his own mind so that it operates in a 
similarly mechanical, automated fashion. The separation of mind and body is, for Baker, 
a way to evoke an image of a fictional mind enraptured by mass cultural mechanization. 
My next chapter moves on to a discussion of the role of the mind in the work of 
David Foster Wallace, a writer who admittedly admired Markson and whose verbose 
descriptions and use of footnotes suggest the influence of Baker. Wallace, as both a 
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fiction writer and a public figure, was preoccupied with what he saw as the isolating 
effects of American culture and the inevitable solipsism that attends human 
consciousness. Using the short story collection Oblivion (2004) as an exemplar of 
Wallace’s style, I argue that Wallace’s vision of alienation derives in large part from a 
conceptual separation, which he makes throughout his work, between the mind and its 
physical and social surroundings. The characters of Oblivion consistently demonstrate 
Wallace’s belief in the separateness of mind and body, and it is this very separateness 
that, in Wallace’s view, leads these characters to the kinds of depression and isolation 
that permeate the book. 
Finally, I turn in my last chapter to a discussion of film, in order to demonstrate 
the ways in which mind/world separation can be presented in a medium other than prose. 
Film, unlike literature, cannot isolate a character’s fictional mind by presenting narrative 
from a limited first-person perspective, because it almost inevitably displays information 
onscreen that is not being recounted exclusively by a single narrator. Filmmakers can, 
however, sometimes craft stories in such a way as to foreground the cognitive isolation of 
specific characters. As an illustrative example of such a screen narrative, I examine the 
popular, science fiction-influenced film, The Truman Show (1998), whose title character 
has, unbeknownst to him, been part of an elaborate reality television show his entire life. 
I argue that the film’s premise foregrounds Truman’s cognitive separation from his 
surroundings by making clear that his worldview and thought processes are almost 
entirely distinct from those of his friends and family, who are continually aware that they 
are part of a fictional program. Thus, the film’s prominent themes of paranoia and 
uncertainty result from Truman’s feeling of being separated or isolated, at the mental 
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level, from the world around him. I argue that it is this very separation that allows 
Truman to transform his consciousness, moving from a state of ignorant bliss to one of 
enlightened skepticism. 
These chapters, collectively, contribute to the field of contemporary literary 
studies through a process of close reading based on cognitive theory and the study of 
mind. In arguing for these texts’ portrayals of cognitive independence, I highlight a key, 
defining feature of this strain of contemporary fiction. Additionally, by basing my 
argument on fictional portrayals of mind/world separation, I aim to present this 
separation as an area for further inquiry. The approach of analyzing a text’s particular 
conception of the relationship between mind and world may be applied to other areas of 
literary and cultural studies.  
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Chapter Two: Inside and Outside: The Fiction/Non-Fiction Boundary in David 
Markson’s Tetralogy 
 
 This dissertation begins with a discussion of the work of David Markson, a writer 
who, in the late phase of his career, specialized in combining fictional narratives centered 
on lonely protagonists with compendia of factoids and anecdotes about artistic, literary, 
and cultural history. This late period began for Markson with 1988’s Wittgenstein’s 
Mistress, a novel structured as an extended monologue written by a woman who may or 
may not, depending on how one interprets her words, be the last person left alive on 
Earth. After Wittgenstein’s Mistress, Markson published four novels before his 2010 
death: Reader’s Block; This Is Not a Novel; Vanishing Point; and The Last Novel, which, 
taken together, form a loose tetralogy (Markson, in an interview with Michael Silverblatt, 
stated his desire to see them published as a single volume). These four novels, like 
Wittgenstein’s Mistress, all consist of short paragraphs that often appear disconnected. 
They also each contain only a single character, combining this central character’s 
narrative with various elements of cultural history, thereby emphasizing his connections 
to cultural collectives while making clear just how lonely and isolated he remains.  
 Markson’s tetralogy, however, does contain important differences that set it apart 
from Wittgenstein’s Mistress. Perhaps most significantly, while the earlier novel is 
written as a monologue, these later novels are written in an omniscient, third-person 
voice. This change in voice and point of view allows Markson to place greater emphasis 
on the historical facts that run through the novels, and to reduce the inherent limitations 
 
 
of writing through the eyes of an arguably insane protagonist. While the characters of the 
tetralogy fight their own battles with depression, isolation, and trauma, their perspectives 
are balanced by the more encompassing, omniscient viewpoint of the narrators. I argue 
that through aesthetic choices such as this, Markson’s tetralogy continues the exploration 
of isolation that he began in Wittgenstein’s Mistress while presenting a different take on 
the theme. Where the earlier novel saw the world’s cultural history become filtered 
through the subjective lens of its protagonist’s consciousness, the later tetralogy develops 
a more balanced approach, in which, even as historical narrative is subjectively 
interpreted by individuals protagonists, those protagonists find themselves being 
conversely absorbed into those same narratives. While these characters all feel lonely, 
cut-off from the world that surrounds them, their roles as component parts of a broad 
cultural history all become clear, as the novels demonstrate the ways in which these 
characters share their own life stories with those of the writers, thinkers, and other people 
who came before them in a tapestry of various, yet interconnected lives. At the same 
time, however, these novels portray historical narratives as inextricably connected to their 
protagonists’ own emotions and points of view. History and individual consciousness 
thus exist, in Markson’s tetralogy, in a symbiotic relationship, simultaneously 
determining one another in an endless cycle of influence. 
 I am not suggesting here that the very fact of these characters belonging to history 
is what makes them unique. After all, any novel with any historical scope at all will 
inevitably demonstrate that its characters are part of history, and any novel with more 
than one character will certainly demonstrate that that character belongs to a collective. I 
am arguing, however, that the form of Markson’s tetralogy foregrounds this historical 
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belonging, raising it to a unique level of thematic resonance. Markson, in combining the 
fictional narratives of his protagonists with non-fictional facts, draws a series of implicit 
relationships between the singular, fictional psychologies of his creations and the broader 
reality outside of his own writing. At the same time, he renders this broader reality 
subject to the whims of fictional narrative, as the selection of non-fictional facts that 
makes its way into these novels is clearly shaped by the needs of the narrative, reflecting 
as it does the states of the characters’ minds. The text foregrounds the interconnectedness 
of personal narrative and collective history by, paradoxically, rendering them utterly 
distinct. Markson’s tetralogy rigidly separates fiction from non-fiction by severing the 
two strands of prose into separate paragraphs. This severing enhances the sense of mental 
isolation built into the texts, as their protagonists all feel disconnected, at the 
psychological level, from the social world, an isolation rendered in part through the stark 
emptiness of Markson’s pages and the ways in which he distinguishes prose genres 
within his work. 
  One of the most striking instances of Markson making connections between the 
distinct realms of individualized narrative and collective history comes at the end of 
Reader’s Block, the first novel of the tetralogy. Reader’s Block, perhaps more than any of 
the other novels in the tetralogy, is a narrative about stalled momentum. The main plot 
thread centers around a character named Reader who is writing a book about a character 
named Protagonist. Reader begins to concoct some scenarios for Protagonist and some 
facts about Protagonist’s background. Mostly, however, Reader just wonders what to do 
with his story. In fact, much of the text of Reader’s Block consists of questions about 
Protagonist that demonstrate Reader’s uncertainty about the character, questions such as 
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the following: “Names for Protagonist’s children? If such? / Whereabouts? If known?” 
(49) As the novel begins to draw to a close, these questions become more emotionally 
evocative, as the text asks “Did it ever, once, enter even Protagonist’s bleakest 
conjecturings that he would finish out his life alone?” (188, italics original)  
 This question sets off the novel’s conclusion by establishing a relationship 
between Protagonist’s loneliness and his death. By the ending, Protagonist, as Markson 
puts it in a letter to Ben Underwood, is “probably a suicide” (99). Before reaching this 
end, however, the novel strings together a long list of names (a list that goes on for nearly 
a page and a half, but which has been abbreviated here), all of which belong to non-
diegetic fictional characters who themselves committed suicide: 
  Emma Bovary. 
  Anna Karenina. 
  Othello… 
  Phaedra. 
  Alcestis. 
  Launcelot. (189-90) 
Here, the novel steps away from both Protagonist’s narrative and the framing narrative of 
Reader’s composition process to simply present information in the barest way possible, 
using the form of a list. The novel isolates literary history from both Protagonist’s and 
Reader’s respective narratives by abandoning those narratives in favor of raw data. The 
information in this list implies, of course, the narrative event of suicide. Reader’s Block 
thus produces a correspondence between this external information and the limited 
perspective of its main narrative thread. Whereas Protagonist is only a single fictional 
character who has not yet even been sufficiently developed by his creator, the list implies 
that he exists as part of a long history of literary deaths, a history that extends beyond the 
boundaries of Reader’s Block’s diegesis. Protagonist’s is not a singular instance, but a 
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part of literary history. At the same time as this list makes Protagonist a part of history, 
however, it also suggests that literary history, as portrayed in Markson’s novel, is being 
relayed in accordance with Reader’s own creative process. Since Reader is creating a 
character who is committing suicide, the impression of literary history presented here 
follows suit, zeroing in on the suicidal theme. 
 Part of what makes Markson’s technique effective is that it does not absolutely 
privilege either fictional or non-fictional elements. In fact, each kind of information is 
emphasized in its own way. Markson makes the fictional elements appear more 
significant by crafting them into a continuous narrative thread, something he does only 
implicitly with non-fictional elements. The non-fictional elements, however, are given 
emphasis through their sheer volume; as Markson himself estimates, “In Reader's Block, 
I talk about the so-called Reader for roughly 20% of the book. In the last three, that figure 
[the different writer figure around which each novel is centered] is mentioned about 1½% 
of the time” (interview with Tayt Harlin). This way, the novels become neither first-
person fictions whose narration consists largely of historical anecdotes, nor compilations 
of historical anecdotes with an occasional fictional aside. Instead, Markson combines 
fiction and non-fiction to create a give-and-take between both types of literary elements. 
 Markson himself apparently came to different conclusions, over the course of the 
last part of his career, about the nature of these novels’ narration. In an interview with 
Tayt Harlin, he says of the central character of each novel of the tetralogy that “the 
intellectual odds and ends [Markson’s term for the non-fictional elements of his work] 
are meant to convey a portrait of what's in his mind. My object is to create him, too, and 
it seems to work.” Here, the author suggests that everything in these novels is the product 
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of a single narrating perspective, that Reader, to take one example, is the character who 
makes factual statements about literary characters and historical figures throughout 
Reader’s Block. In an interview with Alexander Laurence however, he compares 
Reader’s Block to his previous work, stating “Wittgenstein's Mistress is a monologue, and 
the new book is not even a monologue. It's a semi-non-fiction, semi-fiction3.” Markson 
characterizes Reader’s Block as “not a monologue,” suggesting that its contents are not 
the product of a single narrative voice. He also applies the invented genre tags “semi-
non-fiction” and “semi-fiction,” further suggesting that much of the material in his book 
is indeed intended as non-fiction, not as the diegetic statements of a fictional character.4 
 Markson’s decision to privilege both kinds of material means that on one hand, 
the characters are absorbed into the broad scope of history that Markson sketches in his 
novels and on the other, the historical material is filtered through, and shaped by, the 
needs of narrative. The long list of fictional suicides near the end of Reader’s Block 
demonstrates both of these results; even as Protagonist’s fate gets lost in the shuffle of 
multiple pages of names, the names themselves reflect Protagonist’s narrative fate, 
3 Vanishing Point and The Last Novel each notably refers to its central character’s writing as “semifictional 
semifiction” (93, 83, respectively). Markson often incorporated snippets from conversations and book 
reviews into the novels that make up the tetralogy. 
4 The books’ jacket copy present similar uncertainty over the novels’ narrative voice. The back cover of 
Reader’s Block states: “In this spellbinding, utterly unconventional fiction, an aging author who is 
identified only as Reader contemplates the writing of a novel. As he does, other matters insistently crowd 
his mind—literary and cultural anecdotes, endless quotations attributed and not, scholarly curiosities.” The 
description suggests that all of the material in the novel consists of Reader’s thoughts. The back cover of 
This Is Not a Novel, however, describes the book’s plot as follows:  
 
An author, called only ‘Writer,’ is said to be ‘weary unto death of making up stories,’ not to 
mention inventing characters or contemplating plot or setting or theme—and yet is determined to 
seduce the reader into turning pages and ‘getting somewhere.’ What follows is then threaded 
through a sequence of extraordinary literary and artistic anecdotes, glittering quotations, and 
astonishing details about the travail…of the creative life.  
 
This description suggests that the “anecdotes” that make up much of the novel’s text exist independently of 
Writer’s story, as the main narrative is “threaded through” such anecdotes. 
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implying his suicide even while shifting the text away from it. Even the suicide itself is 
never described directly, but only implied, as conveyed in the following passage: 
  Toward what final grievous contemplation amid the disarray? 
  The sun will run out of hydrogen and commence to die in approximately 
 one billion, one hundred million years.  
 
In the interim, what more for the elderly man in the house at the beach but 
to saunter out among the sandpipers and the gulls one afternoon, and stand for a 
time abstractedly in late autumn solitude, and then walk unremarkably into the 
sea? 
 
In the interim, what more for the elderly man in the house at the cemetery 
but to pause at his accustomed window one afternoon, and gaze for a time 
abstractedly at the ranks of still white stone beyond, and then turn unremarkably 
to the gas? 
 
And Reader? And Reader? (192-3) 
Markson states that at the end of the book, “The character that Reader creates suddenly 
bifurcates into the one on the beach and the one in the cemetery. He has nothing left but 
suicide” (interview with Alexander Laurence). Reader’s character is now no longer given 
even the minimally descriptive name of Protagonist and is instead referred to as two 
different characters (or perhaps as a single character in two different locations). His 
already generic identity has been further dispersed into narrative fragments, narrative 
fragments which are themselves further dispersed into the broad swath of non-fictional 
history outlined in Reader’s Block. In fact, even in the middle of the novel’s concluding 
death, Markson makes sure to balance fictional and non-fictional elements by inserting a 
brief, factual aside. Notably, as Reader’s narrative reaches a tragic apex, the book’s non-
fictional threads reach apocalyptic heights when Markson presents statistics about the 
sun’s impending death. Reader’s Block’s death scene, the scene which typically draws a 
novel’s highest levels of pathos (as suggested by the list of fictional suicides) is both 
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overshadowed and mirrored by Markson’s use of non-fiction. The statistics about the 
sun’s demise show that any death, let alone a fictional one, is but a small part of a larger 
process of decay, yet at the same time, they reflect and amplify the first-person anguish 
felt by Protagonist and, by extension, Reader, whose possible suicide is implied by the 
repeated question “And Reader?” 
 This technique is prominent throughout all four of the novels that make up the 
tetralogy. Each contains broad, sweeping non-fictional threads which both mirror and 
place into relief the more minor details of the fictional narratives. Many of these non-
fictional threads run throughout the entire tetralogy. The most prominent of such threads 
is a litany of descriptions of the deaths of famous people, many of whom are artists and 
authors, a thread which most deeply permeates Reader’s Block but which is important to 
the other three books as well. Markson’s novels also sketch a history of racial and ethnic 
hatred and discrimination, most notably in a series of statements that follow the form 
“_______ was an anti-Semite,” statements which are implicitly connected to a few 
intermittent descriptions of the horrors of the Holocaust. Some of these are oblique, as 
when the text simply lists a series of Nazi death camps, as follows: “Auschwitz. Dachau. 
Treblinka. Maidanek. Sobibor. Chelmno. Mauthausen. Ravensbrück. Birkenau. Belzec. 
Theresienstadt” (58). Others are more explicit, as in a series of descriptions of famous 
figures’ experiences. For example, the text notes that “Robert Desnos, who had been 
tortured by the Gestapo for working with the French Resistance, survived periods in 
Auschwitz and Buchenwald” (158). A multitude of similar examples abound. 
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The Power of Failing 
 Such historical atrocities and faded lives run parallel to the concerns of the 
novels’ main characters, concerns which include their own failing or doomed artistic 
projects. In Reader’s Block, Reader faces constant uncertainty over what to do with his 
Protagonist, while in This Is Not a Novel, a character named “Writer” attempts to 
compose a novel with no story, no characters, and no clearly identifiable genre, only for 
the text to ask, at the end, whether Writer’s project was “possibly nothing more than a 
fundamentally recognizable genre all the while, no matter Writer averred?” (189), 
suggesting that Writer, despite his best intentions, has failed to achieve his literary 
ambitions. Reader’s Block thus emphasizes the theme of artistic failure, a theme which is 
even more explicitly connected to death in Vanishing Point and The Last Novel, the final 
two novels of the tetralogy, which feature more frequent references to the physical issues 
of aging, infirmity, and senility. In all of these novels, the writer characters’ failures and 
rejections thus become parts of broad histories of rejection and hatred, while the novels’ 
depictions of death and hatred reflect those characters’ experiences of failure and pain 
within the narrative. 
 Markson depicts different degrees and types of pain throughout the tetralogy. 
Alongside the large-scale historical atrocity of the Holocaust, Markson interweaves a 
multitude of more mundane experiences of suffering and humiliation. Many of these 
experiences take the form of scalding judgments that artists have received, both from 
other artists and from critics. For example, This Is Not a Novel tells us that “At least one 
Boston newspaper suggested in all seriousness that Whitman should be horsewhipped for 
Leaves of Grass,” and The Last Novel tells us that Auden referred to Poe as “An unmanly 
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sort of man whose love life seems to have been largely confined to crying in laps and 
playing house” (7). The novels also contain multiple descriptions of artists’ physical 
suffering, poverty, and destitution. For example, Vanishing Point tells us that “Swinburne 
suffered epileptic seizures,” and Reader’s Block notes that “At thirty-nine, when his first 
wife died, Monet was so poverty-stricken he could not afford the few centimes to redeem 
a pawned locket that he knew she wished to be buried with, and had to borrow” (144-5).  
 The varieties of painful experiences included in both the tetralogy’s fictional and 
non-fictional material produce a series of implied connections. The physical pain felt by 
Novelist in The Last Novel is connected to the failure of Writer, in This Is Not a Novel, to 
produce the kind of work he wants to, a failure connected to the regret and failure of 
artists across the historical spectrum. This failure is further connected to poverty and 
rejection, which are related to death. Death and hatred form the background of historical 
atrocities like the Holocaust and the great wars of human history (The novels frequently 
reference events from both World Wars). This is another way in which the tetralogy 
transforms events from its characters’ lives into components of a rich historical tapestry 
while simultaneously using historical events to reflect these characters’ experiences. 
 Another way that Markson turns history into the substance of narrative and 
narrative into the substance of history is to describe events and phenomena that highlight 
the arbitrariness of historical narratives, thereby questioning these narratives while 
simultaneously affirming their power to shape history. Such phenomena include instances 
in which some of kind of accident has radically, yet almost unnoticeably, altered the 
historical narrative that has passed down over time. For example, Reader’s Block tells us 
that “Throughout the Middle Ages, often no more than a single manuscript of certain 
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classics existed. One leaking monastery roof and the Satyricon could have been lost 
forever, for instance,” and that “Thomas Traherne died in 1674. The manuscripts of his 
poems, never before published, were come upon on a bookseller’s cart in 1897” (14, 61). 
Vanishing Point tells us that “Copies of all of the now long lost plays of Sophocles and 
Euripides still existed at Constantinople until 1203. / When the city’s churches and 
libraries were indiscriminately ravaged and torched by the abortive Fourth Crusade” (52). 
Such examples either explicitly state or at least imply an alternate set of historical 
circumstances in which the same texts are published but end up being forgotten, lost to 
humanity’s collective historical memory. In such alternate circumstances, the same 
historical events would occur, but a different historical narrative would be passed down 
over time. 
 Other passages suggest these kinds of alternate narratives less stridently, but 
imply them nonetheless. The novels of the tetralogy often mention then-contemporary 
judgments of artists that have subsequently been eclipsed or revised over time. For 
instance, Vanishing Point states: “The best dramatic writer since the days of Shakespeare 
and Massinger, Walter Scott called Joanna Baillie. / Who was forgotten before her death” 
(54). Again, such a note suggests an alternate set of historical circumstances, one in 
which the literary history passed down by Western culture reserves a more prominent 
place for Baillie. Vanishing Point presents a contrasting scenario immediately afterward, 
when it notes that “Fragonard was so little known at his death that there would appear to 
have been no obituary anywhere” (54). Once again, the passage suggests an alternate 
history, this time one in which Fragonard is forgotten, rather than remembered. It is also 
worth mentioning here that the “alternate histories” suggested by Markson in these 
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passages are related to the larger themes of discrimination and hatred that run throughout 
the tetralogy. An example demonstrating this theme occurs in The Last Novel, which 
quotes Thomas Jefferson as saying that “The appointment of a woman to public office is 
an innovation for which the public is not prepared, nor am I” (164). Jefferson’s statement 
suggests a broader alternate history in which women who were denied entry to public 
office could have served. The example of Joanna Baillie presents a more specific 
example of a person who was forgotten, despite her talents, because of her gender. 
Markson reinforces the implication of gender discrimination by immediately contrasting 
her situation with that of a man, in the case of Fragonard. Several of the “alternate 
histories” that Markson suggests in his tetralogy revolve around highlighting instances in 
which women’s works have been excluded from the literary canon. 
 Markson’s suggestions of alternative histories emphasize the distinction between 
actual historical events and the narratives that accompany such events. An event can 
occur, yet can be forgotten, excised from the narrative, due to circumstances beyond the 
control of the people involved in that event’s occurrence. If Traherne’s book hadn’t 
happened to have been found at a book sale, for instance, it may have been forgotten 
forever. If Baillie’s works had been written by a man, they may have ended up being 
more widely read. Conversely, because Traherne’s book was found, and because the 
Satyricon was not leaked upon, these texts have been preserved for posterity. At the same 
time as these examples foreground the distinction between events and narrative, however, 
highlighting the circumstantial nature of these works’ survival in the public 
consciousness also foregrounds their inseparability, since if it weren’t for the historical 
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narratives that have kept these works alive, people wouldn’t even know about them in the 
first place.  
 This state of affairs mirrors the relationship between fiction and non-fiction in 
Markson’s tetralogy. The style that Markson adapted for these novels emphasizes the 
distinction between genres by stating historical, non-fictional information as series of 
facts, while framing narrative, fictional information as part of a fictional narrative by 
centering it around obviously fictional characters. At the same time, the fictional and 
non-fictional elements are closely intertwined, paralleling one another closely. The 
ending of Reader’s Block demonstrates this parallel movement by escalating the literary-
historical death count at the same time as Protagonist and Reader move toward what 
become their inevitable ends.  
 The other novels of the tetralogy rely on a similar approach, with some variation. 
Just as Reader’s Block follows a main character who is struggling to compose a piece of 
writing, so does This Is Not a Novel. However, Writer, the main character of This Is Not a 
Novel, has grander ambitions than simply writing a novel. Instead, he wants to do 
something far more difficult, by writing “A novel with no intimation of story 
whatsoever” (2). This novel would also have “no characters…no sequence of events…no 
indicated passage of time…no setting…no so-called furniture…no overriding central 
motivations…no conflicts and/or confrontations…no social themes, i.e., no picture of 
society…no depiction of contemporary manner and/or morals” (2-7, italics original). 
Thus, the fictional plot of Markson’s novel involves Writer’s quest to create a novel with 
no novelistic elements (hence, of course, the semi-ironic title This Is Not a Novel). The 
text continues to enumerate Writer’s goals, while the non-fictional elements respond to 
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these goals in a way that, at first, appears to contradict Writer’s story, as in the following 
passage: 
  Ultimately, a work of art without even a subject, Writer wants. 
  There is no work of art without a subject, said Ortega. 
  A novel tells a story, said E.M. Forster. 
If you can do it, it ain’t bragging, said Dizzy Dean. (9-10) 
Immediately after reaching the point of highest emphasis in describing Writer’s goals, the 
text produces a non-fictional response that immediately undercuts those goals. The Dizzy 
Dean quotation that appears immediately afterward continues a playful back-and-forth 
between Writer’s ambitious goal to subvert literary conventions and the skepticism and 
sense of impossibility that greets the announcement of such a goal. Markson makes it 
appear as though there are cross-purposes at work here that run across both the fictional 
and non-fictional elements of the text. 
 After the opening pages detailing Writer’s goals, the novel proceeds to describe 
some of his difficulties in achieving those goals. These difficulties include an existential 
crisis, as the narrator asks, “Does Writer even exist? / In a book without characters?” (12) 
Writer is caught within the uncertain fiction/non-fiction divide that permeates Markson’s 
tetralogy. He is not sure whether he actually exists, and in fact, he seems to assume that 
even if he does exist, he does so only within the fictional world he is composing. 
Thankfully for Writer, he quickly solves this crisis by finding some answers to the 
question of whether or not he is fictional, as the narrator notes, “Obviously Writer exists. 
/ Not being a character but the author, here. / Writer is writing, for heaven’s sake” (13, 
italics original). Writer realizes that he exists, because he is the one creating this fictional 
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world, not one who is caught up in it. He also validates this realization when he notices 
that he “can have headaches” and “does have headaches,” as well as when the text refers 
to “Writer sitting and/or talking to himself being no more than renewed verification that 
he exists” (14, 15). 
 These passages thus emphasize that on one hand, the division between the 
fictional and non-fictional worlds is absolute, but on the other, fictional worlds can, for 
Writer, feel like they are a part of the actual world. The non-fictional text of This Is Not a 
Novel reflects this theme of blending these distinct worlds, as in the following anecdote: 
 When I saw a performance of this play at Drury Lane, a beautiful pale-
 faced Englishwoman stood behind me in the box and wept profusely at the end 
 of the fourth act, and called out repeatedly: The poor man is wronged. 
 Wrote Heinrich Heine. (18) 
Markson’s novel also refers to “The inexplicable logic by which Thackeray convinced 
himself that Desdemona actually did have an affair with Cassio” (23). Both of these 
passages serve as examples of instances in which a reader or observer has reacted to a 
fictional narrative as though it were real, or at least as if it were a part of the non-fictional 
world, which Writer does, at least momentarily, with his own work when he wonders 
whether or not he actually exists. 
 This notion, that fiction can feel like non-fiction, reinforces the connections, 
which run throughout This Is Not a Novel (as well as the rest of the tetralogy) between 
fictional and non-fictional material. Markson both strengthens and expands these 
connections as the novel reaches its conclusion. Though there is no way to definitively 
divide this novel into sections (It contains no breaks, chapter or otherwise), Markson does 
seem to signal that he is working toward a conclusion when he starts to bring together the 
book’s major themes and narrative strands in the following passage: 
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  Does Writer still have headaches? And/or backaches? 
  As from the start, affording no more than renewed verification that he 
  exists. 
  In a book without characters. 
  Not being a character but the author, here. 
  Turning older or no. 
  Writer is writing, is all. Still. (178, italics original) 
This passage repeats much of the material from the beginning of the novel: Writer is 
writing a book without characters, and he verifies his existence through his physical 
pains. The key addition here is the new information that Writer is “turning older.” The 
passage thus establishes an implicit connection between Writer’s aging and his ambitious 
writing project. In fact, the text suggests that Writer uses this project as a way to fend off 
death, and perhaps achieve some sense of immortality, by following the news that Writer 
is “turning older” with the assertion that “Writer is writing.”  
 The intertwining themes of aging/death and artistic ambition/failure run 
throughout the rest of the novel in both the fictional and non-fictional material. From this 
point on, the text informs us that Writer suffers from a variety of ailments, including 
“tendonitis…[a] pinched nerve…sciatica…[a] silent heart attack…[a] right lobectomy 
and resected ribs,” and finally, on the last page, “Writer’s cancer” (180-90). At the same 
time as Writer is apparently moving closer and closer to death, while also trying to 
preserve his legacy in his writing, the non-fictional material reflects these dual themes 
and further reinforces their connection. The narrator refers to Proust’s bronchial 
pneumonia, Bach’s stroke, and Donne’s consumption, diseases that caused these artists to 
die, before relating three quotations about immortality, in the following passage: 
33 
 
  When the city I extol shall have perished, when the men to whom I sing 
 shall have faded into oblivion, my words shall remain. 
  Said Pindar. 
 
Non omnis moriar. I shall not wholly die 
  Said Horace. 
 
  Per saecula Omnia vivam. I shall live forever. 
  Said Ovid. (188) 
 
These quotations suggest that a person’s works can live on after that person’s death. 
Here, Markson really drives home the connection between Writer’s impending death and 
his ambitious project. Work, for Writer, is a way to stave off death by making him, in a 
sense, immortal. Unfortunately for Writer, one can never know whether this work will be 
remembered or forgotten, as is made clear by the narrator’s presentation of a series of 
quotations that suggest that, rather than live on, a person’s work may simply be forgotten, 
lost to history: 
  Tell me, I pray thee, how fares the human race? If new roofs be risen in 
 the ancient cities? Whose empire is it that now sways the world? 
 
  —Asked one of the fourth-century desert monks, the names of most 
 forever unrecorded. 
 
The time is close when you will have forgotten all things; and when all 
things will have forgotten you. 
  Said Marcus Aurelius. (188-9) 
 
These quotations suggest an uncertainty, on Writer’s part, over the status of his work 
after his death. He is unsure whether it will live on, providing him immortality, or be 
forgotten, leaving his death as nothing more than the end of a life, with no broader 
significance. The theme of historical contingency that ran throughout Reader’s Block 
returns in these passages, but Markson applies this theme much more directly to his main 
character. Writer experiences historical contingency as a part of his own death, rather 
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than that of one of his fictional characters, wrestling with the uncertainty of whether or 
not his ambitious writing project will stave away his demise for just a bit longer. 
 As in Reader’s Block, the non-fictional material not only reflects and reinforces 
the fictional narrative; it also absorbs and meshes with it. In this case, Writer, who began 
This Is Not a Novel by optimistically undertaking the task of writing a novel that subverts 
all of the accepted conventions of Western literature, now finds that his attempt is merely 
a small part of a larger history of such attempts. Writer is certainly not the first artist to 
try to produce revolutionary work, and whether he succeeds or fails (and it increasingly 
looks like he is going to fail), he will neither be the first artist to succeed at his task nor 
the first to fail. This absorption into non-fictional history, along with the more general 
(and certainly more pertinent) themes of failure and death, is wrapped up in the final lines 
of the novel, which read: 
  Western wind, when will thou blow 
   The small rain down can rain? 
 
  It is the business of the novelist to create characters. 
  Said Alphonse Daudet 
 
  Action and plot may play a minor part in a modern novel, but they cannot 
 be entirely dispensed with. 
  Said Ortega. 
 
  If you can do it, it ain’t bragging. 
 
Or was it possibly nothing more than a fundamentally recognizable genre 
all this while, no matter what Writer averred? 
 
Nothing more or less than a read? 
 
Simply an unconventional, generally melancholy though sometimes even 
playful now-ending read? 
 
About an old man’s preoccupations. 
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Dizzy Dean died of a heart attack. 
 
Writer’s cancer. 
 
Christ, if my love were in my arms 
 And I in my bed again! 
 
Then I go out at night to paint the stars. 
Says a van Gogh letter. 
 
Farewell and be kind. (189-90, italics original) 
This conclusion uses a new set of quotations to repeat the general idea, proposed near the 
beginning of This Is Not a Novel, that a novel must have plot, characters, a story, etc. 
However, while such an idea, at the beginning of Markson’s book, seemed a way to 
playfully contradict Writer’s ambitions, here it reads as an assertion of failure. Just as the 
vagaries of historical contingency have absorbed Writer’s attempts at a new art form, so 
have the rules of literature absorbed his work, as well. Where Writer attempted to write a 
story with no plot, he has, despite his intentions, stumbled into the most dramatic plot 
resolution of all: death. He has also, in his very attempt to produce a story with no 
characters, become something of an interesting character himself. His curious 
motivations and subsequent failures drive the narrative momentum of This Is Not a 
Novel, which quickly builds up steam as it reaches its dramatic conclusion. Writer’s 
questions reinforce his sense of failure. He wonders if he has, after all, produced a work 
in a “recognizable genre,” a “simply unconventional” book that is “nothing more or less 
than a read.”  
 Laura Sims believes that this section actually signals a kind of success for Writer. 
As evidence, she cites the line “If you can do it, it ain’t bragging,” a quotation from 
baseball player Dizzy Dean that is repeated earlier in the novel. She writes, “The Dizzy 
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Dean quotation seems muted here, sandwiched between these ambivalent revisions. But 
if what we have witnessed is not, after all, an eradication of the novel form, it is at the 
very least a significant reinvention, and therefore gives Markson just cause to brag” (64). 
I read this quotation, however, as an ironic undercutting of Writer’s sense of futility. 
After all, Markson conspicuously mentions Dean’s death shortly after quoting him, 
reinforcing the inevitability of death at the end of a life of difficult work.5 The last few 
lines of the novel suggest that Writer is turning away from his ambitions and accepting 
his oncoming demise. The text subtly evokes methods other than work for bestowing 
meaning on life, first in the form of love, suggested by the line “Christ, if my love were 
in my arms” (lyrics from the Middle English song “Western Wind,” which are continued 
from the earlier lyrics “Western wind, when will thou blow / The small rain down can 
rain?”), then in the form of religion, suggested by the van Gogh quotation, the omitted 
beginning of which reads “And it does me good to do what’s difficult. That doesn’t stop 
me having a tremendous need for, shall I say the word — for religion…” (letter to Theo 
van Gogh, italics original). Finally, the text suggests that Writer is giving up the search 
5 Markson discusses his references to Dizzy Dean in an interview with Conjunctions: 
 
In This is Not a Novel, I quote Dizzy Dean, the old ballplayer, who was very colorful and 
massacred the language when he was an announcer, but was very popular and a great pitcher. In 
the beginning of the book, I quote E.M. Forster and other writers on how a novel has to follow 
certain rules and how you can't write a novel without doing this and that. And then I throw in 
Dizzy Dean: "If you can do it, it ain't bragging," contradicting what these authors have said about 
the nature of fiction. Late along in the book, after I've written an entire novel breaking all the 
rules, I quote some more people on them, and then, without attribution this time, I throw in the 
Dizzy Dean line again, "If you can do it, it ain't bragging." But I knew it would be forgotten, and 
people don't know who Dizzy Dean is anymore. So I made sure I dropped in—let's say a third of 
the way and two-thirds of the way through—other Dizzy Dean references. One of them is a 
Marianne Moore quotation about him, and one is an anecdote about Ezra Pound, how, when he 
was locked up in a cage at Pisa during the second World War, his exercise was to swing a stick 
like a baseball bat. I worked a mention of Dizzy Dean into that. And then, because I had that list of 
deaths throughout—this one died from this, this one died from that—I put in "Dizzy Dean died of 
a heart attack," and this just a few pages after that unattributed quotation occurs for the second 
time. 
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for deep significance and accepting his fate, ending with the simple exhortation to 
“Farewell and be kind.”  
 
Autobiography in Markson’s Tetralogy 
 As the tetralogy proceeds, Markson continues to blend genres by incorporating an 
increasing amount of autobiographical material into his work. This material lends greater 
complexity to the correspondences between worlds that Markson develops in Reader’s 
Block and This Is Not a Novel, where the factual world described by the author’s non-
fictional material both reflects and absorbs the fictional narratives that he creates. By 
inserting his own persona more directly, and more explicitly, into the text, Markson 
makes it so that the fictional and historical materials in his novels not only interact with 
each other, but with his own personal history, as well. Historical facts and fictional 
narratives become ways for Markson to express his own opinions and personal 
experiences. At the same time, fiction and history also absorb Markson’s personal life, to 
the point where this life becomes a part of both. Hints of the tetralogy’s autobiographical 
underpinnings emerge in This Is Not a Novel, in a passage that conspicuously parallels 
Markson’s own life: 
Your last novel was a flop. You’ve got two wonderful children depending 
on you. Don’t you think it’s time to consider doing something more financially 
responsible in your life? 
 
This is also even an autobiography, if Writer says so. (53) 
The details developed in this passage coincide with Markson’s life; he did have two 
children, and he did have trouble getting his novels published, most notably receiving 
fifty-four rejections for Wittgenstein’s Mistress (interview with Joseph Tabbi 107). 
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Markson also follows this apparently autobiographical detail by bringing in Writer’s 
claim that his book is “even an autobiography,” if he says so. Writer’s various generic 
categories for his work form a recurring motif in This Is Not a Novel; he variously refers 
to his work as “a sequence of cantos awaiting numbering,” “a continued heap of riddles,” 
“a polyphonic opera,” and “a disquisition on the maladies of the life of art,” in addition to 
numerous other descriptions (23, 70, 73, 86). Placing the tag “autobiography” in such 
close proximity to this statement about dim literary prospects suggests a correspondence 
with Markson’s own life story. 
 This autobiographical content is given new significance through repetition and re-
contextualization. Later on in This Is Not a Novel, the text reads: 
Writer incidentally doing his best here—insofar as his memory allows—
not to repeat things he has included in his earlier work. 
Meaning in this instance the four hundred and fifty or more deaths that 
were mentioned in his last book also… 
 
Your last novel was a flop. 
 
All of this preoccupation implying little more, presumably, than that 
Writer is turning older… 
 
Though with Writer also now recalling the refrain from Dunbar’s Lament 
for the Makers, about the deaths of such as Chaucer and Lydgate and Henryson 
and Gower: 
Timor mortis conturbat me. 
The fear of death distresses me. (147-8) 
This passage begins with what clearly appears to be a direct reference to Markson’s 
previous work in Reader’s Block, mentioning the “four hundred and fifty or more deaths” 
that occurred in Writer’s last book. This line thus connects Writer to Markson, the author, 
even more directly, a connection that continues when Markson repeats the line “Your last 
novel was a flop” right before mentioning Writer’s preoccupation with getting older. This 
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section thus brings together Markson’s own life with Writer’s story, along with the 
themes of literary failure and death, themes which are further emphasized by the 
references (many of which I have replaced here with ellipses) to other pieces of literature 
and to other famous deaths sprinkled throughout this passage. Finally, Writer thinks 
directly about his own fear of death, making it difficult not to interpret this passage as a 
way for Markson to both fictionalize his own fear through the character of Writer and to 
place this fear in the context of a historical laundry list of famous deaths, as he does when 
he recalls Dunbar’s laments for “Chaucer and Lydgate and Henryson and Gower.”  
 While This Is Not a Novel (and, to a lesser extent, Reader’s Block) includes some 
details and basic plot elements that appear to have been adapted from Markson’s life, 
Markson’s autobiographical material becomes both more specific and more prominent in 
the last two novels of the tetralogy. Vanishing Point, which appeared after This Is Not a 
Novel, is largely a retelling of Markson’s own artistic practices, corresponding more 
directly with the author’s life than do Writer’s struggles in This Is Not a Novel. Vanishing 
Point begins with the statement “Author has finally started to put his notes into 
manuscript form” (1). The novel goes on to provide some skeletal details of Author’s 
writing process and his current state of health, noting that he has been “scribbling notes 
on three-by-five-inch index cards,” he has “been procrastinating,” he experiences a “lack 
of energy,” and he has spent a lot of his writing time not by typing, but by simply 
“shuffling and re-arranging…the index cards” (1, 3, 4, 6, 8). While Reader’s Block 
focuses largely on the content of Reader’s writing project, and This Is Not a Novel 
focuses on Writer’s general goals, Vanishing Point is more concerned with the specific 
details of what Author is doing and feeling as he writes. This shift is indicative of a more 
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general shift in focus away from the work itself and to the person producing the work. As 
Françoise Palleau-Papin notes, “The writer of the previous novel is now called Author, 
and the change is meaningful. The word ‘writer’ insists on the work of writing, while 
‘author’ draws our attention to the authority of the writer who signs his name to the 
book” (252). Markson uses this shift in naming to signal a shift towards the increased 
importance of autobiography in his final two novels. 
 Markson’s autobiography shines through the text in the way that these passages 
from Vanishing Point echo his own writing process and his then-current concerns. 
Vanishing Point describes its main character’s composition process as one of compiling 
and re-arranging a series of three-by-five-inch note cards. This is how Markson himself 
compiled notes for his late novels, as he outlines in an interview with Tayt Harlin: “I use 
index cards. I store them in the tops of a couple of shoes boxes. If I made a stack of them, 
they'd probably be about two feet tall. I'm constantly shuffling.” Vanishing Point also 
demonstrates a more pointed, and more prominent, concern with aging and its effects on 
Author’s work, a concern which apparently preoccupied Markson during this period of 
his life. In fact, an excerpt from an interview with Joey Rubin from July 2005, about one-
and-a-half years after the publication of Vanishing Point, contains passages that appear as 
though they could have come directly from the novel. Responding to a question about 
how much of a factor age plays in his reading habits, Markson tells the interviewer about 
his “damned medical problems,” his increasing need to rest, his tendency to forget names 
and words, and his growing sense that his fading mental acuity prevents his work from 
attaining its previous level of quality. These comments demonstrate that for Markson, 
aging was painful not only for its effect on the body but for its effects on the mind and on 
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the process of producing literary work. The connections between Markson’s life and the 
character of Author thus strengthen the connections, apparent throughout the trilogy, 
between aging, death, and the struggles that attend the creative process. Whereas in This 
Is Not a Novel, writing was a way for Writer to fight off death and aspire to immortality, 
in Vanishing Point, Author has more modest goals, finding that even getting started on 
his work is a struggle, due to the pain and loss of energy that attend his aging. This 
struggle reflects Markson’s own during the end of his life. 
 The rigors of age also lead Vanishing Point to present non-fictional material 
differently than do the previous novels of the tetralogy. Vanishing Point still consists 
largely of factoids and quotations, often related without direct intervention from the main 
character. It also includes multiple instances, however, in which Author’s presence 
intrudes on the presentation of facts, as his hazy, fading memory causes him to remark on 
his uncertainty and forgetfulness. The novel establishes a pattern of such instances, 
beginning with the question: 
  Why does it seem like the earliest fragment of American history that 
 Author can remember ever having learned— 
  That Dolley Madison saved Gilbert Stuart’s portrait of George 
 Washington when the British burned the White House in 1814? (21) 
 
Here, Author trudges as far back as he can go through his past by trying to figure out the 
earliest fact he can possibly remember learning. The passage contains multiple hedges 
that suggest the uncertainty of Author’s memory; he is unsure why it seems like the 
earliest fragment he can remember having learned. 
 In instances such as this, facts are thus presented not with objective certainty, but 
as pieces of Author’s mental life that are slipping away from him. Later in the story, the 
text presents more questions about Author’s mental life: 
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  Whose tale, locked for some decades, now, in Author’s memory?— 
  Of someone visiting at an old people’s home and noticing a woman 
 beyond an unclosed bathroom door—scrubbing her face in a toilet bowl. 
 
  And why particularly indelible? (48-9). 
The tale sketched here is notably bare; in fact, what is presented is less the plot of a story 
and more a hazy stream of details from a single scene. Markson’s use of the word 
“locked” to describe the tale’s status in Author’s memory is evocative, suggesting, with a 
single word, what Vanishing Point establishes throughout; that Author’s memory is a vast 
storehouse of facts to which he himself lacks complete access. This passage also presents 
multiple levels of ambiguity, as Author wonders not only whose tale this is, but why it 
has stuck with him.  
 Instances such as this set up a pattern that runs through Vanishing Point. While 
the novel’s format is similar to This Is Not a Novel, in that it intersperses snippets of its 
main character’s fictional narrative among non-fictional material for, according to 
Markson “only about 1½%” of the book (as opposed to the “roughly 20% of [Reader’s 
Block],” the content of these snippets focuses less on Author’s work and more on his 
struggles to dredge up facts from the storehouse of his memory (interview with Tayt 
Harlin). He “paus[es] to recall” the ways that people told time before the invention of 
watches, he asks himself “why…it seem[s] odd…that Yeats and Kipling were born in the 
same year,” and he wonders “why [he] does…not know if what used to be named Arbor 
Day is still celebrated” (52, 100, 132). In the tetralogy’s earlier volumes, the non-fictional 
material absorbed the primary narratives, turning Reader’s and Writer’s fictional 
concerns into components of a broader history. Non-fiction served as a way for 
Markson’s characters and, by extension, Markson himself, to connect with the world. In 
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Vanishing Point, the non-fictional material does often serve this function, but the text 
also emphasizes Author’s disconnection from the world, documenting his attempts and 
struggles to recall and re-organize his memories. 
 Not only does Author have trouble connecting to the world because of his 
inability to remember; he also has difficulty adequately communicating his ideas, a 
difficulty which underlies the tetralogy’s overarching theme of the struggle to write. This 
communicative difficulty becomes more and more apparent as Vanishing Point draws to 
a close, starting around page 178, which begins: 
  Selah, which marks the ends of verses in the Psalms, but the Hebrew 
 meaning of which is unknown. 
 
  And probably indicates no more than pause, or rest. 
 
  Why does Author wish it implied more—or might stand for some ultimate 
 effacement, even?... 
 
  Selah. Absolutely, all the illimitable connotations of Einstein’s cosmic Oy, 
 vey Author hereby personally endows it with—a terminal desolation and despair. 
 
  Done? Done. Beware Selah. (178, italics original) 
 
Author struggles here because the language available to him isn’t able to express the 
ideas that he has in mind. Much as Writer, in This Is Not a Novel, found that his artistic 
ambitions were doomed to failure, Author finds that he is unable to make his meaning 
clear. His solution to this problem is to simply decide for himself what “Selah” is going 
to mean. Even in doing so, however, he finds it necessary to try out different meanings in 
order to express what he wants to say. The implication is that Author still struggles to get 
his point across. Appearing in close proximity to this passage are, significantly, a 
reference to what Author believes to be a successful piece of art, the 1953 recording of 
Tosca, the unflattering comparison to which foregrounds Author’s feelings of 
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incompetence, as well as multiple references to famous writers’ deaths (including Dante 
and Virgil). Such references once again reinforce the connection between death and 
artistic failure, as well as the connection between Markson’s non-fictional material and 
the fictional, yet semi-autobiographical, narrative of Author. 
 These strands merge at the novel’s conclusion, as Author gradually loses the 
ability to communicate. He experiences bright lights and “gaps in his consciousness” 
(187). Eventually, his inability to make himself clear and connect with the world 
becomes a problem not just for his work and for his ability to remember non-fictional 
material, but for even the barest acts of communication. Author’s voice (but not Author 
himself) disappears from the picture completely on the last few pages, reaching the 
“vanishing point” of the book’s title, leaving only Author’s children to carry the 
narrative: 
  “Dad? Dad? Say something.” 
  Rosie, You Are My Posy. 
  A sentence consists of a noun and verb. If you want to use an adjective, 
 come and ask me first.  
 
  Orchestra play like pig. 
 
  “Dad? Please? You can’t just sit there and stare. Talk to us. Answer us, 
 Dad. We love you, you know?’ 
 
  I do at least three paintings a day in my head. What’s the use of spoiling 
 canvas  when nobody will buy anything? 
 
  A symphony is no joke. 
 
  You know I can’t stand Shakespeare’s plays, but yours are worse. 
 
  “Dad? We truly want to bring the children. But they won’t understand at 
 all, if you just sit and don’t say anything. They’ll be frightened. Dad?” 
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  Couldn’t that lady cut herself, standing on that seashell? 
 
  Go, litel bok. 
 
  “Oh, Dad. Oh, Dad.” 
 
  Selah. (190-1, italics original) 
The passages addressed to “Dad” are, significantly, the only passages in Markson’s 
tetralogy that appear in quotation marks, even when we include actual historical 
quotations. This differentiates these passages from the non-fictional material that runs 
throughout the tetralogy, suggesting that they are not statements that make their way from 
the non-fictional world into Author’s fiction, but are instead spoken by other characters, 
presumably Author’s children, who express deep concern for their ailing, disoriented 
father, who is now apparently speechless. 
 Markson also tweaks the approach that he used in ending Reader’s Block and This 
Is Not a Novel. Whereas in those books, the non-fictional material that Markson included 
on the final few pages reiterates major themes such as death and suicide, the material 
presented at the end of Vanishing Point appears thematically unconnected; we get a 
quotation about linguistic brevity, one about Shakespeare, one about the orchestra, etc. 
What actually holds these quotations together is that they repeat earlier passages from 
Vanishing Point. However, where earlier in the novel, the text identified the original 
speaker of each of these quotations, this time around, they are unattributed, presented 
without the same context as when Markson first used them. For example, the song title 
“Rosie, You Are My Posy” appears on page 8, as the text explains that Al Jolson used to 
sing the song for a free meal. The line “I do at least three paintings a day in my head” 
appears on page 7, but it is attributed to Modigliani. When they appear at the end of 
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Vanishing Point, Markson removes these bits of context. This increases the effect of 
Author’s struggles, throughout the novel, to remember information. Author’s fading 
memory now applies to the novel’s non-fictional material, which becomes disconnected 
from its sources, left to float aimlessly, both on the space of the page and in the 
disorganized storehouse of Author’s mind. 
 The disconnected information that ends Vanishing Point further develops the 
theme of breaking down historical narratives. Markson strikes a delicate balance 
throughout the tetralogy by establishing themes and ideas through suggestion and 
implication, rather than through explicit statement. The historical, non-fictional material 
thus suggests overarching narratives, even though many of the bits of information don’t 
have any direct connection to each other. The ending of Vanishing Point shows these 
connections breaking down, so that pieces of information actually exist as separate, 
discreet bits. The non-fictional material reflects Author’s state of mind at the same time 
as it absorbs his narrative. Just as the continuous references to death and suicide in 
Reader’s Block and This Is Not a Novel render Reader and Writer as components of 
broader histories of death and suicide, so do the breakdowns in narrative render Author’s 
life just another series of pieces of information that are transformed into disparate bits. 
Even his children’s desperate pleas for communication are buried, fighting for narrative 
space with fragments of half-remembered quotations and song titles. Thus ends 
Vanishing Point, with Author himself disappearing into nothingness. 
 This ending presents the most extreme of example of a character’s being 
subsumed into history that occurs in Markson’s tetralogy. Markson takes care to 
distinguish Author’s consciousness from the flow of history as portrayed in Vanishing 
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Point, only to eventually have that consciousness merge with Author’s historical context. 
Author is lost to history. At the same time, however, this very process of being lost is 
narrated in such a way that it reflects Author’s own consciousness, continuing a pattern 
that recurs throughout the tetralogy. Ultimately, this pattern develops a nuanced portrait 
of the mind/world relationship. The mind, in Markson’s work, is a part of history, but at 
the same time, subjectivity is the only perspective from which an individual can 
understand broader historical forces. The characters of Author, Writer, and Reader live 
this relationship, often with tragic ends.
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Chapter Three: Nicholson Baker’s Miniature Histories 
 
 Fredric Jameson famously characterized postmodern art as marked by a “waning 
of affect,” a loss of deep feeling that Jameson associates with what he sees as 
postmodernism’s broader theoretical critique of “the hermeneutic,” with “the 
hermeneutic” referring, in this case, to the capacity for an appearance to signify some 
deeper meaning or significance. In Jameson’s formulation, postmodern art was marked 
by an emphasis on the superficiality of images and a de-emphasis on any emotion, 
feeling, or meaning that might be signified by such images. To illustrate what he sees as 
the difference between postmodernism and its predecessor, high modernism, Jameson 
compares Andy Warhol’s painting Diamond Dust Shoes (which he cites as a 
paradigmatic example of postmodern art) with “Van Gogh’s well-known painting of the 
peasant shoes” (which he cites as an example of high modernism) (6). For Jameson, the 
Van Gogh “may be described as hermeneutical, in the sense in which the work in its 
inert, objectal form is taken as a clue or a symptom for some vaster reality which replaces 
it as its ultimate truth” (8, italics original). In this case, the “vaster reality” that Jameson 
describes is the working life of the peasant to whom the shoes depicted in the painting 
presumably belong (Jameson 7-8). Jameson believes that in Warhol, however, there is 
“no way to complete the hermeneutic gesture and restore to these oddments [the shoes 
depicted in the painting] that whole larger lived context of the dance hall or the ball, the 
world of jetset fashion or glamour magazines” (8-9). The “waning of affect” that Jameson 
 
 
describes is thus produced by what he sees as the detachment of artistic images from the 
type of lived contexts that allow viewers to complete the types of “hermeneutic gestures” 
that imbue these images with meaning. 
 Warhol’s painting does portray its subject in such a way that it appears detached 
from lived context, setting the shoes off against a plain, black background, an abstract 
backdrop that eschews the earthy, impressionistic realism of Van Gogh’s muted gray 
background. I question the notion, however, that this detachment represents some kind of 
decline in the realm of “affect.” To isolate one aspect of Warhol’s painting, we can look 
at the brand labels that are clearly visible in some of the shoes. One of the most basic 
tenets of marketing is that individuals can and do form deep emotional attachments to 
brand names and labels. The same can be said of the particular styles of Warhol’s shoes; 
these styles and fashions exist largely because of the emotional value that consumers 
attach to them. I want to suggest here that Warhol’s painting represents not so much a 
“waning of affect” or, to cite another of Jameson’s key phrases, “a new depthlessness” 
inherent to postmodernism, as much as it simply places affective depth in a new context 
of mass-cultural consumerism. Warhol’s painting suggests not that affect has waned, but 
that it exists in a changed world. The affect that Jameson describes now has the capacity 
to be transferred in new ways, through mass-cultural products and images. 
 I question Jameson’s formulation of postmodernism in order to introduce the 
work of Nicholson Baker, which raises similar concerns about the affective value of mass 
culture. Much like Warhol’s paintings, Baker’s fictions are packed with depictions of 
mass-cultural products, including consumer goods, brand labels, and office 
accoutrements. The characters in Baker’s novels tend to develop deep emotional 
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connections to these products. In fact, Baker’s work represents, if anything, not so much 
a waning but an excess of affect, since nearly everything in his fiction has a deep, 
emotional significance for his characters. His work suggests a turn in late postmodern 
fiction away from the ironic parody that characterizes the fiction of authors like Donald 
Barthelme and Thomas Pynchon, and toward an enthusiastic engagement with the 
modern world.  
 However, despite these differences between Baker’s work and the work that 
Jameson describes as typically postmodern, critics have employed Jameson’s 
terminology and formulations to describe Baker’s novels. Philip E. Simmons, for 
example, argues that The Mezzanine exemplifies a “postmodern historical imagination” 
that “both invokes and rejects traditional modes of historical understanding in ‘depth,’ as 
it reconfigures the human subject and ranges among local and contingent historical 
narratives organized at the mass-cultural ‘surface’” (2). Essentially, Simmons argues that 
the mass-cultural experiences that pervade The Mezzanine are particularly postmodern in 
that they fail to signify anything beyond themselves, existing in a perpetual present that is 
unconnected to any broader historical narratives.6 He thus reads The Mezzanine as 
indicative of the kind of “depthlessness” that Jameson sees in Warhol, emphasizing the 
role that this “depthlessness” plays in defining Baker’s novel as typically postmodern. 
The structure of Simmons’s analysis of The Mezzanine even echoes that of Jameson’s 
essay, as Simmons compares The Mezzanine with a modernist foil (in this case, Walker 
Percy’s novel The Moviegoer).  
6 Graham Thompson makes a similar argument when he states that Baker’s novel “fashions a theory of 
periodization that abandons ‘trends and events’ and attempts to capture the way that decades are 
experienced constantly in media res” (302). Thompson, like Simmons, emphasizes what he sees as The 
Mezzanine’s deliberate turning away from overarching historical narratives. 
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 The problem with Simmons’s argument is that it simplifies Baker’s conception of 
history by essentially excising it from The Mezzanine. While Baker’s novels do indeed 
emphasize small-scale events over broad, historical “meta-narratives,” they are actually 
acutely informed by history, especially by the ways in which history shapes the 
particulars of human experience. More specifically, The Mezzanine explores the historical 
implications of the relationships that its protagonist, a young office worker named Howie, 
forms with the then-contemporary technological innovations that make up his workplace 
environment, the environment in which almost the entirety of the novel’s narrative takes 
place. In my discussion of Jameson’s critique of Warhol’s shoe painting, I argued that 
Warhol’s painting suggests an affective, emotional element particular to the branded, 
mass-cultural environment implied by the shoes’ designs and labels. Similarly, The 
Mezzanine depicts a particular kind of affective experience that attends its protagonist’s 
interactions with the mass-produced, technological entities that make up his workplace 
environment, as well as his home life and personal history. 
 These interactions form the basis for Baker’s particular conception of history in 
The Mezzanine, as the objects that interest Howie are inextricably tied to his own 
historical imagination. Howie envisions his own, personal history as one defined largely 
by these objects, as they often stand in, in his memory, for entire relationships. For 
example, Howie engages in a lengthy reminiscence about earplugs that leads him to 
thoughts of how L., his one-time lover, would lovingly place the plugs in his ear before 
bedtime (109-10). A long series of thoughts about neckties becomes a way for Howie to 
reconstruct his relationship with his father, with whom he bonded over male office wear 
(27-8, footnote 1). Earplugs and neckties thus become means of encapsulating a vast 
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personal history, attached as they are to crucial, formative memories. Howie also 
demonstrates a deep interest in the histories of objects’ developers, as when he recounts 
going to a library to research information on Frederick Mennen, the inventor of Jiffy Pop 
popcorn, or when he remembers reading about a man named Z. Czaplicki, who conducted 
research on the subject of shoelace durability (107, footnote 1, 132-3, footnote 1). 7  
 Howie expresses explicit enthusiasm over all of these memories, demonstrating 
the affective dimension of historical imagination that permeates The Mezzanine. He even 
remembers that when finding that somebody had conducted research on the subject of 
shoelace wear, “The joy I felt may be difficult for some to understand” (132, footnote 1). 
Howie’s memories also make clear that he is keen to identify the human elements that 
can be related to inanimate objects, associating ties with his father and Jiffy Pop popcorn 
with the mysterious life of its inventor. Howie tends to imbue these objects with human, 
emotional significance, and it is his historical imagination that allows him to do this, 
whether he is imagining a personal history shared with his father or researching the 
history (one that is, for Howie, both personal and cultural) underlying products like 
popcorn and shoelaces. In The Mezzanine, history and emotional depth, precisely the 
things that critics like Simmons see as absent from the novel, are not only crucially 
important, but closely related, as Howie’s emotions are presented largely as products of 
the ways in which he constructs history.  
7 Mark O’Connell evokes the way in which Howie’s interest in this kind of research reflects Baker’s own 
interest in humanizing objects, when he writes,  
 
There is a sense in which Baker, like his narrators in Room Temperature and The Mezzanine (and 
this is a distinction numerous critics have declined to make), can be seen as having an almost 
anthropomorphizing degree of compassion toward objects, a tendency from which his desire to 
preserve as much as possible stems. It is not a case, however, of his valuing objects equally to 
humans; it is a case, rather, of his valuing objects because of their status as products and records of 
human endeavor. There is, as such, a profoundly humanistic and humane foundation to this 
concern with the mundanely material and ephemeral (294). 
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 Historical imagination thus shapes Howie’s relationship to technology in The 
Mezzanine. More significantly, I argue, this relationship also functions in the opposite 
direction, as Howie’s historical imagination is shaped by his technologically saturated 
environment. The Mezzanine makes clear that Howie’s view of the world is one of 
technological determinism. He sees his world, including its human denizens, as 
exhibiting the same kind of mechanical, deterministic motivation as inanimate objects 
like the escalator that he rides to work, operating on a fixed trajectory toward 
predetermined destinations, as opposed to operating according to human intentions and 
desires. A reader has the right to be skeptical of Howie’s view of humanity, but 
regardless of any of the human characters’ various intentions within The Mezzanine’s 
fictional world, Howie consistently portrays these characters as though they are almost 
completely lacking in intention, as if they are complex machines whose desires are 
determined by externally observable forces. While Howie does not explicitly outline this 
kind of deterministic theory of history, he implies his belief in it, as I argue in this 
chapter, through his depictions of the people who populate his work environment. 
Moreover, Howie makes it clear that not only does this mechanistic determinism 
influence his worldview; he actually believes that it is desirable, a goal or ideal worth 
striving toward. Howie takes such joy in mechanical objects in part because he loves their 
rote predictability, the reassuring certainty that they provide when functioning properly. I 
argue, in the final section of this chapter, that The Mezzanine is in large part a novel 
about Howie’s desire for the mechanistic determinism that he sees operating in the world 
around him. Contrary to the arguments of Simmons and Thompson, Howie’s outlook is 
explicitly historicist, and his particular brand of historicism derives from his desire to 
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impart mechanistic qualities onto his environment. This desire suggests that one of the 
defining features of the novel’s postmodern milieu is a desire for certainty in an ever-
changing world, as well as a need to make that world’s unpredictability clear and 
predictable, to turn the uncertain march of history into the kind of safe, mechanical 
forward movement of Howie’s escalator. Consequently, The Mezzanine is not so much a 
novel that, as Simmons suggests, elides history, but one that depicts a desire to control it. 
 
Unbecoming Humans 
 Howie tries to affect this kind of predictability in part by imbuing humans and 
human activities with mechanistic, machine-like qualities. This mechanization produces 
Howie’s particular sense of historical determinism, as the novel depicts human behavior 
as being controlled by outside forces. The Mezzanine thus collapses conceptual 
distinctions between humans and objects, making objects more human-like and humans 
more object-like. In Howie’s mind, humans and objects are parts of a single, cohesive 
system of emotional resonances and interrelated operations. The interrelatedness of 
humans and objects is, of course, built into the very premise of the novel. The Mezzanine 
contains very little action that occurs in real time, and much of this action consists in 
Howie’s escalator ride. The escalator is an excellent example of an object that assists 
people in performing actions. Howie and the escalator form, in essence, a coupled system 
that produces Howie’s movement toward the mezzanine. 
 The escalator’s upward movement also helps lead Howie toward developing his 
mechanistic view of humanity. Howie emphasizes this sense of historical determinism at 
the beginning of Chapter 12, when, describing his position atop the escalator, he notes 
that “From this height, the height of sociology and statistics, foreshortened employees 
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moved in visible patterns” (99). Howie portrays his viewpoint as one of objective, 
scientific detachment, invoking the academic disciplines of sociology and statistics, even 
as his description of his fellow employees makes clear that he is projecting his own 
limited, subjective perspective on the scene, as the adjective “foreshortened” emphasizes 
the way that these employees look to Howie, rather than the way that they would look 
from a more detached, objective perspective.  
As Howie describes these employees’ activity in detail, his narration makes clear 
that the mechanistic aspects of this scene are not inherent to the scene itself, but are 
instead projected upon it by Howie, since the deterministic overtones of this passage are 
produced not by the world that Howie observes, but by the grammatical style he uses to 
describe this world. He employs a passive voice in order to emphasize what he sees as his 
fellow employees’ lack of agency, stating that they are “held in” each other’s 
conversation or “propelled by” the lobby’s revolving door, as opposed to actively (in both 
the physical and grammatical senses) pursuing these movements (99). When Howie does 
use the active voice here, it describes the lobby denizens’ willful sublimation into 
predetermined patterns of movement, a sublimation that he, notably, desires to affect in 
his own life. His coworkers “coalesced in front of elevators whose arrival dinger just lit,” 
forming groups whose movement is determined by the movement of a machine, the 
“dinger” that motivates their behavior further suggesting behaviorism by evoking the 
image of Pavlov’s dogs (99). Howie also notes that they “renewed the permanent four-
person line at the cash machine,” once again allowing the operation of the machine to 
determine their behavior while they are simultaneously subsumed into the permanent 
structure of the line (99). In fact, many of these people exist as components of abstract 
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structures, rather than as individuals. They are parts of “intersecting rushed trajectories,” 
a “neat clockwise semicircle,” and a “loop-the-loop,” patterns of motion that, in Howie’s 
view, structure the human behavior of the office (99). 
 Howie notably projects this sense of mechanical determinism not only onto 
others’ actions, but on his own experiences, as well, as demonstrated by an earlier scene, 
in which, while riding the escalator, he realizes that the escalator will cause him to cross 
paths with a co-worker named Bob, with whom he “had never had one of those less-than-
a-minute chats that are sufficient to define acquaintanceship in large companies” (60). 
The word “define” is significant here, since it suggests that an abstract entity like 
“acquaintanceship” can be broken down into discrete bits, as if it were a tangible object. 
Once again, Baker uses the passive voice here in order to emphasize the individuals’ lack 
of agency. As Howie puts it, he and Bob are “going to be brought” closer to each other, 
neither having a choice in the matter, the wording here emphasizing the way in which the 
escalator and its rider function as a single, interlocked system. Howie does note that he 
and Bob would, upon crossing paths, have a choice as to whether to acknowledge one 
another or to find some distraction in order to feign ignorance; however, he also stresses 
that they “would have to” make the choice to do one of these things while they are 
brought into “forced proximity,” foregrounding the ways in which the system of 
movement in which the men are caught up circumscribes the types of choices that they 
have the capability to make. The passage ends with the possibility that the two men’s 
scant conversational history will be brought, in Howie’s words, “onto an even higher 
plane of awkwardness” (60). Their relationship will, in Howie’s mind, exist as a distinct, 
abstract entity that Howie refers to as a “plane.” The implication here is that the 
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relationship itself, or the awkwardness of it, exerts a kind of social force on Howie and 
Bob that determines, to at least some degree, their interactions with one another.  
 Howie does solve the problem of forced awkwardness by, in his words, “freezing 
in mid-stride, the instant I caught sight of [Bob] (just before I had actually stepped onto 
the escalator), pointing in the air with an index finger, as if I had just thought of 
something important that I had forgotten to do, and walking off quickly in another 
direction” (60). He is thus able to exert his will on the situation, to a degree, by choosing 
to simply walk away from the escalator and avoid passing Bob altogether, thereby 
obviating the need to choose between acknowledging or ignoring his co-worker. Even 
Howie’s decision here, however, is shaped by the “plane of awkwardness” that he sees 
emerging. He wants to walk away but cannot simply do so, instead making a show of 
acting as though something else besides the imminent encounter with Bob is causing him 
to make his decision. Howie thus portrays the escalator and the office’s social codes, 
along with Howie and Bob’s interactive history, as interlocking, mechanized systems that 
shape his own behavior in this scenario.  
 When Howie describes instances when he does engage in conversation, he 
portrays his behavior as similarly circumscribed by a series of mechanized social codes, 
as he makes clear in an earlier scene, in which he converses with Tina, another of his co-
workers. The conversation begins with a discussion of Ray, another co-worker who is out 
of work with an injury. Tina has composed a poster for Ray containing the message 
“Ray, missing you, hoping you come back to work soon! From your Co-Workers” (30). 
The poster also depicts “a vase holding five large, loopy outlined flowers,” whose petals 
contain signatures of various office employees (30). The image on the poster is clearly 
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generic: a picture that could appear on just about any poster at just about any office 
building in America during the time when The Mezzanine was published. However, 
Howie, who consistently derives aesthetic pleasure from the repetitive rituals and routines 
of his workplace, “made an exclamation about its beauty: it was beautiful” (30, italics 
original). 
 As he does in his interaction with Bob, Howie describes his behavior as 
circumscribed by abstract systems of convention, and the histories of his interactions with 
his co-workers combine with these social codes to shape his present actions. He recounts 
his signing of the poster, saying  
I found an unobtrusive petal of the fourth flower: not too prominent, because I 
had a feeling that I might have been a little on the cool side to Ray recently—you 
go through inevitable cycles of office friendliness—and I wanted him to see 
signatures of people whose sentiments he would be absolutely sure of first. (30) 
Howie is motivated here by his own past behavior toward Ray; however, he credits this 
behavior to “inevitable cycles of office friendliness.” Once again, he attributes agency to 
an abstract entity, in this case a “cycle,” that determines his and Ray’s behavior. His 
decision to sign the poster is made according to his own volition, though even this 
decision is influenced by the system of social conventions and personal histories within 
which he relates to his co-workers. 
 After signing the poster, Howie continues to emphasize the deterministic elements 
of his office social life in his description of his conversation with Tina, during which Tina 
is suddenly interrupted by a phone call. Howie wants to leave, but decides that “it would 
have been brusque to do so” (32). This is due to the fact that, as he puts it, his and Tina’s 
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“interchange had passed just barely beyond office civility into the realm of human 
conversation, and thus had to be terminated conversationally” (32). Howie, as he often 
does, uses grammar to de-emphasize human agency, making “interchange” the subject of 
his sentence, suggesting that the conversation is performing actions on its own, taking on 
a new status that requires behavioral adjustments from the two co-workers. Howie also 
portrays “etiquette” as a discrete entity, noting that it “requires [him] to wait until 
[Tina’s] phone duty was done in order to exchange one last sentence with her” (32). Tina 
is similarly, in Howie’s mind, expected to produce certain types of behaviors in response 
to both Howie’s signals and to the conventions of the social scenario, as he believes it her 
duty to inform him if her conversation will take up a significant amount of time. 
Although Howie and Tina make conscious decisions, Howie suggests that their decisions 
are directly influenced by a broad system of social etiquette and office relations. Howie 
conspicuously describes these relations as discrete entities, emphasizing the systematic 
nature of his conversation.  
 The kinds of abstract, deterministic systems that Howie sees shaping his 
conversations also appear, to him, to shape the course of his internal thought processes. 
While his tone throughout The Mezzanine is generally optimistic, he mourns, at certain 
points, the ways in which his thoughts and experiences will be shaped by forces beyond 
his own control, as the continuous march of history renders certain kinds of experience 
unobtainable. In Chapter Thirteen, Howie begins to think about the different varieties of 
shampoo brands and products that have passed through his life. These brands, as do so 
many other consumer products in The Mezzanine, form an important part of the 
emotional texture of Howie’s life. This is true even of products of which Howie does not 
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make direct use. As he puts it, “I am not proud of the fact that major ingredients of my 
emotional history are available for purchase today at CVS. The fact seems especially 
puzzling, since mine was entirely a spectator’s emotion: I did not use any of the great 
shampoos” (115). Instead, he is simply fascinated with the various sounds and images 
that become associated, in his mind, with the products, including the products’ names and 
labels (along with all the connotations of sophistication and/or tackiness they may carry), 
and the voice-overs that permeate the shampoos’ TV ads.  
 Howie, however, isn’t simply “not proud” of his emotional connections to these 
products; his thoughts about shampoo actually carry a deeper sense of sadness and regret. 
He ponders the historical cycles of branding and popularity that products like shampoos 
go through, connecting these cycles to his own life. For Howie, the interaction between 
these cycles and his own “personal pantheon” of familiar shampoo brands shapes the 
roles that these brands play in his emotional state: 
Eventually, as products continue to be launched year after year, your original 
shampoo pantheon, or toothpaste or vending machine or magazine or car or felt-
tip pen pantheon, becomes infiltrated by novelty, and you may find yourself 
losing your points of reference, unable to place a new item in a comparative nest 
of familiar brand names because the other names still themselves feel raw and 
unassimilated. (115-6) 
This passage shows Howie continuing his tendency to de-emphasize human agency by 
using the passive grammatical voice to attribute actions to abstract entities. His “shampoo 
pantheon” is “penetrated by” novelty, and this novelty, not Howie himself, causes Howie 
to feel lost among the new brand names that pop up on the CVS shelves. As he continues, 
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he cites a nest of brand references which, along with his personal history of interactions 
with these brands, alters the texture of Howie’s conscious experience, causing new 
brands to “feel raw and unassimilated” (116, italics added). The Flex brand “wore him 
down,” and now any other brand “feels dead” to him, no longer entering his mind as a 
living, vital, piece of conscious information. 
 This seemingly minor diminishment of joy is connected, for Howie, to a broader, 
more all-consuming diminishment, as he worries that the kind of process that has caused 
him to lose the immediate pleasures of shampoo will eventually “reach some critical 
point and leave [him] saturated, listless, unable to entertain a single new enthusiasm,” a 
powerless victim of the inexorable march of history (116). The connection that Howie 
draws between shampoo and this broader loss of enthusiasm is an important example of 
the kind of significance that seemingly minor details frequently take on in The 
Mezzanine, as well as the importance of the deterministic force of history that Howie sees 
operating on him and his co-workers. This passage also shows Howie attributing his own 
emotional condition to abstract, mental entities. The “critical mass” that he posits will be 
reached by, in his words, “the combined volume of all the miniature histories of 
miscellanea that have been collecting in parallel in my memory” (116). Note that the 
“volume” is the subject of the sentence, and that it consists of smaller “histories” which 
perform the action, in Howie’s mind, of “collecting.” Howie’s description suggests that 
this action takes place apart from his own intentions and volitions.  
 In this way, Howie sketches an autobiographical narrative of an individual whose 
life (as well as the lives of his acquaintances) is shaped by abstract, mechanized systems 
of interacting forces, including the relentless, intersecting forces of personal and cultural 
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history. Howie feels that his and his acquaintances’ actions are circumscribed and, to 
some degree, even determined, by such systems. The Mezzanine’s stylistic choices, 
including the strategic use of passive voice, emphasize Howie’s belief in determinism by 
portraying humans as though they have been stripped of agency. Howie also collapses 
distinctions between such abstract systems and the physical world by describing these 
systems as though they are concrete entities, while describing people as though they are 
components of abstract systems. The novel’s portrayal of humans as mechanized entities 
combines with Howie’s continuous attribution of emotional significance to objects to 
collapse conceptual distinctions between the abstractions of human thought and the 
physical movement of concrete objects. In Howie’s (and, by extension, Baker’s) world, 
uniquely human experiences like socialization and emotion enter into systematic 
relationships with non-human objects. While such a perspective may seem dystopian, 
Baker’s view is, with some exceptions, actually an optimistic one, and he, along with 
Howie, celebrates the possibilities for objects to carry emotional resonance and for 
humans to become lost in historically grounded systems of objects.  
 
Loving the Machines 
 This celebration of cold, mechanical determinism is what lends The Mezzanine its 
own particular brand of emotional affect, an affect peculiar enough that critics such as 
Simmons have failed to identity it. Simmons’s characterization of the novel as a work 
concerned with surface depth is likely a result of the fact that in The Mezzanine, Howie’s 
emotional experiences are inspired so often by his interactions with mechanical entities 
that are likely to initially appear cold and unemotional to a new reader who has not been 
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initiated into Howie’s particular way of thinking. The fictional world that Baker creates is 
one which is populated by mechanistic, deterministic systems, systems that are 
nonetheless lived in and put into use by human characters who register deep emotional 
responses to them. 
 On a basic level, this is clearly the case with Howie, as his extended monologues 
on subjects such as shampoo brands, paper towel dispensers, shoelaces, and straws make 
clear his deep fascination with the mass-produced, mechanical products of mass culture. 
On a deeper and more evocative level, however, Howie is not simply interested in these 
products, but in series of underlying processes which determine the operation and 
dissemination of these products. Moreover, he reads these kinds of deterministic, 
mechanical processes into the human behaviors that he observes, both in himself and in 
others. He is not only interested in the operation of mechanical products, but he desires to 
affect their mechanistic determinism in the behavior of himself and others. Thus, 
mechanization, in The Mezzanine, is actually a primary cause of Howie’s emotional 
relationship to his surroundings, rather than a deterrent. 
 The discussion of shoelaces that occupies much of Chapter Two demonstrates the 
centrality of mechanization to this relationship, as the text makes clear that Howie is 
interested not simply in shoelaces themselves, but in the mechanistic processes that 
accompany their use. He notes his wonderment at the consistency of his shoelaces’ wear. 
His right and left shoelaces have each broken “less than two days apart,” leading Howie 
to wonder what it is about his shoe-wearing and/or tying practices that have led the laces 
to wear so evenly (15). Howie’s sense of wonder is part of a larger pattern that recurs 
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throughout The Mezzanine of Howie observing a phenomenon, then trying to decipher 
the mechanism or process that undergirds said phenomenon. 
 In this case, Howie envisions his own actions constituting such a process, one that 
he portrays as operating almost unconsciously, apart from his own will and knowledge. 
Thinking back on his childhood experiences of learning to tie his shoes, he remembers a 
moment in which, stopping to retie a loose lace, Howie, in his words,  
found as I retied the shoe that I was doing it automatically, without having to 
concentrate on it as I had done at first, and, more important, that somewhere over 
the past year since I had first learned the basic moves, I had evidently evolved two 
little substeps of my own that nobody had showed me. (18, italics original) 
Howie notably describes this as a time when he, without any apparent conscious thought, 
developed a mechanistic, repetitive routine, then retroactively became aware of that 
routine. His shoe-tying routine evolved, according to him, in an almost automatic way, 
proceeding of its own accord without any conscious input from his own mind. I am not 
suggesting here that Howie himself did not play a role in his own show-tying. What I do 
want to emphasize, however, is that the particular style of Howie’s narration emphasizes 
the automatic qualities of his actions, as he both chooses actions that appear to him 
automatic and quasi-mechanical (as in his description of the shoe-tying incident) and 
describes actions in such a way as to emphasize their deterministic elements (as in his 
description of his workplace lobby).  
 This emphasis on the mechanistic nature of human actions is consistent with 
Howie’s narration throughout the novel, even recalling a description that occurs earlier in 
Chapter Two, when Howie remembers the particular feel of his office’s carpeting on his 
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shoeless foot. As he describes it, “my foot had, without any sanction from my conscious 
will, slipped from the untied shoe and sought out the texture of the carpeting; although 
now, as I reconstruct the moment, I realize that a more specialized desire was at work as 
well…” (12). As Howie proceeds to describe the feelings that made him want to slip out 
of his shoes, it becomes clear that he was driven to this action by the tactile sensation of 
his foot against the carpet. Howie’s description suggests, however, that rather than 
proceed according to his own feelings and desires, the action happened apart from his 
“conscious will,” and that his foot acted of its own accord (12). By making “foot” the 
grammatical subject, Howie further suggests that it is his foot, acting independently of his 
own will, that is responsible for slipping out of the shoe. 
 Moreover, Howie makes it clear that he not only sees his world (or at least 
substantial parts of it) as mechanized and deterministic, he actively enjoys and seeks out 
this kind of determinism, viewing it as something to appreciate and aspire to. As he 
ponders the “near simultaneity” of his shoelaces’ fraying, he concludes that the 
explanation for their coinciding wear must be that his “shoe-tying routine was so 
unvarying and robotic,” and that “The near simultaneity was very exciting—it made the 
variables of private life seem suddenly graspable and law-abiding” (15). Howie is 
attracted to the mechanical, automatic qualities of his actions, actions of which he was, 
crucially, unaware at the time he performed them. This attraction is grounded not only in 
the comfort that this routinization affords him; it stems from active enthusiasm and 
excitement.  
 Examples of this kind of enthusiasm abound in the text. For instance, Howie 
makes it clear that he admires the “mechanical ingenuity” of the modern office bathroom, 
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pointedly wondering, “where but in the corporate bathroom do we witness mechanical 
engineering in such a pure form?” (72) His evocation of “purity” further reinforces the 
notion that he views mechanical efficiency as an ideal toward which humans ought 
continually to strive. This idealization of mechanization is very much a part of Howie’s 
thought processes about himself and his own actions, as well. After finishing tying his 
shoes, he “watched with interest the fluent, thoughtless fumblings of [his] own hand” 
(25). He acts as a detached observer of his own body, emphasizing the automatic qualities 
of that body’s movement, which proceeds, according to Howie’s description, absent of 
any thought. 
 Howie’s idealization of mechanization gradually emerges throughout the novel as 
a defining component of the personal history that he sketches, a history whose arc 
suggests that Howie has, over time, become increasingly interested in mechanizing his 
own behavior. This much is suggested by what is perhaps the climactic passage of The 
Mezzanine, in which Howie produces a long table displaying the frequency of thoughts 
he has per year (127-8). The list demonstrates Howie’s desire to quantify even the most 
ephemeral aspects of his experience, a desire that Howie makes clear when he compares 
his thought list to the little numbers that appear in his paperbacks, noting that thanks to 
these numbers, “you feel that your forward progress is confirmed more objectively than 
when you merely reach a new chapter” (126). Howie wants to see his progress marked in 
a quantifiable, objective way, in a manner that elides the fuzzy ephemerality of human 
judgment, subjectivity, and emotion. Of course, this desire for objectivity is clearly an 
unreachable ideal, as Howie himself makes clear when he comes to the conclusion that 
“thoughts were too fluid, too difficult to name, and once named to classify, for my 
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estimate of their relative frequency to mean very much” (128). The course of Howie’s 
musings about his “thought frequency” table encapsulate what I am positing as a key 
theme of The Mezzanine: the desire for mechanized certainty in the face of the 
unquantifiability of human experience. 
Howie’s desire for objective measures of personal progress is perhaps best 
illustrated by a list of eight “major advances” in his life that he periodically refers to. All 
eight “advances” have at least something to do with instances where Howie was able to 
alter his behavior to make it more efficient, and the fact of his referring to these instances 
as “advances” reinforces their status as moments when he made steps toward the ideal of 
mechanization. The sixth advance, “discovering that sweeping was fun,” exemplifies the 
novel’s particular combination of human affect and cold mechanization. Howie expresses 
palpable enthusiasm for his “advances,” and his sense of enthusiasm emerges precisely 
from his ability to accomplish tasks efficiently. It is important that Howie’s list consists 
not of jubilant, celebratory events (such as weddings, graduations, etc.), but events, 
including sweeping, that are simple, and that can be completed in a mechanistic fashion 
similar to his shoe-tying. Howie makes clear the importance of efficiency in producing 
his happiness when, describing the joy that he takes in sweeping, he quotes things that 
“Samuel Johnson said about the deadliness of leisure and the uplifting effects of 
industry” (21). Howie, throughout the novel, expresses greater enthusiasm over 
industriousness than in fun. 
The development, over time, of Howie’s enthusiasm for mechanized efficiency, is 
perhaps best illustrated by his description of his evolving attitudes toward escalators and 
escalator passengers. He notes that he has, over time, developed the “habit of standing 
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still and gliding for the entire ride, rather than walking up the steps” of an escalator (100). 
This habit stands in contrast to earlier times, when Howie was adamant that escalator 
passengers ought to walk up the escalators, rather than standing still. He felt this way for 
several reasons, all of which illustrate key tendencies of Howie’s thoughts on the 
relationships between people and machines. One reason is that he feels that the original 
intent of the escalator’s inventor was to assist motion rather than take it over, a feeling 
that continues a tendency of Howie’s to take interest in the human intentions that underlie 
the invention and implementation of mechanical apparatuses (100).  
Another reason has to do with the frustration of waiting behind stationary 
passengers, a frustration borne not only of sheer impatience, but of Howie’s interest in 
efficiency. He notes his annoyance over the “pattern of sloth and congestion that may 
persist for hours” which he envisions resulting from others’ standing still (101). Finally, 
Howie envisioned walking up the escalator as an aesthetically pleasing marriage of 
human intention and machine-like efficiency of movement. He would exhort his fellow 
riders to “Feel your own effortful, bobbing steps melt into the inexhaustible meliorism of 
the escalator” (101, italics original). His description evokes visions of a kind of blending 
of intentions, intentions that belong to both the riders and, in Howie’s utopian futurism, 
to the machine itself, as suggested by his attribution of “meliorism” to the escalator. All 
of Howie’s reasons for initially preferring walking to standing still while riding an 
escalator thus accord with patterns of thought that he demonstrates throughout the novel. 
 Eventually, however, Howie develops a change of heart, a change also inspired by 
his interest in mechanical efficiency, an interest that has apparently increased over the 
course of his lifetime. He notes that now that he is a frequent passenger on the escalator, 
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presumably riding it regularly out of job-related necessity, he understands the desire to 
stand still while riding (101-2). It is important to note here that Howie comes to an 
appreciation for escalator rides through habit and regularity; just as he appreciates the 
consistent efficiency of mechanical movement, so does he come to appreciate his own 
life more when he himself engages in patterns of regular, consistent activity. His 
appreciation for the escalator also follows from his desire to meld human intention with 
this mechanical efficiency, and from the joy that he takes in this efficiency. He notes, 
“My total appreciation for the escalator deepened, eventually becoming embedded along 
my spinal column,” once again suggesting his vision of a glorious melding of man and 
machine (101). He also describes the stationary escalator ride as a “trance of motorized 
ascension,” a phrase that associates Howie’s positive emotions precisely with the 
mechanical aspects of his environment (102).  
 It is this joy and appreciation that Howie takes in his mechanized office 
environment that constitutes the “excess of affect” that I alluded to earlier. The 
Mezzanine is not a book of depthless, postmodern surfaces, but is rather a novel that 
points toward a particular kind of depth that its protagonist reads into the ephemera of 
1980’s American office life. My reading of the novel demonstrates that not only does 
Howie enjoy his interactions with mechanical, mass-produced objects; it is the very fact 
of this mechanization that makes them attractive to him. Howie revels in the mechanical 
determinacy of his surroundings, and he does what he can to impose this determinacy on 
his social environment, portraying his co-workers, and even himself, as mechanized 
entities with little-to-no choice in how they run their lives. While the notion of an entirely 
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mechanized world is clearly a fantasy, The Mezzanine portrays a singular mind for whom 
this fantasy holds an unyielding attraction. 
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Chapter Four: David Foster Wallace’s Private Prison 
 
 In a well-publicized commencement speech delivered at Kenyon College, David 
Foster Wallace narrates his vision of an “average adult day.” He describes a scene in 
which a hypothetical person, after a long day at work, goes to a supermarket and 
experiences a multitude of minor frustrations of a type that regularly occur in large, 
corporate American stores: bad lighting, annoying music, crowds, etc. Wallace concludes 
his description by stating that such an experience is frustrating, “Because my natural 
default setting is the certainty that situations like this are really about me. About MY 
hungriness and MY fatigue and MY desire to just get home, and it’s going to seem for all 
the world like everybody else is just in my way” (6). The ostensible purpose of this 
hypothetical anecdote is to demonstrate Wallace’ belief in the importance of choosing 
what one pays attention to. He believes that the nondescript individual featured in this 
scene can reduce their frustration by choosing to think about their surroundings 
differently and paying less attention to their own ill feelings. 
 While Wallace’s intentions in this speech were to deliver the kinds of reassuring 
platitudes typical of a college commencement, I want to point out that the scenario 
Wallace sketches demonstrates a tendency in his thought that recurs throughout his 
writing: namely, the tendency to see an individual’s mind as somehow separate, or 
detached, from the surrounding social world. Wallace believed that consciousness was an 
individualized phenomenon: that an individual’s thoughts exist in a closed-off space, 
 
 
detached from others’ minds. He makes this belief clear in an interview with Laura 
Miller, in which he says, “there is this existential loneliness in the real world. I don't 
know what you're thinking or what it's like inside you and you don't know what it's like 
inside me” (62). Wallace was preoccupied by this sense of separation between minds, by 
what he perceived as a lack of access that people have to others’ thoughts. He tended to 
treat the issue of mental access as both an emotional problem, as suggested by his 
reference to “existential loneliness,” and as a moral problem, as suggested by his 
supermarket scene. 
 Wallace’s belief in the inherent loneliness of consciousness is informed by his 
perspective on language, as he often demonstrated a belief that language’s capacity for 
people to express thoughts to one another is essentially limited. His interest in such 
linguistic limitations finds expression in his thoughts about Wittgenstein, a philosopher in 
whom he maintained an interest throughout his writing career. Speaking to Larry 
McCaffrey about Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Wallace summarizes the book’s argument as 
follows: “In order for language both to be meaningful and to have some connection to 
reality, words like tree and house have to be like little pictures, representations of real 
trees and houses. Mimesis. But nothing more. Which means we can know and speak of 
nothing more than little mimetic pictures. Which divides us, metaphysically and forever, 
from the external world” (44). Wallace notes that Wittgenstein “trashed” this argument in 
his later work, in order to develop a community-based model of language as a “function 
of relationships between persons” (44). However, Wittgenstein’s repudiations of his early 
work did not entirely satisfy Wallace, who tells McCaffrey, “we’re still stuck with the 
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idea that there is this world of referents out there that we can never really join or know 
because we’re stuck in here, in language” (44).  
 Wallace’s choice of the word “stuck” is revealing, suggesting as it does a vision 
of language as a kind of prison. This, I argue, is the central informing image of Wallace’s 
fiction. Wallace viewed consciousness as just such a prison, cut off from society by what 
he saw as the limitations of language. The feelings of anomie, isolation, alienation, and 
depression that pervade his work are products of this viewpoint. Wallace himself tended 
to ascribe these feelings to widespread social causes, often speaking in generalities about 
moods and ideologies that he saw pervading America, his particular generation, or both. 
In his interview with McCaffrey, he states, “If you operate, which most of us do, from the 
premise that there are things about the contemporary U.S. that make it distinctively hard 
to be a real human being, then maybe half of fiction's job is to dramatize what it is that 
makes it tough” (26). Wallace envisioned his fiction as mirroring contemporary society 
by depicting the difficulty of being human. However, it would be more accurate to state 
that his fiction mirrors his own particular vision of this difficulty. Wallace tended to 
perpetuate a narrative that suggested that contemporary times presented unique 
difficulties for humans’ emotional lives, a narrative threaded throughout his fiction.  
 Related to this narrative is Wallace’s tendency to generalize the psychological 
travails of vast national or generational entities. In a harsh critique of John Updike, 
Wallace compares his generation to Updike’s, stating that where Updike’s generation 
feared social conformity, “Today's sub-40s have different horrors, prominent among 
which are anomie and solipsism and a peculiarly American loneliness” (“Certainly” 54). 
These horrors can more accurately be ascribed to Wallace himself than to Generation X-
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ers or Americans generally, as the loneliness and anomie he discusses here are the same 
feelings he mentions in countless interviews and depicts in his fiction. Wallace described 
his own role as a writer as something of a cultural doctor, diagnosing and finding cures 
for widespread social ills; he even refers to the role of art as “CPR” in his interview with 
McCaffrey (26). Critics have tended to support this view, as both Stephen J. Burn and 
Marshall Boswell, Wallace’s two most prominent academic critics, refer to selections of 
the author’s work as a “diagnosis” of various elements of American culture (8, 
Understanding 65). I argue, by contrast, that any cultural diagnoses implied by his fiction 
are outgrowths of Wallace’s assumptions about the isolated nature of consciousness and 
the emotional valence he attaches to these assumptions. 
 At the same time as he views language as isolating consciousness, Wallace 
paradoxically sees it as the means through which people are able to escape this isolation. 
Speaking to Miller about “existential loneliness,” he states, “In fiction I think we can leap 
over that wall [of loneliness] itself in a certain way” (62).8 Wallace’s goal in his fiction 
was to forge emotional bonds with his readers and to battle against what he saw as the 
self-alienation built into consciousness and language. He regarded language as both a trap 
from which human consciousness can never fully escape and the very thing that people 
can use to escape from that trap. This belief informs his characters who, similarly to 
8 Similarly, he tells Hugh Kennedy and Geoffrey Polk,  
 
I think all good writing somehow addresses the concern of and acts as a anodyne against 
loneliness. We’re all terribly, terribly lonely. And there’s a way, at least in prose fiction, that can 
allow you to be intimate with the world and with a mind and with characters that you just can’t be 
in the real world. I don’t know what you’re thinking. I don’t know that much about you as I don’t 
know that much about my parents or my lover or my sister, but a piece of fiction that’s really true 
allows you to be intimate with…I don’t want to say people, but it allows you to be intimate with a 
world that resembles our own in enough emotional particulars so that the way different things 
must feel is carried out with us into the real world. I think what I would like my stuff to do is make 
people less lonely. (16) 
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Wallace himself, feel themselves unable to communicate with or understand other 
people, yet try desperately to do so. This goal of using communication to stave off 
loneliness is the basis for Wallace’s unabashed moralism, perhaps the defining quality of 
his fiction. Wallace, famously among his critics, advocated the espousal of “single-
entendre principles”: direct, possibly even sentimental statements that would counter the 
stance of ironic detachment Wallace saw as endemic to contemporary American life (“E 
Unibus” 192). This commitment to direct statement and moral purpose informed not only 
Wallace’s fiction, but critical interpretations of his writing, as well. In fact, much of the 
critical literature surrounding Wallace focuses on what critics see as his moral acuity and 
urgency. In “David Foster Wallace: The Death of the Author and the Birth of a 
Discipline,” Adam Kelly elucidates this morally centered strain of criticism. Kelly also 
argued in a later essay that Wallace is a “novelist[] of ideas,” implying that Wallace 
ought to be read in order to understand the abstract concepts depicted in his fiction 
(“David Foster Wallace and the Novel of Ideas” 3). This type of critical approach is also 
carried out by major Wallace critics such as Boswell and Burn. 
 I argue that Wallace’s interest in “single-entendre principles” derives from his 
particular sense of consciousness as isolated from the social world. Wallace’s belief that 
language was inherently limited and that its limitations isolated people from one another 
meant that he felt that using words to communicate ideas, the very task of the author, was 
an act of intense difficulty.9 For Wallace, this difficulty goes hand-in-hand with what he 
believed to be the over-prevalence of irony in contemporary culture. He outlines this 
9 Wallace’s sense of communication as inherently fraught with uncertainty may explain his writer’s block. 
As described in D.T. Max’s biography, Wallace worked on his third novel, The Pale King, from the 1996 
publication of Infinite Jest up until his 2008 death, but was unable to complete it. Max’s biography contains 
multiple mentions of Wallace throwing away pages from the novel out of frustration. 
76 
 
                                                             
stance in “E Unibus Pluram” (described in Kelly’s “David Foster Wallace: The Death of 
the Author” as an “artistic manifesto”), in which he argues that the self-conscious 
narrative stances that defined postmodern metafiction (as exemplified, in the essay, by 
John Barth’s “Lost in the Funhouse”) had pervaded mainstream culture, and that the 
antidote to ironic distance was sincere engagement, or as Wallace put it, “reverence and 
conviction” (193). Wallace’s career-long battle against irony was in many ways a 
quixotic quest, and I want to suggest that his preoccupation with the intentional self-
consciousness of writers like Barth was largely a projection of the persistent, nagging 
self-consciousness that Wallace felt in his own life and depicted in his fiction. The 
metafictional techniques employed by Barth (and countless other writers) are designed to 
detach a story’s narrating consciousness from the narrative itself. Wallace saw this 
detachment as more generally pervasive in human thought, viewing consciousness as 
necessarily detached from the events it perceives. 
 This sense of detachment pervades nearly all of Wallace’s fiction, but finds 
particularly acute expression in Oblivion, his 2004 short story collection. Oblivion is, as 
Boswell has pointed out, arguably the “bleakest” of Wallace’s books (“The Constant 
Monologue” 151). This bleakness derives from the degree to which the book’s 
protagonists are isolated, at the level of consciousness, from other people. While Wallace 
frequently depicts characters who are alone in their minds, the stories of Oblivion takes 
this loneliness further, often evoking their protagonists’ utter, inevitable hopelessness in 
their attempts to form social bonds with others. The book exemplifies Wallace’s moral 
commitments to the value of sincerity and communication. It also, I argue, demonstrates 
the ways in which these moral commitments derive from Wallace’s assumptions about 
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the mind’s isolation. The characters of Oblivion express (sometimes almost verbatim) 
Wallace’s own anxieties about human consciousness, the feeling that one is somehow 
“trapped” by the limitations of language and perception. The stories frequently read as 
moral allegories, but their true value, I argue, lies in their expression of authorial angst. 
 
A Loss for Words 
 One of the ways in which Oblivion expresses Wallace’s belief in the 
individualized nature of consciousness is through repeated instances of characters’ 
inability to communicate their thoughts and feelings. The connection Wallace saw 
between individualized consciousness and communicative difficulties is expressed most 
explicitly in Oblivion by the character of Neal in “Good Old Neon,” who laments what he 
sees as the inherent “fraudulence” of the human condition when he states, “And you think 
it makes you a fraud, the tiny fraction [of self] anyone ever sees? Of course you’re a 
fraud, of course what people see is never you. And of course you know this, and of 
course you try to manage what part [other people] see if you know it’s only a part” (179). 
These lines evoke anxieties about self-presentation that were apparently actually felt by 
Wallace, who “was intensely concerned with his public image” (Kindley).10 Neal’s 
10 Indications of such anxieties abound. For example, in a letter to Elizabeth Wurtzel, Wallace wrote,  
 
I go through a loop in which I notice all the ways I am self-centered and careerist and not true to 
standards and values that transcend my own petty interests, and feel like I'm not one of the good 
ones. But then I countenance the fact that at least here I am worrying about it, noticing all the 
ways I fall short of integrity, and I imagine that maybe people without any integrity at all don't 
notice or worry about it; so then I feel better about myself. It's all very confusing. I think I'm very 
honest and candid, but I'm also proud of how honest and candid I am--so where does that put me? 
(qtd. in Lipsky 175).  
 
This kind of self-reflexive fussiness over appearances emerges in multiple interviews, including Wallace’s 
1997 televised interview with Charlie Rose. Images of anxiety related to self-presentation also abound in 
Wallace’s fiction, including in the story “My Appearance” (from Girl with Curious Hair), in which a minor 
celebrity is coached before her appearance on a late-night talk show, or an extended, speculative 
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statements also trace the cause of this anxiety back to Wallace’s feeling that an 
unbreachable chasm exists between a person’s thoughts and others’ perceptions. Acting 
as a mouthpiece for the author, Neal extrapolates the basic fact that a person cannot 
express to others every single facet of his personality, thinking that the inevitable result 
of this incomplete knowledge is a kind of “fraudulence” in human behavior and 
presentation. 
 Whereas Neal, who is characterized as a socially savvy extrovert, is obsessed with 
the “fraudulence” that results from donning multiple personalities and identities, other 
characters in Oblivion are rendered as having a more basic, yet more pressing problem, 
which is that they are simply unable to make their thoughts understood to others. Wallace 
embodies this inability in a physiognomic image in the story “Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature,” which is narrated by a man whose mother, according to himself, underwent a 
botched plastic surgery that “caused her to look insanely frightened at all times” (182, 
italics original). The mother underwent a second surgery that only made her condition 
worse, leaving her with an expression that the narrator describes as “a chronic mask of 
insane terror” (182). Naturally, this becomes a problem, as others tend to interpret the 
mother’s face as indicating feelings of fear, or are least uncertain of how to read her 
expressions, regardless of what she is actually feeling. She thus manifests in physical 
form the anxiety of self-presentation expressed by Neal. Both characters, in their own 
ways, reflect Wallace’s preoccupations with the inherent limitations of self-expression. 
 The title of the story is meant to recall Richard Rorty’s philosophical book of the 
same name, which, in Rorty’s words, refers to his argument that, “The picture that holds 
description in Infinite Jest of the invention of the video phone, which causes widespread self-consciousness 
among telephone users.  
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traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind as a great mirror, containing various 
representations—some accurate, some not—and capable of being studied by pure, 
nonempirical methods” (12). In other words, Rorty is critical of the notion that the human 
mind simply reflects reality. The thematic connection with Wallace’s story emerges 
through the image of the mother’s face. Just as Rorty is skeptical of the mind’s ability to 
reflect nature, so does Wallace, in his story, want to convince his audience to be skeptical 
of the ability of the mother’s face to reflect her inner emotions. Greg Carlisle believes 
that the story’s parallels with Rorty lie in themes of self-absorption, stating, “Wallace’s 
characters highlight the fact that we resist adapting our beliefs, that we fear the 
potentially negative reactions of others, and that we feel the pull of the isolating comfort 
of our mirror-gazing” (91). I argue here that the story’s connections with Rorty have less 
to do with what Carlisle calls “mirror-gazing,” and more to do with the ways in which 
truth is negotiated in Wallace’s fictional world. Rorty pushes his readers to see 
“conversation as the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood” (389, 
italics original). Similarly, Wallace’s story presents a vision of truth as negotiated 
through interpretations of events, and the mutability of truth is, for Wallace, another root 
cause of the anxiety and alienation that attend the difficulty of self-expression. 
The mirror also appears in the story in a more direct form, in a scene where the 
narrator describes his mother’s first view of her inanimate face after plastic surgery. As 
he relays the incident,  
They [presumably the doctors] brought her the mirror and the first surgery’s 
bandages came off then one could at first not ascertain whether the face’s 
expression was a reaction to what she saw in the mirror or if it itself was what she 
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saw and this was the stimulus causing the noises. Mother…could herself not 
ascertain at first if the look of insane terror was the response or the stimulus. (185) 
Like many of the images that populate Wallace’ writing, this is an exaggerated gag that, 
in its exaggeration, evokes the author’s mindset. Wallace often went through elaborate 
verbal contortions to control his image, suggesting an unceasing self-consciousness of his 
uncertainty about others’ perceptions of his public persona.11 Such uncertainty is 
reflected (no pun intended) in the mother’s mirror-gazing, to which nobody, not even she, 
knows how to react. This uncertainty reverberates around the room, since one person’s 
interpretation (or misinterpretation) is based on another’s interpretation, which is based 
on another’s, ad infinitum. Just as in Rorty’s conversational model of truth, the reaction 
to the mother’s face is reached through shifting, unstable, negotiations. 
 This anxiety over the negotiated aspects of truth informs the story’s main plot, 
which involves legal problems that the narrator has faced as a result of his role in the 
injury of a young boy. The injury was caused by a collection of dangerous spiders that 
the narrator keeps in his garage. At some point, the boy fell through the roof of the garage 
and into the area where the spiders were being held. Descriptions of this incident appear 
sporadically, through the narrator’s asides and non sequiturs, suggesting that he wants to 
avoid talking about the injury but cannot stop thinking about it. He mounts unprovoked 
defenses for his role in this incident, noting that he did not “have anything against the boy 
in any way,” and that “it is quite a stretch to say that an area of weakness in a twenty-
year-old garage roof equals failing to exercise due diligence or care” (184, 186). Just as 
11 To take one example, Max’s biography recounts an incident after the publication of his first novel in 
which Wallace asked a college friend “to plant the good news with their class agent for the Amherst 
newsletter, ‘not, of course, letting her know that I requested or even endorsed your doing so’” (67). This 
description resonates with numerous incidents from Wallace’s life and fiction, which often depicts 
characters who work extra hard to control the ways in which others interpret their communicative acts. 
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his mother is unable to convince anyone else (including herself) about the true nature of 
her emotions, so has the narrator found that he has been unable to make his interpretation 
of the spider incident convincing in court. While the narrator believes that his story 
reflects the reality of what happened to the boy, the story that holds up in court is 
negotiated through conversation in such a way as to implicate the narrator, who was 
“released in late 1996,” presumably from jail (182). The image of the court system 
expresses a sense of anxiety of the possibility of being taken to task for a truth that has 
been publicly negotiated, and which directly contradicts one’s own subjective sense of 
that truth.  
 The image of a woman with a fixed facial expression, so prominent in 
“Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,” recurs in Oblivion, in the story “The Suffering 
Channel.” “The Suffering Channel” follows a journalist named Skip Atwater, whose 
“best regarded piece ever so far” in his career is an article about a “little girl in Upland 
CA [who] had been born with an unpronounceable neurological condition whereby she 
could not form facial expressions” (300). While the image is not central to the plot of the 
story, Atwater’s interest in the story does indicate his own repressed psychological 
makeup. The journalist is characterized as milquetoast in the extreme, a caricature of 
blandness who is “all but celibate,” and, in his journalistic work, has “no innate sense of 
tragedy,” is “all upbeat angle” (271, 270). This pent-up personality is a recurring type in 
Oblivion, and its persistent emergence further suggests Wallace’s preoccupation with 
what he sees as the closed-off nature of human subjectivity.12 
12 As Chad Harbach notes,  
 
Whereas much of Wallace’s work has been marked by an exuberant willingness to adopt the 
accents and idiolects of culturally, racially, sexually, and economically diverse characters, it’s 
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 The character who best embodies this type, and who is most indicative of 
Wallace’s despair over subjectivity, is Terry Schmidt, corporate focus group facilitator 
and lead character of “Mister Squishy.” Schmidt, like Atwater, is a sort of generic 
ineffectual American straight white male character type, one who is both competent (but 
not necessarily stellar) at his job and incompetent in matters social and sexual. He is a 
devoted professional whose adherence to corporate codes of conduct, in addition to his 
own lack of self-assurance, renders him ineffectual, both in terms of his personality and 
in terms of his ability to affect change in his surroundings. This type is part of a more 
general, and generic, Wallace critique of the dehumanizing aspects of the American 
corporate world. The story, originally published in 2000, is thematically similar to 
Hollywood films of the same period such as American Beauty and Fight Club, offering a 
formulaic satire of the white-collar workplace as a place of conformity and tedium. In 
“Mister Squishy,” this critique is directly related to Wallace’s assumptions about the 
separateness of individuals’ minds. Schmidt is dehumanized and repressed because his 
own thoughts and desires are so distinct from the public role that he plays as a corporate 
drone. 
 Moreover, Schmidt’s repression is portrayed as a product of the way that his mind 
amplifies his inability to change the physical world. In Wallace’s world, thoughts tend to 
fester. Existing in a mind that perceives, yet is not entirely part of, the social world, these 
thoughts take on a life of their own and overwhelm their owners. Schmidt internalizes his 
surprisingly easy to construct a composite sketch of Oblivion‘s several protagonists: he is a flabby, 
heterosexual male in his late thirties, with a midlevel corporate job, a beleaguered or nonexistent 
love life, a habit of curling scare-quotes around a few too many of his words, and a vocabulary 
that Wallace himself would no doubt describe as “literally incredible.” He has probably been 
through therapy, and he may, beneath his guise of placid normalcy, be contemplating suicide or 
murder. 
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social failures until his thoughts about those failures take over and finally overwhelm his 
entire self-concept. Schmidt’s social failure is made clear by his relationship to a co-
worker named Darlene Lilley. He harbors recurring sexual fantasies about Lilley, and he 
dreams of “tak[ing] off his public mask and open[ing] his heart to her” (33). His social 
impotence, however, continuously causes him to put off calling his workplace crush. He 
remembers an incident in which he heard some co-workers making fun of Lilley’s 
physical appearance, to which he had only been “outraged enough to have come very 
very close indeed to confronting [these co-workers] directly” (50). This sense of social 
impotence manifests in a fantasy of Schmidt’s, in which he and Lilley “hav[e] high-
impact intercourse on the firms’ conference tables [while] Schmidt kept finding himself 
saying Thank you, oh thank you in rhythm to the undulatory thrusting motions of the 
coitus” (53-4, italics original). The fear being expressed here is that social failure is not 
simply situational, but is actually a more generalizable condition. In other words, 
Schmidt does not simply fail to initiate a relationship with Lilley; his failure is actually a 
part of his identity. For Wallace, social problems become more insidious when they are 
also psychological problems, as his sense of thoughts as self-perpetuating entities leads 
him to portray the mind as an amplifier of distress. 
 Schmidt’s internalization of his own failure is made most clear in an extended 
description of his relationship to the story’s title character. “Mister Squishy” is a 
corporate mascot of the snack cake manufacturer for whom Schmidt is currently working. 
The mascot becomes an avatar for Schmidt’s self-concept, as the text notes that 
sometimes when shaving in the morning, 
84 
 
[Schmidt] would look at his face and at the faint lines and pouches that seemed to 
grow a little more pronounced each quarter and would call himself, directly to his 
mirrored face, Mister Squishy…when he thought of himself now it was as 
something he called Mister Squishy, and his own face and the plump and wholly 
innocuous icon’s face tended to bleed in his mind into one face. (33-4, italics 
original) 
This passage brings together Wallace’s dual aims in the story, of simultaneously 
producing a critique of media and corporate culture while profiling the emasculated 
American male. The intersection of Schmidt’s mental state with the Mister Squishy 
character demonstrates Wallace’s sense of the transformative effects of the isolated mind 
in the face of the global reach of mass culture. The false promises of marketers, cloaked 
in the guises of friendly, innocuous characters, are transformed into indicators of 
psychological failures. Schmidt’s mind, cut off from social interaction (or at least from 
the kind that occurs outside of the workplace), produces harrowing visions of its own 
powerlessness. 
 A connection exists between Schmidt and the unnamed narrator of “Philosophy of 
the Mirror of Nature.” Both find that their inability to communicate their desires and their 
visions of the world exacerbate their sense of isolation from other people. This isolation 
causes them to develop subjective visions of reality that become personally harmful. 
Schmidt’s lack of self-confidence metastasizes into an all-consuming psychological 
roadblock. The narrator of “Philosophy,” by contrast, possesses an unrealistic confidence, 
believing in his own vision of the truth even when it doesn’t jibe with reality. In both 
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cases, Wallace casts his own sense of the incommunicability of mental states as a 
powerful force of social isolation. 
 
Misperception 
 Characters in Oblivion not only find themselves unable to communicate thoughts 
and feelings to others; they also find themselves unable to accurately perceive important 
elements of the world around them, an inability that is tied to Wallace’s conception of 
consciousness as isolated from the social and physical realms. Wallace’s characters don’t 
simply fail to notice their surroundings, but are trapped in their own minds, cut off from a 
meaningful understanding of their own realities. Wallace allegorizes this vision of 
consciousness in the story “The Soul Is not a Smithy,” the text of which consists of its 
unnamed narrator’s recollection of an incident that occurred when he was a student in a 
fourth grade civics class in 1960, in which a group of his peers flees a murderous 
substitute teacher.13 The narrator is characterized primarily by his tendency to focus on 
information that is not particularly relevant to his immediate surroundings. For example, 
though he is unable to read, he is able, with savant-like acuity, to “supply a certain 
amount of specific quantitative information” about the printed words on a page, including 
the numbers of words per page and line, and even the numbers of occurrences of specific 
letters (72). Similarly, when he is sitting in class, he is unable to pay attention to his 
lessons, focusing instead on creating stories that he imagines being played out in the wire 
13 The title is likely a reference to the penultimate line of James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man: “I go to encounter for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my 
soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (224). I interpret Wallace’s title as an acknowledgement that the 
story’s narrator fails to encounter the reality of his own experience. Wallace named Joyce’s novel as a 
favorite in an interview with Laura Miller (62). 
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frames of the classroom windows. He continues to do this even when his fellow students 
flee the classroom out of fear of their teacher. 
 The narrator thus remains deeply tethered to his personal, subjective, imaginative 
vision, even as chaos unfolds around him. Wallace conveys the narrator’s sense of being 
lost in fantasy through two formal decisions. First, his narration deemphasizes the 
incident involving the substitute teacher, instead focusing mainly on a fantasy scenario 
occurring only in the narrator’s mind, in which a young girl named Ruthie loses her dog. 
By focusing on this fantasy scenario in depth, Wallace conveys the story through his 
character’s distracted mind, to the point where the actual events of the story are heavily 
obscured. Second, Wallace generally has his narrator phrase the facts of the story as 
second-hand, rather than directly experienced, pieces of information. The narration 
consists of statements that the narrator has either heard from somebody else or recalled 
reading in a newspaper after the incident occurred. By contrast, information about his 
fantasy scenarios is presented directly, firsthand. The second-hand quality of the 
narration amplifies the sense that the most significant events of the story occur outside of 
the narrator’s direct conscious experience, and that the narrator is lost in a fantasy world. 
 This second-hand narration makes clear that the narrator’s interpretations of the 
story’s main events develop independently of the events themselves. He states, “Only 
much later would I understand that the incident at the chalkboard in Civics was likely to 
be the most dramatic and exciting event I would ever be involved in in my life,” making 
clear that the event became meaningful only after the fact (69). The story’s meaning 
develops through gradual accumulation in the narrator’s consciousness, when the events 
themselves are only a memory, a fact accentuated by the narrator’s statement that he 
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“received the full story so many times from classmates and authorities and the Dispatch 
[the local newspaper] that in memory it nearly feels as if I were present as a full witness 
from the beginning” (85). He actually gains a fuller sense of presence from these second-
hand accounts than he did from being physically present at the event. He was so detached 
from the proceedings that these retellings feel more real than the event itself. 
 This sense of detachment from real-world events is an emotional register toward 
which Wallace consistently aims in Oblivion, especially in the story “Oblivion,” which is 
narrated by a man named Randall who is embroiled in a fight with his wife, Hope. Hope 
alleges that Randall’s snoring is keeping her awake at night, while Randall insists that 
Hope is only dreaming, and that he has not, in fact, been snoring at all. The scenario 
manifests Wallace’s despair in individuals’ lack of access to a reality outside of their 
subjective points of view, and the couple’s disagreement becomes an intractable, 
increasingly bitter battle. Neither spouse is able to obtain an objective perspective on the 
situation, each remaining trapped in their individual perspectives. The dream imagery 
that permeates the story and forms the crux of its plot externalizes Wallace’s anxieties 
about subjectivity, as dreams are, by nature, deeply subjective experiences. I argue that 
Wallace uses this story to draw connections between dreams and waking life, and that 
these connections derive from his assumption of the irreconcilability of subjectivity and 
reality. For Wallace, waking life is apparently akin to living in a dream world, closed off 
from the concrete facts of life, and “Oblivion” dramatizes this vision. 
 This closed-off quality of Wallace’s vision of consciousness is most clearly 
demonstrated in a scene in which Randall, narrating the story, discusses his marital 
problems with a therapist. When the therapist continuously presses Randall to explain 
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why the sleeping issue is so important to him, Randall claims that the problem actually 
has little to do with sleep. Instead, as he puts it,  
The real issue is that it’s bizarre, surreal, an almost literal “waking nightmare.” 
My wife is now no one I know. She’s claiming to know better than I myself 
whether I’m even awake. It’s less unfair than seemingly almost totally insane. I 
know whether I’m sitting here having these exchanges. I know I am not dreaming 
this. To doubt this is insane. But this, to all appearances, is what she’s doing. 
(210) 
Randall claims that his concern is his wife’s persistent claims to objective interpretations 
of facts, when in fact, she is relying on her own, subjective interpretation, unwilling “to 
entertain at least the possibility” that her point of view is wrong (206). The irony is that 
Randall is doing the very same thing of which he accuses Hope. He claims to know 
exactly when he is sleeping and when he is awake.  
At one point, the therapist even questions him on this very matter, asking “How 
can you even know for certain whether you snore or not? If you are snoring, then by 
definition you’re asleep” (208). Randall eventually responds by once again insisting that 
he is not asleep during Hope’s accusations. Wallace uses the therapist as an audience 
cypher, hinting at the inconsistencies that litter Randall’s accounts of the facts. The 
therapist continues to deflate Randall’s recollections, asking whether he may be 
“stubborn or blind” about the sleeping issue and pointing out that Randall is 
“getting…upset” (209, 208). Randall’s continuous denials, his stubbornness, and his 
escalating temper all suggest that he is becoming increasingly set in his worldview, 
digging in his heels in an effort to defend his position and win the argument against his 
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wife. His defensiveness signals a further irony in his behavior, mirroring his own earlier 
statements that Hope demonstrated “a further entrenchment or ‘hardening’ in her own 
position—the essence of her position being that I myself was being irrationally ‘stubborn’ 
and ‘untrusting’ of what she could plainly hear with her own two ears” (203).  
Randall’s narration suggests that both he and Hope are becoming more and more 
deeply enmeshed in their subjective points of view, evoking Wallace’s vision of 
subjectivity as an isolating trap. The dream imagery further evokes the depths of this 
subjectivity. Hope and Randall each claim that the other’s perception of reality is only a 
dream. Each claims, in other words, that the other is presenting an entirely subjective 
vision of the truth with no basis in fact. The intractability of their perspectives leads the 
couple to have their sleep patterns studied at a sleep center, at which point the center’s 
doctors reveal that both have, in fact, been sleeping. Wallace resolves the couple’s 
dispute by further suggesting that his characters’ subjective visions have no hope of 
reconciliation, and that each is doomed to exist in their own mental world. 
As in “The Soul Is not a Smithy,” Wallace chooses to enact this sense of isolating 
subjectivity through limited first-person narration. Just as readers are given access, in 
“The Soul,” to the narrator’s personal fantasies as they obscure his teacher’s threats, so 
are they given access to Randall’s version of events at the expense of Hope’s. In 
“Oblivion,” the limited perspective encourages us to mistrust Randall and to recognize 
the ways in which he is becoming increasingly tethered to his own, biased perspective. 
Such mistrust is suggested by his scenes with the therapist. Thus, even though Hope and 
Randall share a blindness to each other’s point of view, Wallace clearly wants readers to 
bring a higher level of scrutiny to Randall’s perspective. Wallace believes, after all, that 
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one’s subjective perspective is inherently misleading, and he casts his most critical eye on 
the characters whose subjectivity is rendered in the most detail.  
The story’s ending deepens the sense of unreliability and uncertainty surrounding 
the story’s portrayal of subjectivity. In something of a plot twist cliché, Wallace suddenly 
interrupts the story’s main narrative with the following dialogue: 
 “up. Wake up, for the love of.” 
 “God. My God I was having.” 
 “Wake up.” 
 “Having the worst dream.” 
 “I should certainly say you were.” 
 “It was awful. It just went on and on.” 
 “I shook you and shook you and.” (237) 
The dialogue proceeds for about a page, with the first speaker eventually referring to the 
second as “Hope,” making clear that the entire story has actually been Hope’s dream. The 
ending thus recasts all of Randall’s narration as figments of Hope’s subconscious mind. 
Interpreters read this ending in various ways. Wyatt Mason suggests that Hope’s dream 
expresses “worries over going to a sleep clinic, turmoil over whether she is dreaming or 
waking,” and states that, “the husband she inhabited in her dream, whom her mind 
painted as vile, whose true nature we will never know, is here now by her bedside, trying 
to soothe her.”  
 The truth of the story is less clear, however, and the story itself suggests the 
possibility that Hope is experiencing something much more serious than anxieties about 
sleep. Greg Carlisle points out that the story strongly hints at the possibility that Randall 
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has raped Hope’s daughter (who is, of course, also his own stepdaughter), Audrey, and 
that, furthermore, Hope has been sexually abused by her own father.14 Carlisle also notes 
that the person next to whom Hope wakes up may, in fact, not even be Randall at all, and 
may even be Hope’s father. This possibility is suggested by some of the story’s final 
lines, which begin with Hope as she speaks with the unnamed person sharing her bed: 
  “Wait—am I even married?” 
  “Please don’t start all this again.” 
  “And who’s this Audrey?” 
  “Just go on back to sleep now.” 
  “And what’s that—Daddy?” (237) 
Of course, these lines may also suggest that Hope is simply disoriented upon waking up 
from her dream. Ultimately, Carlisle argues that Hope’s dream expresses the trauma she 
has experienced due to her father’s abuse, as well as her denial of that trauma and her 
desire to repress it. 
 I would not say that Carlisle is necessarily wrong about this story, but I do argue 
that the reality of Hope’s situation is fairly unimportant to the story, subordinated as it is 
14 Such hints are numerous, and they become more prevalent as the story progresses, suggesting that 
thoughts of abuse gradually intrude into Hope’s dream world. Randall experiences a “momentary, 
hallucinatory ‘flash’ or vision of our Audrey supine in a beached canoe and myself [sic] straining piston-
like above her” (212). He mentions that after she left for college, “Audrey was no longer at home to 
‘preoccupy’ me or serve as the ‘focus of [my] affections’” (225). At the very least, the Randall featured in 
the story’s dream world lusts after Audrey. He mentions driving to her college to stare into her dorm room 
(223-4). When he recalls giving Audrey driving lessons, he focuses on “the noisome sound of her breathing 
and shapes of her leg” (231). Randall also hints at Hope’s father’s relationship to his own daughters, Hope 
and Vivian, recalling that during one conversation,  
 
in his pale eyes was what sometimes looked or appeared to be the terrible stepfatherly knowledge 
of what our Audrey could have been to me, perhaps as Hope—as well as Vivian…—had once 
served as or been to himself; and it was not at all difficult to conceive almost at will a low angle 
image or vision or nightmarish ‘shot’ of his prone face just above, engorged and straining, one 
well freckled right hand clamped tight over Hope or Vivian…beneath him’s [sic] open mouth, and 
his crushing weight thoroughly and terribly adult. (214) 
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to the emotional imagery of her dream scenario. As in “The Soul Is not a Smithy,” 
Wallace’s intent is to render what he sees as the isolated world of individual 
consciousness. He wants his readers to experience Hope’s feelings, not her real life. 
Whether or not Hope has actually been abused, the abuse scenarios alluded to in her 
dreams clearly express a sense of fear and marginalization. I want to suggest the 
possibility that Wallace intended the abuse hinted at in “Oblivion” as not necessarily 
(though possibly) indicative of real-life abuse, but certainly indicative of some deep-
seated anxiety related to Hope’s interpersonal relationships.15  
 One indication that Hope’s concerns may, in fact, be with matters less life-altering 
than sexual abuse is that her dream frequently fixates on her own aging and loss of 
physical attractiveness. Within the dream world, Randall refers to “Hope’s dry, dark, 
narrow, increasingly haggard face” (205). In an extended description of changes in 
Hope’s appearance, he notes that “recent years had not been...‘kind’ with respect to 
Hope’s gynecic or womanly charms or appeal,” describing her as having undergone a 
“‘weazening’ or desiccation, her skin toughening and becoming in places leathery in 
appearance” (217-8). Hope’s dream clearly expresses concerns about her own aging and 
appearance. While the story leaves open the possibility that Hope has been abused by her 
father, it also leaves open the possibility that Randall’s abuse, as described in the dreams, 
is simply an expression of deep-seated anxiety over her own desirability, that she 
15 The story is, in this regard, remarkably similar to David Lynch’s film Mulholland Drive. In Lynch’s film, 
the main narrative is revealed to be a character’s dream, recasting the majority of the film as expressions of 
that character’s subconscious. Wallace was an acknowledged Lynch fan, and he published an article on 
Lynch in Premiere magazine in 1996 (The article was later reprinted in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never 
Do Again). Mulholland Drive was released in 2001, a few years before “Oblivion” was first published. It is 
therefore quite likely that Wallace was writing under the influence of the film when he composed 
“Oblivion.” 
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imagines the worst possible way in which her husband could leave her for a younger 
woman. 
 The dream also contains a great deal of language that emasculates Randall, 
suggesting that the dream expresses Hope’s deep, long-repressed anger against her 
spouse/partner (who may or may not be Randall; again, Hope’s real-world bedside 
partner is unnamed). Randall is portrayed as sensitive and emotionally soft, in contrast 
with the hard, strong-willed Hope. After fighting with Hope, his “hands sometimes 
literally trembled or shook with frustration and fatigue related disorientation” (205-6). 
Dream-world Randall also notes that “conflict or argument was more difficult or ‘harder’ 
on myself than on either Hope…or Audrey” (222). While Hope’s dream never truly 
resolves the conflict between herself and Randall, it does suggest that on an emotional 
level, the dream-world Hope is stronger than the dream-world Randall. Her dream also 
highlights the fact that Randall, “as a child…had evidently sucked or ‘nursed’ at [his] 
own thumb” (216). Randall, for all his stubbornness and anger, is still a small, petty child 
at heart. 
 Ultimately, the Hope-Randall conflict, as dreamed by Hope herself, evokes deep 
personal feelings of anger and insecurity. Wallace’s goal in “Oblivion,” as in “The Soul 
Is not a Smithy,” is to immerse readers in the character’s subjective experience, loading 
these characters’ perspectives with hyper-emotional language while shutting out the rest 
of the fictional world. This shutting out of reality demonstrates Wallace’s conception of 
consciousness as utterly distinct from its surroundings. His stories isolate consciousness 
from material and social worlds to an extreme degree, demonstrating deep anxiety over 
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the possibility that this isolation renders people unable to accurately perceive the very 
worlds in which they live. 
 
Self-Consciousness in Oblivion 
 This sense of the mind’s isolation, so prevalent throughout Wallace’s work, exists 
in a mutually amplifying relationship with his interest in self-consciousness. Wallace’s 
sense of consciousness as isolated from the surrounding world leads him to depict self-
consciousness as a debilitating psychological problem, as the prevalence and intensity of 
his characters’ self-consciousness heightens their feelings of isolation from society and 
culture, an effect that runs throughout the stories of Oblivion. Wallace, who publicly 
endorsed what he saw as the virtues of banality and sincere, “single-entendre values,” 
was ambivalent about engaging in self-knowledge or self-questioning, and this 
ambivalence manifests in his characters’ debilitating senses of self-consciousness (“E 
Pluribus,” 192-3). His generally bourgeoisie, highly educated protagonists are intelligent 
enough to question themselves and to gain high levels of awareness of their own minds, 
but it is this intelligence that renders them depressed and socially impotent. Marshall 
Boswell addresses the role of self-consciousness in Wallace’s fiction when he notes that 
several of his stories deal with “doubling self-consciousness, what ‘David Wallace’ 
describes…as ‘line[s] of thought’ that turn into paralyzing ‘inbent spiral[s]” (“The 
Constant Monologue” 157).16 What Boswell describes here is the process through which 
Wallace’s characters’ thoughts turn in on themselves, as those characters focus attention 
on their own minds at the expense of attention to the outside world. In other words, these 
16 Boswell places the name “David Wallace” in quotation marks, because he is quoting the fictionalized 
version of Wallace that appears in the novel The Pale King. 
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characters think so much about their own thoughts that they begin to shut out what is 
happening around them, leading to what Boswell describes as “paralysis.” My analysis of 
Oblivion connects this paralysis with Wallace’s broader conceptual separation of mind 
and world. The book’s depictions of paralyzing self-consciousness derive from this 
separation, as well as heighten it. 
 While Wallace portrayed self-consciousness as particularly endemic to highly 
educated people, his fiction also suggests that he viewed it as a problem inherent to 
human thought in general. This is made clear in the Oblivion story “Another Pioneer,” 
which essentially allegorizes Wallace’s views on the prehistoric development of human 
consciousness. The story’s main narrative concerns an ancient village of an unspecified 
time and place, into which is born a child prodigy who, even at a young age, possesses 
advanced knowledge and wisdom.17 The villagers treat the child as a kind of oracle, 
setting him up on a dais in a hut, where they gather at regular monthly sessions to ask 
him questions. The child at first provides simple, straightforward answers to his fellow 
villagers’ questions, but eventually, he develops a “more humanistic and less mechanical 
kind of intelligence” and begins “responding to a villager’s question with questions of his 
own” (132). As the narrator puts it, it is as if the child “now understands his answers as 
part of a much larger network or system of questions and answers and further questions 
instead of being merely discrete self-contained units of information” (131). The child 
develops a systematic, complex mode of thought more consistent with a contemporary, 
17 The story also contains at least two levels of framing narrative, as it is related by an unnamed narrator, 
who notes that he heard it told from “an acquaintance of a close friend,” who overhead the story being 
shared between two other people on an airline flight (117). My analysis here is concerned primarily with 
the story’s main narrative thread, but it is worth noting that the framing narratives introduce a degree of 
uncertainty into the main narrative, since the story has been retold multiple times. This sense of uncertainty 
is emphasized by the fact that the narrator explicitly notes areas where the narrative breaks into multiple 
“variants” or versions.  
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educated mind than with the straightforward, literal mode of thinking of his fellow 
villagers.  
 The story, which begins as something of a philosophical allegory, becomes by the 
end an expression of Wallace’s anxiety about self-consciousness. The child, in 
developing advanced intelligence, gains a level of self-awareness that his fellow villagers 
lack, and it is precisely this self-awareness that causes his downfall. As time passes, his 
answers to villagers’ questions become more and more hostile, and he eventually 
responds to these questions with only a “rebuke or complaint” (135). The child is, in 
effect, a snob; his knowledge causes him to resent those whom he believes less intelligent 
than himself. The other villagers, of course, grow tired of the child and stop showing up 
to the weekly meetings. The child’s high level of awareness and knowledge is, in the end, 
what isolates and distances him from his peers. 
The story’s ending emphasizes the role of self-consciousness in the child’s 
journey. A rival village’s shaman asks the child, “Is it possible that you have not realized 
the extent to which these primitive villagers have exaggerated your gifts, have 
transformed you into something you know too well you are not?...How long before they, 
too, see what you have seen when gazing deep inside yourself?” (138) Wallace takes care 
to emphasize this moment of self-realization, which suggests that the child is becoming 
increasingly self-aware, realizing his own inessential nature and his true fallibility. 
Wallace frequently depicts characters whose self-knowledge leads to anomie and despair, 
and in the case of “Another Pioneer,” he applies this sense of anomie to an allegorical 
figure, one who represents Wallace’s view of the overall development of human 
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intelligence, the separation of systematic intelligence from the old-world knowledge of 
tribal society. 
Wallace renders his view of the deadening effects of self-consciousness in a more 
mundane context in “Mister Squishy,” in which Terry Schmidt’s inability to effect 
change in his life and his surroundings is, at least in part, an effect of his growing self-
awareness. Wallace portrays Schmidt as a once-idealistic young man who gave up on his 
professional dreams as he entered adulthood. The story’s narrator describes Schmidt’s 
youthful fantasies, in which he used “the sheer force of his personality and command of 
the facts to persuade tablesful of hard-eyed corporate officers that legitimate concern for 
consumer wellbeing was both emotionally and economically Good Business” (29). 
Young Schmidt is abetted, in these fantasies, by the “solid reputation for both caginess 
and integrity of T.E. Schmidt & Associates,” apparently an imaginary business that 
Schmidt envisioned himself one day founding (29). While this fantasy is clearly naïve, it 
demonstrates young Schmidt’s belief in himself and his ideals. 
Later in life, however, these ideals fall by the wayside, driven by Schmidt’s 
accumulated life experience and self-knowledge. According to the text, when he 
thinks of the starry-eyed puerility and narcissism of these fantasies…, a rough 
decade later, [he] experiences a kind of full-frame internal wince, that type of 
embarrassment-before-self that makes our most mortifying memories objects of 
fascination and repulsion at once, though in Terry Schmidt’s case a certain 
amount of introspection and psychotherapy…had enabled him to understand that 
his professional fantasies were not in the main all that unique. (30) 
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Wallace makes clear that Schmidt has expanded his overall sense of awareness of both 
himself and his society. He realizes that he is one of many who harbor youthful fantasies, 
and that those fantasies in and of themselves do not make him any different than others of 
his generation. Wallace suggests that Schmidt’s developing awareness leads to pain, as 
well as to both physical and psychological paralysis. Furthermore, Schmidt’s self-
awareness is connected to his own social and professional impotence. I have already 
discussed his inability to express his emotions or form relationships. Wallace also makes 
clear that Schmidt has settled into a sense of professional resignation, accepting his role 
as a corporate cog doing unsatisfying work. He experiences “private fears and thoughts of 
failure and impotence and terrible and thoroughgoing smallness within a grinding 
professional machine [he] can’t believe [he] once had the temerity to think [he] could 
help change or make a difference or ever be more than a tiny faceless cog in” (31-2, 
italics original). Wallace’s descriptions of Schmidt suggest that the author connects this 
feeling of helplessness not just with getting older, but with accumulating self-
knowledge.18 
 While Schmidt embodies Wallace’s view of the way self-consciousness operates 
in a fairly mundane context, Wallace’s most pointed, and also most unconventional, 
depiction of self-consciousness in Oblivion appears in the story “Good Old Neon.” While 
Terry Schmidt is portrayed as something of an ineffectual sub-everyman, Neal, the 
protagonist of “Good Old Neon,” is Schmidt’s opposite: cool and likable, successful in 
both his social and professional lives. However, he feels a gnawing sense of personal, 
quasi-spiritual emptiness. As he puts it, “My whole life I’ve been a fraud. I’m not 
18 The story makes clear that Schmidt has injected poison into the snack cakes that he is testing. The 
implication is that Schmidt can make a difference, but only by far exceeding the norms of mainstream 
culture in a way that will destroy the lives of himself and others. 
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exaggerating. Pretty much all I’ve ever done all the time is try to create a certain 
impression of me in other people” (141). Neal’s feelings of “fraudulence” mean that he is 
constantly unhappy, despite attaining so many outward markers of success.19 Even with 
such an outwardly successful character, however, Wallace still diagnoses self-
consciousness and mental isolation as causes of spiritual anomie. For Wallace, these 
properties of mind lead not only to external, but internal despair. 
 The role of self-consciousness in determining Neal’s misery is made clear in his 
descriptions of his condition. Throughout his life, he has, in his own words, “tr[ied] to 
create a certain impression of [himself] in other people.” (141). Such efforts have, 
according to Neal, 
…made me work really hard, so I’d always do well and end up getting what I 
wanted. But then, once I got the best grade or made All City or got Angela Mead 
to let me put my hand on her breast, I wouldn’t feel much of anything except 
maybe fear that I wouldn’t be able to get it again. The next time or next thing I 
wanted. I remember being down in the rec room in Angela Mead’s basement on 
the couch and having her let me get my hand up under her blouse and not even 
really feeling the soft aliveness or whatever of her breast because all I was doing 
was thinking, “Now I’m the guy that Mead let get to second with her.” Later that 
seemed so sad. (141) 
Neal’s problem has nothing to do with what he does, but with the way he conceptualizes 
his actions. He interprets events not just according to what they are, but in terms of what 
they say about him and his identity. In other words, he doesn’t just touch a breast, he 
19 He is quite similar in this regard to the protagonists of films such as The Truman Show, American 
Beauty, and Fight Club, all of which were released around the same time as the publication of “Good Old 
Neon.” 
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becomes “the guy” who touched that breast. His awareness of himself as this particular 
guy drains the satisfaction from the experience. This awareness also accentuates 
Wallace’s belief in the deadly significance of the separateness of individual 
consciousness from its physical surroundings. Neal internalizes an individualized idea of 
what his action means for his identity, and this idea drowns out and nullifies the physical 
sensation of the action. 
 The notion that human consciousness interprets events according to some 
meaning or significance is, of course, generalizable. It is, in other words, inherent to the 
very nature of consciousness for all people, not just for a fictional character like Neal. 
Wallace often treats his characters as cyphers for general properties of human experience, 
as befits his role as a moralistic writer. He is interested not simply in depicting character, 
but in making character stand for what he sees as widespread human conditions. In the 
case of Neal, Wallace produces an exaggeration of a general human drive to make 
experiences meaningful. Neal thinks about his experiences in terms of what they say 
about him as a person, and he allows his awareness of this meaning to overwhelm the 
experience itself. 
 In fact, Neal becomes so preoccupied with concerns about image that he is at 
times even completely blinded to his own internal feelings. He experiences emotional 
responses to events and to other people, but he comes to believe that such experiences are 
not genuine, or that they somehow fail to count as “real” emotional experiences. This is 
made clear in his description of a time in his life where he joined a church in order “to try 
to wake up spiritually” (156). According to Neal, he joined the church with pure motives, 
but eventually became “anxious to impress the congregation with how devoted and active 
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[he] was” (157). Neal draws a clear conceptual distinction between his actions and his 
intentions. He works extremely hard as a member of the church, volunteering, studying, 
and serving on committees (157). He believes, however, that these actions fail to count as 
genuine service to the church, because they are driven in part by his inner motivation to 
impress the congregation. Neal, crucially, draws the same sharp distinction between mind 
and external world that Wallace does; he is anxious because his mind’s intentions never 
quite seem to match up to his physical actions. 
 This becomes even clearer when Neal describes an incident in church in which he 
started “pretending to speak in tongues” (157). In the process, he found that, “in a kind of 
fever of excitement I was able to hoodwink even myself into thinking that I really had the 
Spirit moving through me and was speaking in tongues when in reality I was just 
shouting ‘Dugga muggle ergle dergle’ over and over” (157). Neal demonstrates a fallacy 
in his thinking about his fraudulence: namely, that he selectively deems certain of his 
actions to be genuinely motivated, while others are assumed to be “fake” or “pretend.” 
Neal makes clear that he really felt, at the time of the incident, to be having a spiritual 
experience. It is only after the fact that he describes this experience as an example of him 
“hoodwinking” himself. Neal, however, never makes clear what qualifies something as a 
“genuine”, as opposed to fake, experience, or why he makes distinctions between these 
two categories. 
 Neal’s descriptions do suggest that he tends to be suspicious of actions motivated 
by others’ interests. He distrusts his motivations for all of his volunteer work and spiritual 
study, driven as these activities were by his desire to ingratiate himself to other people. 
This is despite the fact that such work apparently caused Neal to have a deep feeling of 
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spirituality during worship. This is also despite the fact that Neal implies a certain level 
of community feeling that he experienced during his time in church, making note as he 
does of all of the collaborative work he performed with other church members. Neal is 
thus revealed to be not so much fraudulent as self-centered. He believes that actions 
undertaken for personal gain are genuinely motivated, while actions motivated by others’ 
interests are undertaken under false pretenses. 
 This is because Neal remains largely blind to the emotions of others, even when 
he acts with good intentions toward them. He laments that when a pastor blessed him, he 
was “not genuinely being struck down by the Spirit like the other people on either side of 
me” (157, emphasis added). Regarding his volunteer work in the church, he notes that he 
“was really only saying and doing these things because all the real parishioners were 
doing them and I wanted everyone to think I was sincere” (158, emphasis added). In 
addition to assuming that his own actions fail to count as “genuine,” he assumes that 
others’ actions do count in this way. This is despite the fact that Neal has no apparent 
reason for this assumption. In other words, these other parishioners may, much like 
himself, be motivated by their desire to ingratiate themselves to the church community 
and impress others, but Neal gives no indication that he even considers this possibility. 
He simply assumes a certain purity of intention on the part of others. 
 Such assumptions are further evidence that Neal is a narcissist more so than a 
fraud. He is obsessed with parsing his own motivations for his actions, but he rarely, if 
ever, gives a thought to the motivations of others. He thus doubts himself continuously, 
to the point where he essentially manufactures his own “spiritual crisis.” In fact, there 
may be no better indication of Neal’s self-obsession than that he treats his feelings of 
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“fraudulence” as a serious problem while treating his community work as a deceptive 
charade. Neal is one of the defining protagonists of Wallace’s career, because he 
exemplifies Wallace’s conceptual distinction between mind and world, living almost 
entirely in his own head while discounting the significance of material and social action. 
Wallace, in “Good Old Neon,” follows the focus on self-consciousness that defines 
stories like “Another Pioneer” and “Mister Squishy” (as well as numerous other works in 
his oeuvre) and amplifies it, to the point where his protagonist becomes blind not just to 
his others’ feelings, but to his own as well.  
 These characters exemplify Wallace’s tendency, especially prevalent in his late 
fiction, to use protagonists to generalize about the state of human consciousness. In 
Wallace’s fictional worlds, this generalized view of consciousness is usually pessimistic, 
emphasizing what the author sees as the mind’s isolation from its surroundings. This 
isolation is sometimes a generational condition, sometimes a national one, and sometimes 
simply, in Wallace’s view, an inherent quality of human thought. In all cases, though, it is 
central to the moral and emotional content of his work. Oblivion is notable for placing 
particular emphasis on this isolation, and the book’s bleak tone results from its author’s 
conviction that humans are doomed to lives of isolation. For Wallace, people’s efforts to 
communicate, to understand one another, and to attain self-awareness are all fated to 
failure, a failure that defines his fictional themes. 
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Chapter Five: The Truman Show: A Mind on an Island 
 
 
 David Markson, David Foster Wallace, and Nicholson Baker all confront, through 
their fiction, the possibilities and ramifications of mental isolation, creating characters 
whose extreme inward psychological focus cuts them off from the world outside of their 
mind and portraying, to varying degrees, individual, subjective mental experience as 
detached from its physical and/or social surroundings. Such writers use the medium of 
fiction to express their respective senses of what this isolation feels like, examining its 
implications for qualitative, conscious experience. These authors use their fictional work 
not only to tell stories, but to explore what are, for them, real-world aspects of this kind 
of isolated subjective experience. This is especially true in the cases of Wallace, whose 
characters exemplify his belief in the deterministic inevitability of solipsism, and of 
Baker, whose characters conversely experience the type of joy that their creator takes in 
his own mental isolation, an isolation that allows him to develop personalized obsessions 
and individually curated histories of the peculiar objects that make up the texture of his 
daily life. For these writers, fiction is a means by which to depict isolated elements of 
conscious experience as directly as possible. 
 Fiction also allows these writers to use narrative techniques which are particular 
to the medium of prose in order to depict mental isolation in their work. Prose fiction 
lends itself to a close focus on and in-depth description of first-person mental experience 
 
 
in ways that elude some other narrative media. Markson, Wallace, and Baker all employ 
the form of the first-person monologue as a way to enhance the sense of mental isolation 
that permeates their work, filtering their narratives through the perspective of single 
characters. The first-person perspective, as used by these writers, requires readers to 
internalize the fictional world of a piece of writing exclusively as it is presented by the 
narrating character, without the sense of objectivity that can be imparted through 
omniscient third-person narration. Such narrative “filtering” is precisely why, for 
example, Wallace is able to render the truth of Randall and Hope’s disagreement 
ambiguous in “Oblivion”; since he only presents Randall’s point of view, readers are 
granted access to the objective facts outside of his mind only indirectly.  
 The medium of film, however, makes this kind of perspectival isolation more 
difficult, since film, by its very nature, presents its viewers with a myriad of information 
beyond that which is presented directly by its characters. While a novel may present its 
story in mediated form, told to readers though a single character’s words and point of 
view, film is much less able to perform this kind of trick. Even a point-of-view shot, used 
to simulate an isolated visual perspective, inevitably contains a plethora of visual 
information, including props, sets, actors, and other elements of mise-en-scéne, that, if 
not entirely unmediated, is at least less mediated than the narration of a story like 
“Oblivion.” Film allows audiences a measure of control not present in conventional 
fiction, since they are free to focus on any information that appears in the frame, rather 
than be led by the whims of a specific narrative persona. 
 For this reason, film, in order to convey a sense of isolated mental experience, 
often relies less on formal elements than on narrative premises. One film whose premise 
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allows it to depict this kind of experience is 1998’s The Truman Show, directed by Peter 
Weir. The Truman Show follows a man named Truman Burbank who has unwittingly 
lived his entire life as the subject of a large-scale reality television program. Truman lives 
inside of a massive studio, in which a veritable army of actors portray his friends, family, 
and work associates. All of the events that take place around Truman, right down to 
weather patterns, are controlled by the producers of “The Truman Show,” who reside in a 
control booth embedded in the studio’s ceiling. The film’s premise entails that Truman is 
to some degree isolated, at the level of his conscious experience, from literally everybody 
he knows. His perspective is individualized, as he is the only character in the film who 
truly and completely believes (at least at beginning of the film) in the reality of the 
simulated environment of “The Truman Show.” Truman’s friends, both close and casual, 
interact with him with a full awareness that they are actors playing parts in a simulated 
fantasy world, while Truman, because he has never been exposed to the world outside of 
the show, treats these interactions as unimpeachably real, or least as more real than his 
associates treat them. Where Truman’s thoughts, actions, and statements are sincere, 
those of everyone he knows are knowing put-ons, leaving Truman, so to speak, “out of 
the loop.” In this chapter, I analyze the implications of this sense of mental isolation on 
the film’s portrayal of Truman’s conscious experience.  
 When I describe Truman as mentally isolated, I am not suggesting that Truman is 
some kind of “brain in a vat,” existing completely apart from any sort of cultural, 
physical, or social context. I am arguing, however, that the premise of The Truman Show 
presents an observable instance in which, even given the physical and social contexts that 
he shares with his friends and family, Truman’s mental experiences are clearly unique 
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from those of his associates. I also do not want to suggest that the notion that a film’s 
portrayal of its protagonist’s mental experiences as unique from those of other characters 
is anything new. After all, any film (or novel, or play) that contains multiple characters 
will generally try to suggest to its audience that each of these characters has a distinct 
personality and worldview. I do argue, however, that The Truman Show foregrounds 
Truman’s mental uniqueness and isolation in such a way that it becomes the film’s 
primary motivator of dramatic tension and plot development. Truman isn’t simply 
different from other characters; he views the nature of his own reality in a completely 
distinct way, since he interprets as a real world what other characters see as a fake TV 
studio, and the ways in which he copes with this difference between himself and others 
comprise his character arc. 
The unique worldview and mental isolation that Truman experiences are, to a 
large degree, direct products of the influence of mass media as portrayed in the film. The 
role of mass media has certainly played a major role of critical discussions of the film, 
with many critics reading The Truman Show as a critique and/or satire of reality 
television.20 This “media critique” angle of criticism certainly informs Simone Knox’s 
argument that the film reflects Baudrillard’s philosophical ideas about “simulacra” by 
depicting a world in which the boundary separating reality from televisual fantasy 
becomes obscured. Indeed, the role of this blurred boundary in creating the film’s 
emotional conflicts can hardly be denied. I argue here, however, that The Truman Show 
cannot be entirely reduced to a parable on mass media, and that the film, in addition to 
20 Such critics include Bishop and Cardullo. The film’s cast also address, in the DVD’s “making of” 
feature, The Truman Show’s anticipation of the popularity that the reality TV genre would achieve in the 
years immediately following the film’s release. 
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making arguments about mass media, is making arguments about its characters’ 
psychology.  
This “media critique” angle also informs one of the central philosophical 
questions posed by the film (and stated most succinctly by Christof, the creator of “The 
Truman Show,” at the end of the film’s climactic scene): is Truman better off staying in a 
fake, media-controlled world that will make him happy or venturing out into the world 
outside of the show, where he does not know what will happen to him but where he will 
be able to break out of the show’s contrived environment? One way to frame Truman’s 
choice in answering this question is to state it in terms of a true/false binary: Truman can 
either accept the media-saturated falsehood of his life in Seahaven (the town that 
comprises the entirety of the set of “The Truman Show”), living his life in a state of 
ignorant bliss, or he can seek the truth. This true/false binary is the type of frame that 
critics often apply to the film’s plot, including Knox, in her Baudrillard-inspired reading, 
and Randall Verarde, who argues that Truman’s ability to dream of a world beyond 
Seahaven makes him an “authentic” character. Both Knox and Verarde see the central 
conflict of the film as one between truth and falsehood. In my argument, however, I 
frame Truman’s choice in more relativistic terms. I argue that Truman isn’t choosing 
between truth and falsehood as much as he is choosing between the familiar and the 
unfamiliar. Consequently, I read the film as an exploration not of the blurry line between 
truth and fiction, but of one person’s quest to pass through different states of 
consciousness, and Truman’s movement from the familiar to the unfamiliar carries with it 
what the film wants its audience to see as a movement toward new possibilities of raw, 
unchecked emotion. This movement into raw emotion is an important part of not only 
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Truman’s experiences, but those of the film’s other characters as well, particularly 
Hannah, the actor who plays Truman’s wife.  
The distinction I make here, between the theme of truth and the theme of 
emotional unfamiliarity, can be further explained by comparing The Truman Show to The 
Matrix, another film released in the late 1990s that distilled boilerplate philosophizing 
and a science fiction-inspired premise into a commercially successful mainstream movie. 
In The Matrix, Neo, the main character, discovers that the world around him has largely 
been simulated by a giant computer system known as “The Matrix.” He meets several 
other individuals who share this discovery, each of whom is able to move inside and 
outside of The Matrix, even as the rest of the unknowing mass of humanity remains 
caught, unaware, in its simulated world. The key point that I want to emphasize here is 
that in The Matrix, the computer program is a mass phenomenon, shared by the bulk of 
the general population. Humanity is thus under the spell of a collective delusion, and it is 
up to the film’s heroes to bring the truth of reality to light. In The Truman Show, 
however, the world of Seahaven is, for most of the cast and crew of “The Truman Show” 
program, merely a job; only for Truman does Seahaven constitute, at least at the 
beginning of the film, an actual world. This individualization of delusion is what renders 
Truman, at the mental level, so different from everyone else he knows, in terms of how 
he interprets his surroundings. The individualized nature of Truman’s condition is one of 
the key plot elements that allows the film to focus so closely on the psychological 
implications of Truman’s story, and the film, according to my argument, is less about 
Truman discovering the truth than it is about him breaking out of one set of beliefs and 
into another.  
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The film is ultimately less interested in whether or not Truman’s beliefs are true 
and more interested in how these beliefs change Truman, even telegraphing this theme 
when Christof tells Truman, as Truman is about to leave Seahaven, “There is no more 
truth out there than there is in the world I created for you.” While much of what Christof 
and the other crew members of “The Truman Show” say is to be taken with a grain of 
salt, motivated as it is by their desire to keep the show running, this statement, regardless 
of Christof’s intentions, actually sums up the film’s worldview quite well. In the world of 
The Truman Show, there is no real distinction between truth and fiction; rather, the truth 
is simply constructed in a lot of different ways, in a lot of different contexts, by a lot of 
different people. The world that Christof created is just one kind of truth, and the world 
outside of Seahaven that Truman is going to enter into is another kind. The idea that truth 
is constructed and relativistic is, of course, typically postmodern, but not in the same way 
as Knox’s Baudrillardian view of truth, in which Truman is cut off from his “authentic” 
self by the media simulation perpetuated by Christof and his cohorts. 
 I argue that while Truman’s discovery of the truth of his situation is clearly 
important to the film, a more important motivator for him is his desire not so much to 
find truth, but simply to have experiences that are unfamiliar or different to him than 
anything else he has done before. Truman wants to push against the limits of his 
experience and his consciousness in order to escape from the routines for which his 
relationships and friendships provide a psychological and social context. The film 
emphasizes this desire to simply “get away” from his current life in part through 
Truman’s stated (but unfulfilled) desire to travel to Fiji, which he tells his friend Marlon 
(played, within the film, by an actor named Louis) he wants to visit because of its 
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location on the complete opposite side of the world from Seahaven. As he says to 
Marlon, “You can’t get any further away before you start coming back.” Truman is 
attracted to Fiji not because of anything he actually knows about its culture, people, or 
geography, but simply because it is as far away as he can possibly get from his current 
life. Truman talks about his desire to get away even though the film, up to that point, 
gives its audience little to no indication that he is particularly unhappy with his current 
lifestyle. Truman is not escaping from anything other than the familiar, and while he 
discusses his planned escape in spatial terms, it turns out to also be psychological, a move 
from one state of mind to a different, less familiar, and perhaps more frightening one. 
Truman repeats the implication that he is seeking unfamiliarity for its own sake when he 
spontaneously suggests to Meryl, his TV wife, that they go to Atlantic City “because I 
never have [been there]. That’s why people go places, isn’t it?” Ultimately, Truman isn’t 
looking for truth; he is looking for new experience, for an expansion of the horizons of 
his consciousness. 
Ultimately, The Truman Show is able to demonstrate this expansion precisely 
because its premise externalizes its protagonist’s psychology. The film makes clear 
precisely what the limits of Truman’s mind are by providing visual and spatial analogues 
both for the entirety of what Truman knows (the show’s set) and the entirety of what he 
doesn’t know (the world outside of the set). Truman’s movement from Seahaven to the 
outside world is a movement past the outer limits of his own knowledge, away from the 
contained, isolated perspective he has at the film’s beginning. The Truman Show 
expresses the belief that Truman is naturally drawn to this kind of psychological 
disruption, choosing to leave behind mental isolation for an unknown world. His mental 
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isolation goes hand-in-hand with the familiar, routine social context of the television set 
where he has lived his entire life, and the film documents his journey away from this 
world, a journey that he hopes will take him not only into new social contexts, but away 
from the lonely island that is his consciousness. 
 
Dual Identities: Inside and Outside “The Truman Show” 
The film initiates Truman’s movement from the familiar Seahaven to the 
unfamiliar outside world by establishing a stark duality between these locations, a duality 
that is not simply physical and locational, but, more importantly, psychological. From the 
very beginning, the film establishes two psychological perspectives that a character can 
embody within its fictional world. Truman, at least at the beginning of the film, inhabits a 
perspective all his own, since he believes in the reality of the fictional world of “The 
Truman Show,” and since he is generally unaware that a world exists outside of 
Seahaven. Characters who occupy the world outside of the show, such as Christof, 
embody the opposite perspective, since they are fully aware of both the world that exists 
outside of Seahaven and the contrived nature of Truman’s televised, mostly fictional 
environment. Some characters, however, truly embody the duality at the heart of the film, 
a duality that encompasses both of the aforementioned psychological perspectives. These 
characters include, most notably, two actors: Hannah, who plays Truman’s wife Meryl, 
and Louis, who plays Truman’s best friend Marlon. These characters are caught between 
both perspectives, because they must remain aware of the show’s contrivances, which are 
designed to keep Truman an active participant in the show, while simultaneously taking 
seriously Truman’s beliefs in the show’s reality. Hannah and Louis’s respective mindsets 
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are key to understanding the film’s psychological themes, since they create a template for 
Truman’s journey, embodying the cognitive duality that Truman is trying to achieve. 
Whereas Hannah and Louis are able to move, psychologically, between the world of the 
show and the outside world, Truman is in the process of trying to affect this movement 
for himself by attaining the kind of perspective that would allow him to see Seahaven 
from an outsider’s point of view. 
The filmmakers’ goal of establishing this kind of psychological duality for 
Hannah and Louis is exemplified in “How’s It Going to End?,” a behind-the-scenes 
documentary included in the 2005 DVD release of the film, featuring interviews with the 
cast and crew, who explain their approach to demarcating the dividing line between the 
film’s two worlds. The subjects of the DVD’s interviews include actors Laura Linney and 
Noah Emmerich, who play, respectively, Hannah and Louis. Linney and Emmerich 
discuss the process of playing characters who are themselves in character, relating to the 
interviewer their actor characters’ elaborate backstories. According to Linney and 
Emmerich, the process of preparing for the film entailed creating their characters’ 
biographies, biographies which include their characters’ motivations for appearing on 
“The Truman Show” in the first place. Linney imagines Hannah as a ruthless careerist, 
driven by money and power to achieve stardom on the show’s unconventional, yet far-
reaching media platform. Emmerich, on the other hand, imagines Louis as being pushed 
into show business as a child actor by his controlling stage parents. Emmerich describes 
Louis as a conflicted character, one whose friendship with Truman has come to feel 
genuine, even though Louis is, in fact, only “acting” as Truman’s friend, pushed into the 
friendship by the demands of the television show. 
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 The psychological duality attributed to these characters is, for the most part, only 
implied by the film itself, rather than presented explicitly, as Louis and Hannah rarely 
appear out of character, shown breaking only during short on-camera interview clips, or 
instances where something goes terribly wrong on “The Truman Show,” such as when 
Hannah feels physically threatened by Truman or when Louis realizes that Truman has 
escaped the unceasing gaze of the many cameras filming the show. The paucity of such 
incidents suggests that Emmerich and Linney should have little need to envision such 
elaborate backstories for their characters. Even in tense moments, Louis and Hannah 
reveal little to nothing about their personal lives outside of the show, and the film never 
depicts them in any context other than that of the show’s controlled environment. The 
backstories explicated by Linney and Emmerich thus function primarily as extra-diegetic 
elements of the film, influencing the actors’ performances without ever being made 
explicit to the viewing audience or to other characters in the film. The fact that these 
actors were so invested in backstories that never make it directly to the screen 
demonstrates the sense of importance (a sense that appears to extend to the rest of the 
film’s cast and crew) with which they invest the preservation of the duality of the world 
of The Truman Show. Linney and Emmerich were committed to the idea that, within the 
world of the film, they were both inside and outside of the “Truman Show” program. 
Hannah and Louis had lives and identities apart from the show, even though the film 
almost exclusively depicts the parts of their lives spent in character, on the show’s set.21  
21 This duality is reflected in the film’s credits, which list Linney as playing “Hannah Gill/Meryl Burbank” 
and Emmerich as playing “Louis Coltrane/Marlon.” Natascha McElhone, who also plays a cast member of 
“The Truman Show,” is similarly listed as playing two characters (“Lauren/Sylvia”). The actors who play 
characters that exist only within the show (such as lead actor Jim Carrey, who plays Truman) or who play 
characters that only exist outside of the word of the show (such as Ed Harris, who plays Christof, the 
creator of “The Truman Show”) are listed as playing a single character each. 
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 The fact that these backstories, despite their invisibility to the audience, were so 
important to Linney and Emmerich suggests that the duality experienced by Louis and 
Hannah is meant to be perceived as a largely psychological condition; since we never 
actually see either character outside of the show, we can only ever infer instances in 
which these characters feel their status as liminal people who exist both inside and 
outside of the show. Simone Knox poses an argument that suggests that these characters 
are sliding away from this dualistic sense when she writes,  
Hannah/Meryl and Louis/Marlon both emphatically insist on the authenticity and 
sincerity of the show. As Louis/Marlon puts it: "It's all true, it's all real. Nothing 
here is fake, nothing you see on this show is fake... it's merely controlled." This 
obviously works as part of the film's ironic commentary, but, given that 
Louis/Marlon has been on the show for nearly as long as Truman, it also suggests 
the possibility that these "actors" may have lost the ability to distinguish between 
what is real and what is simulated. They have begun, as Jean Baudrillard 
discusses in relation to illness, to "simulate" rather than to "feign.” (3) 
Knox sees the film as a philosophical parallel to Baudrillard’s critique of contemporary 
mass media, presenting characters who lose the ability to distinguish between truth and 
fantasy, thus experiencing a Baudrillardian “simulacrum.” However, I argue that both the 
actors’ comments and the film itself suggest that far from losing the ability to, in Knox’s 
words, “distinguish between what is real and what is simulated,” Louis and Hannah are 
instead defined largely by their liminal status, existing as they do both within and without 
the show’s simulated environment.  
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 Hannah, in a clip from an on-camera interview that appears in the brief montage 
that opens the film, appears, at first glance, to confirm Knox’s argument about the film’s 
simulated reality, noting of her role in “The Truman Show,” “Well, for me, there is no 
difference between a private life and a public life. My life is my life [sic] is ‘The Truman 
Show.’ ‘The Truman Show’ is...a lifestyle, it's a noble life, it is...a truly blessed life.” 
While Hannah suggests here that the show is, for her, not just a show but a “lifestyle,” her 
character’s actions throughout the rest of the film suggest the opposite: that Hannah is 
acutely aware of her status as an actor playing a role in a simulated world. Her comments 
in this interview, like so many of her other actions in the film, are part of a concerted 
effort to maintain the illusion that the show is, indeed, real, an illusion that obviously 
benefits her, providing as it does a platform to develop her celebrity status. The film hints 
at this by immediately cutting from Hannah’s interview to a shot of Truman, in the 
middle of a pretend monologue about getting lost on a mountain-climbing expedition, 
saying “Yeah, tell me something I don’t know. All right; promise me one thing, though: 
if I die before I reach the summit, you’ll use me as an alternative source of food.” The 
playful editing here implies a predatory element to Hannah’s preservation of the show’s 
sense of realism. Hannah doesn’t actually believe in the show’s authenticity so much as 
she uses the sense of authenticity that it presents as a means to exploit Truman for her 
own, personal gain. 
 The film establishes Hannah’s continuous awareness of the distinction between 
“The Truman Show” and the outside world by having her, at several junctures, turn 
toward the diegetic camera filming the show to pitch a product to the viewing audience. 
Hannah, in the middle of her interactions with Truman, frequently poses while facing the 
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camera in order to display such products, shilling for them while simultaneously trying to 
integrate her pitches into her conversations with Truman. Linney, in her documentary 
interview, cites these product placements as evidence of Hannah’s ambitiousness and 
unyielding drive to profit from the show, and indeed, Hannah is so intent on delivering 
these sales pitches that at one point, when Truman, distressed by his growing sense of 
paranoia and clearly sensing that “Meryl” is not who she appears to be, tells his TV wife, 
“You can’t stand me,” to which Hannah, in her “Meryl” role, responds, “That’s not 
true…Why don’t you let me fix you some of this new MoCocoa drink? All natural cocoa 
beans from the upper slopes of Mt. Nicaragua! No artificial sweeteners!” Even in this 
stressful situation, when Truman is beginning to break down the barrier that divides the 
show from the outside world, Hannah remains very much aware of this borderline. As she 
pitches the cocoa mix, the camera zooms in on her blandly smiling face, emphasizing the 
advertisement while deemphasizing Hannah’s surrounding environment, making it clear 
that Hannah has, mentally, removed herself from her argument with her TV husband in 
order to step into her role as an advertiser. 
Hannah’s product placements serve in part as a satire on consumerism and 
advertising, a recurring motif in The Truman Show.22 Her dialogue in such scenes is so 
clearly contrived, based as it is on advertisements that would have been several decades 
out of date at the time of The Truman Show’s release. Hannah’s clothing and gestures, as 
Linney notes in her DVD interview, are based on advertisements of the 1950’s, and the 
dated appearance of her sales pitches highlights their artificial nature. The artificial nature 
22 This motif is also present during a series of scenes in which a pair of Truman’s acquaintances manipulate 
him into contrived positions in order to leave him standing in view of an advertisement, thereby allowing 
the camera filming “The Truman Show” to capture the ad in order to present it to the film’s diegetic 
viewing audience.  
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of these pitches also demonstrates Hannah’s continuous awareness that she is, in fact, 
starring in a television show, and that she is not just having conversations with Truman 
but is also performing for the viewing audience. Such scenes impact the film’s overall 
presentation of Hannah as Truman’s wife by establishing her as only partially engaged in 
her married life, realizing as she does that she is both Meryl and Hannah, both Truman’s 
wife and a person with an autonomous identity outside of the cloistered world of the 
reality show.  
 Louis’s case is somewhat more complicated, since, as Emmerich suggests in his 
interview, Louis feels more affected by his relationship to Truman than does Hannah. 
Emmerich notes that even though Louis is only “acting” as Truman’s friend, he has, due 
to his almost-lifelong involvement with the show, spent most of his life, in the guise of 
Marlon, as Truman’s actual best friend. According to Emmerich, Louis “feels really 
guilty about deceiving Truman,” since he feels such a close friendship with Truman after 
all of the years that they have spent on the show together. Louis thus retains his 
awareness of the distinction between the world of “The Truman Show” and the outside 
world, yet still becomes emotionally invested in Truman’s fate. While Hannah is able to 
maintain a sense of separation between these worlds through most of the film, treating the 
show’s simulated world as a mere means to monetary gain while generally maintaining 
her emotional distance from Truman, Louis, in spite of his awareness of his dual identity, 
feels conflicted about its moral consequences, conceiving of it as a “deception” of 
Truman. The fact that he sees his actions as deceiving Truman certainly suggests that 
Louis, even as he recognizes the distinction between the worlds inside and outside of the 
show, does not necessarily privilege one or the other as more real or more authentic. 
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While the film posits the world of “The Truman Show” as a simulated environment, 
Louis recognizes that it is very real to Truman, and that his own assumed identity within 
that world may constitute a real breach of trust, even in a relationship that began as a 
mere acting gig. 
 The film demonstrates Louis’s sense of duality during a confrontation with 
Truman about the nature of the show’s reality. After Truman’s heated argument with 
Hannah/Meryl, Louis/Marlon rushes to the Burbank house to diffuse the situation. 
Immediately afterwards, the film cuts to a shot of Louis/Marlon and Truman sitting on 
the edge of a partially built bridge, discussing Truman’s fears. Truman tells 
Louis/Marlon, “I don't know what to think, Marlon. Maybe I'm going out of my mind, but 
I get the feeling that the world revolves around me somehow.” Louis/Marlon responds by 
attempting to quell Truman’s fears, telling him, “It's a lot of world for one man. You sure 
that's not wishful thinking, you wishing you'd made something more of yourself? Christ, 
Truman, who hasn't sat on the Jon and had an imaginary interview on ‘Seahaven 
Tonight?’ Who hasn't wanted to be somebody?” Louis/Marlon’s response here is notable 
in that it evokes both Louis’s sincere investment in his relationship with Truman and his 
calculated performance in the role of Marlon. His appeal to Truman’s “wishful thinking” 
demonstrates his familiarity with Truman’s psychology, as the film has already 
established that Truman has a tendency to harbor unfulfilled dreams, the most notable of 
which is his perpetually quelled ambition to travel to Fiji. However, Louis also tries to 
manipulate Truman in his evocation of a “Seahaven Tonight” (“Seahaven Tonight” being 
an apparently popular local talk show) interview as a paradigmatic example of what it 
means to “be somebody.” This evocation is part of a series of calculated gestures from 
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the cast and crew of “The Truman Show” to reinforce Truman’s sense of provincialism 
by referencing local phenomena as paradigms of excellence, and Marlon’s allusion to 
“Seahaven Tonight” demonstrates that even as he shares this intimate moment with his 
friend, he is still Louis, remaining aware of the world outside the show and of the need to 
maintain order within the artificial confines of Truman’s world.23 
 The film emphasizes Louis/Marlon’s conflicting motives through editing choices, 
as he continues by reminiscing about the two friends’ shared experiences, telling Truman,  
I’ve been your best friend since we were seven years old, Truman. The only way 
you and I ever made it through high school was cheating off each other's test 
papers. Jesus, they were identical. But I always felt safe knowing that, because 
whatever the answer was, we were right together and we were wrong together.  
Here, the film is edited to invest the repeated word “together” with the sense of dual 
meaning that I argue is so important to the film’s portrayal of its characters’ dual 
psychologies. As Louis/Marlon speaks, the film cuts away from his warmly upturned face 
to Truman’s pensive, downturned face, highlighting the fact that Truman is mouthing the 
words “we were right together and we were wrong together” along with Louis/Marlon. 
Truman clearly has enough of a shared history with Marlon that he knows exactly what 
his friend will say here, and he is clearly emotionally affected by Louis/Marlon’s words 
to the point that he tearfully, and almost unconsciously, repeats them. Coming from 
Truman at this moment, the word “together” signifies his and Marlon’s shared experience 
23 The most significant example, in terms of the film’s plot, of the crew of “The Truman Show” influencing 
Truman’s attitude to keep him from escaping, is the planned (simulated) death of Truman’s father by 
drowning, a death that leaves Truman with a lifelong fear of large bodies of water. Another notable 
example occurs when Truman enters a travel agency, only to see a poster featuring an image of an airplane 
getting hit by lightning, along with the caption, “IT COULD HAPPEN TO YOU!” Truman’s experience in 
the travel agency is one of several moments in which the film pushes the crew’s efforts to keep Truman on 
the island to comic levels of absurd obviousness. 
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of friendship. Coming from Louis/Marlon, however, the word suggests Louis’s desire to 
keep Truman not only believing in the fantasy world of the show, but also remaining 
together, in spirit and belief, with his fictional friend.  
 The most important moment in this scene, both in terms of expressing the theme 
of Louis/Marlon’s dual identity and in terms of pushing forward the film’s narrative 
momentum, is the point at which the film begins to cut between, on one hand, the friends’ 
conversation on the bridge and, on the other hand, Christof’s production studio. 
Louis/Marlon tells Truman, “You’re the closest thing I ever had to a brother, Truman. I 
know things haven't worked out for either of us like we used to dream they would. I 
know that feeling when it's like everything's slipping away and you don’t want to believe 
it so you look for answers someplace else. But, well…” At this point, the film cuts away 
to Christof, who speaks into a headset, saying, “I would gladly step in front of traffic for 
you,” a line that Marlon immediately repeats. Christof’s appearance is immediately 
conspicuous, because not only has he not appeared in this scene up until this moment; he 
hasn’t appeared in the film at all, other than a few short clips of exposition during the 
film’s overture-like opening montage. The film thus undercuts the emotional peak of 
Truman’s conversation with Marlon with this sudden reveal that Marlon’s apparently 
sincere words are only being fed to him off-camera. Given the sense of duality built into 
the character of Louis/Marlon, a line like “You’re the closest thing I ever had to a 
brother” takes on a conflicted meaning, since on one hand, it can be read as simply 
another attempt on the part of Louis to manipulate Truman’s emotions in order to keep 
him on the island, and on the other hand, it can be seen as a sincere declaration of deep 
friendship. 
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 The filmmakers’ decision to leave Christof out of the scene until after 
Louis/Marlon delivers this line certainly allows for a level of ambiguity over its intention, 
or at least suggests an intention on the part of the filmmakers to suspend the audience’s 
disbelief that Louis/Marlon is being sincere. The scene itself emphasizes Louis/Marlon’s 
sincerity, and Emmerich’s acting shows the results of his decisions to prepare to play the 
character as conflicted between the dual desires of both keeping the show going and 
being a good friend to Truman. As he readies himself to declare his friendship to Truman, 
Louis/Marlon looks down toward the sea, blinks a couple of times as though preparing to 
deliver a difficult-to-articulate truth, then looks directly and unblinkingly at Truman, 
declaring his feelings of brotherhood. The camera places Emmerich’s eyes in almost the 
exact center of the frame, emphasizing Louis/Marlon’s direct and empathetic eye 
contact.24 
 The film’s editing thus expresses the dual nature not only of Louis/Marlon, but of 
the world of the film itself. On one hand, Louis, in the role of Marlon, expresses what is, 
24 Acclaimed film editor Walter Murch, in his book-length essay In the Blink of an Eye, espouses a theory 
of film editing that compares film cuts to the blinking of a human eye. Murch writes,  
 
So it seems to me that our rate of blinking is somehow geared more to our emotional state and to 
the nature and frequency of our thoughts than to the atmospheric environment we happen to find 
ourselves in. Even if there is no head movement…, the blink is either something that helps an 
internal separation of thought to take place, or it is an involuntary reflex accompanying the 
mental separation that is taking place anyway…[The blink of a person engaged in a conversation] 
will occur where a cut could have happened, had the conversation been filmed. Not a frame earlier 
or later. (62, italics original) 
 
Whether or not Murch’s theories have any scientific validity (He cites “experimental work” published by 
Dr. John Stern), they are, interestingly, reflected in this scene from The Truman Show, both at the diegetic 
and non-diegetic levels. At the diegetic level, Louis/Marlon blinks before telling Truman about his feelings 
of brotherhood, suggesting that at this moment, he is sorting through his conflicting thoughts and feelings 
about his relationship with Truman. When he actually delivers the line, however, he is unblinking, 
suggesting a sense of directness, sincerity, and clarity of thought to his feelings. At the non-diegetic level, 
the film’s cuts between Truman and Marlon on the bridge and Christof in the production studio evoke the 
kind of separation of thought that Murch discusses, both for Louis/Marlon, who is negotiating his dual 
identity, and for the film’s audience, who must necessarily keep track of the distinction between the worlds 
inside and outside of the “Truman Show” program. 
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for him, a sincere sense of love and brotherhood for Truman, while on the other hand, the 
film’s cuts to Christof demonstrate both Louis’s emotional manipulation of Truman and 
his continued awareness of the existence of the world outside of the set of “The Truman 
Show.” The film ironizes this position by having Christof feed Louis the line, “And the 
last thing I'd ever do is lie to you,” having Marlon avow his desire not to lie in a 
statement that is, if not an outright lie, at least made under false pretenses. This scene, 
along with Hannah’s advertisements, expresses the dual identity and dual sensibility that 
Louis/Marlon and Hanna/Meryl negotiate in their positions as both Truman’s closest 
confidants and the two actors most responsible for deceiving Truman. This duality is 
central both to these particular characters, and to the film at large, which takes place both 
inside and outside of the constructed world of the TV program “The Truman Show.” 
 Louis/Marlon and Hannah/Meryl are such important characters to the film, not 
only because they are the characters with whom Truman shares his closest relationships, 
but because they most clearly embody a sense of duality that is essential to both the 
film’s overall premise and to its psychological themes. One of the premises of my 
argument is that the film documents Truman’s psychological progression from a singular 
point of view, in which he unknowingly internalizes Seahaven as his actual place of birth 
and residence, to the kind of dualistic view embodied by his wife and best friend, in 
which he comes to see Seahaven for what we know it to be: both Truman’s actual living 
environment and a constructed world that exists inside of the “real world” outside of the 
show’s set. While the film wastes no time puncturing Truman’s illusions (A satellite TV 
camera falls out of the sky in the film’s fourth minute and hits the ground directly in front 
of Truman), and while it explicitly and consistently acknowledges Truman’s desire to 
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leave Seahaven (Truman frequently mentions his desire to go to Fiji), it also clearly 
demonstrates that whatever suspicions he may harbor about the nature of his hometown, 
Truman maintains a personal, emotional attachment to his surroundings that, for him, is 
quite sincere.  
The film emphasizes this sincerity in Truman’s bridge-side conversation with 
Marlon. Just as Weir uses Emmerich’s eyes to suggest both the devotion and the 
psychological conflictedness he feels in lying to Truman, so does he use the eyes of Jim 
Carrey, in the part of Truman, to suggest not only Truman’s suspicion that something is 
wrong with his world, but his emotional connection to his best friend, as well. When 
Truman confesses his suspicions to Marlon, telling his friend “Everybody seems to be in 
on it,” he looks intently at Marlon, who looks back, after which Truman looks off into the 
distance, still intently. Truman’s eyes appear near the center of the frame, and the camera 
lingers silently on his distant stare, his eyes focused, but not on any one thing, suggesting 
his pensive uncertainty about his current situation. However, as Marlon begins to 
reminisce about cheating in school and camping in the woods, the film cuts back and 
forth between the two friends, using Truman’s image to emphasize his softening 
emotions, as Carrey, his eyes still furrowed in an intense glare, lets out a mild chuckle, 
then, after further reminiscence, unfurrows his eyes by raising his brows slightly, letting 
the audience know that Truman’s memories of the times he has shared with Marlon affect 
him enough, on an emotional level, to cause him to at least momentarily forget his 
suspicions. 
This scene exemplifies the film’s particular use of Marlon as a means for Truman 
to connect to his childhood past, as even with Louis’s awareness of his deception of 
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Truman, the two men have a shared history that lends them a natural, unfeigned 
camaraderie. However, while Truman’s relationship with Marlon appears quite natural, 
his relationship with Meryl is much more complicated, as we never directly see the 
couple experiencing any happy moments together. In fact, the first time Hannah/Meryl 
appears onscreen with Truman, she stops to talk to him mainly to hawk a product to the 
show’s audience (“The Chef’s Pal: It’s a dicer, grater, peeler, all in one!”) and to tell 
Truman, who is in the middle of gardening, “You missed a spot.” The film does, 
however, establish a distinction between the couple’s strained present and happy past in a 
scene where Meryl, Truman, and Truman’s mother look through a photo book. In this 
scene, the film cuts back and forth between Truman’s real-time reactions, which are 
marked by a series of forced smiles and attempts to get away from the interaction (He 
tells his mother, “We should be getting home”), and his wedding photos, in which he 
sports a wide, gaping grin, a look which rarely appears on his face in the film’s real-time 
chronology. The scene serves as the film’s effort to establish a plausible background for 
Truman and Meryl’s relationship, even as that relationship appears, in the present time, 
quite unhappy for both characters.25 
In addition to his relationships with Marlon and Meryl, Truman’s relationship to 
the town of Seahaven plays an important role in establishing his emotional rootedness in 
the life from which he eventually escapes. Even as his skepticism towards Seahaven’s 
residents grows, Truman retains a degree of implicit trust in the ability of the town’s 
social and political structures to protect him. In one of the key turning points in Truman’s 
25 It is worth noting that any positive emotions generated by this scene are undercut by another of the film’s 
comic displays of the obvious falsity of Truman’s world, as Truman, after Meryl and his mother leave him 
alone, looks through the photo book to find that Meryl was crossing her fingers in the moment when the 
couple were married. 
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turn towards skepticism, he runs into an office building and pushes an elevator button, 
only to see the elevator door open to reveal, instead of the expected elevator, a room that 
appears to be part of a TV studio lot. As security guards proceed to pull Truman away 
from the scene, Truman yells, “If you don’t tell me what’s happening, I’ll report you!” 
Even as the building’s official personnel make what are obviously weak attempts to cover 
up the scenario, telling Truman that what he saw behind the elevator doors was “nothing” 
and that the building’s staff is “remodeling,” Truman, despite his growing 
incredulousness, retains his trust that there is someone or something to whom he can 
report the strange behavior he is witnessing. Truman’s trust is further demonstrated when, 
in the following scene, he seeks the advice of Marlon, telling his friend, “I’m definitely 
being followed.” When Marlon asks “Who?” Truman replies, “It’s hard to tell. They look 
just like regular people.” Just as Truman believes that there is still a power structure in 
Seahaven that will protect his safety, so does he believe that a distinction can be made, 
within Seahaven, between the “regular people” and those who are “in on” whatever it is 
that he thinks is happening to him.  
In addition to establishing Truman’s trust in Marlon, the film also makes it clear 
that, however distant Meryl may be, Truman still trusts his wife in his moments of 
uncertainty. After speaking to Marlon about his concerns, Truman’s next move is to 
confront Meryl with news of some of the strange things he’s begun to notice happening 
around Seahaven. The film uses Truman’s scenes with Marlon and Meryl to establish 
Truman’s psychologically grounded story arc, in which he gradually transitions from a 
trusting relationship with his world to a sense of questioning skepticism. Such scenes 
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portray moments when Truman is, psychologically, “on the fence,” willing to both 
question the nature of his world and to express his trust in it.  
 
Experiencing The Truman Show 
 Having established the sense of duality that runs through The Truman Show, both 
in the film’s fictional world and in the characters of Louis, Hannah, and Truman, I now 
turn to a discussion of the way in which this duality determines the film’s portrayal of 
these characters’ qualitative experiences. For both Truman and Hannah, moving from the 
controlled context of the show to the less-familiar outside world entails an emotional 
intensity that is generally unavailable in Seahaven. Hannah effectively illustrates this 
intensity, as she undergoes a particularly sudden transition from her “TV personality” to 
her “real-life personality.” As I’ve already noted, Hannah’s television presence is defined 
largely by her relationship to the film’s diegetic audience, the watchers of “The Truman 
Show” program. Even as she engages in tense, heated conversation with her TV husband, 
she constantly strives to maintain her awareness of the viewing audience, posing and 
pitching products to them. Hannah’s composed product-pitching demonstrates not only 
her awareness of that audience, but her psychological distance from the constructed 
world of the program. She remains emotionally undeterred to the point that she can 
disengage from her interactions, at least to the point of being able to break the fourth wall 
of “The Truman Show” just enough to make her pitches. This quality of Hannah’s 
supports Linney’s discussion of her character as a cold, calculating, money-driven actor 
who views her role on “The Truman Show” as a career stepping-stone.  
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 However, the film creates opportunities for Hannah to lose her sense of emotional 
distance, and it is at these moments that we see other, more visceral aspects of her 
personality emerge. This transition from cold and composed to impulsively emotional 
occurs most clearly after Truman first confronts Hannah about his suspicions that 
something is not right in his world. Given that the film shows Christof relaying directions 
to Louis/Marlon during the latter’s bridge-side conversation with Truman, we can assume 
that even before she confronts her TV husband, Hannah has already been made aware of 
his growing suspicions about his world’s partially fictional nature. The scene thus 
presents Hannah with a situation in which maintaining her dual awareness is especially 
difficult, since she must act, toward Truman, as if nothing out of the ordinary is going on 
while simultaneously maintaining a full awareness that her job is to keep Truman 
believing in the fantasy world of Seahaven. Linney embodies this duality in her 
performance. As the scene begins, the camera pans right until Hannah, who is riding her 
bicycle home from work, has her face almost directly in the center of the frame. Linney 
adopts a steely-eyed, tight-lipped glare, subtly but clearly distinct from Hannah’s usual 
forced smile, and for a moment, she affords the audience a brief glimpse of Hannah’s 
personality before adopting the persona of Meryl. The film marks the boundary between 
Hannah and Meryl, between the outside world and the constructed world of Seahaven, by 
switching camera styles, from the non-diegetic camera that films Hannah to the diegetic 
camera filming “The Truman Show.”26 Immediately after this shift occurs, Hannah enters 
26 The film marks the distinction between the non-diegetic and diegetic cameras by placing black, blurry 
marks in the corners of the frame to signal instances when the audience is viewing the film through the 
diegetic television cameras. Simone Knox addresses the film’s use of such techniques to mark the boundary 
between the world of the show and the outside world in her essay, “Reading the Truman Show Inside Out.” 
Director Peter Weir also briefly alludes to the technical aspects of this process in the “making-of” feature 
included in the film’s DVD release (“Faux Finishing”). 
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the frame wearing her “Meryl face,” peeking into Truman’s car with a wide-eyed yet 
concerned grin to check on Truman, who is waiting in the car’s driver seat. 
 As Truman tells her to get into the car, Linney looks down and blinks unsteadily a 
few times, indicating a momentary break in the “Meryl” façade, but she quickly 
composes herself to try to allay Truman’s suspicions. From here, Linney almost 
wordlessly conveys Hannah’s struggle to stay in “performance mode,” pasting Meryl’s 
wide grin across her face, only to pull the corners of her mouth in to a purse-lipped look 
of rapt concern when Truman, intent on proving to her that something strange is afoot, 
becomes increasingly manic. She leans toward Truman, breathing heavily to convey 
Hannah’s increasing anxiety, until she suddenly switches gears by getting back into 
character as Meryl, playfully and unsuccessfully admonishing Truman by uttering his 
name in a sing-song voice. As Truman continues to drive his point home, the best that 
Hannah can do to try to maintain normalcy is to meekly, desperately tell Truman, apropos 
of nothing that has occurred in the conversation so far, “You know, I invited Rita and 
Marlon for a barbeque on Sunday…” The statement’s obvious contrivance demonstrates 
Hannah’s inability to address, in any coherent way, Truman’s psychological break from 
the world of the show. 
 Truman elects to disrupt the situation by spontaneously pulling the car into the 
road and driving wildly around town. As he and Hannah/Meryl drive over the bridge that 
leads out of town, Hannah becomes absolutely panicked, screaming at Truman to stop, 
her eyes gaping widely. I argue that, given the context established by the film, the raw 
emotion that Hannah displays here is not only an emotional response to danger, but a 
psychological break. Just as the world of “The Truman Show” is calculated, so is Meryl’s 
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persona. As Truman begins to break apart from the constructed reality of the show, he 
brings Meryl along with him, and consequently, the calculating psychological 
mechanisms that allow Hannah to render Meryl’s persona are short-circuited, leaving 
Hannah emotionally exposed in a way that the film implies has rarely or never happened 
in her past interactions with Truman. Hannah’s reactions come about in response not only 
to danger, but, more generally, to the raw emotions set off in her in the process of this 
psychological break. Even when Truman and Hannah/Meryl safely make it over the 
bridge, the smile that covers Hannah’s face is much different from the one she typically 
adopts in her “Meryl” persona. Linney affects an open, gaping grin, rather than the tightly 
locked, upturned smile that typically crosses Hannah’s face when she is “in character.”  
 Hannah’s reactions convey what I am arguing is a specific perspective that the 
film takes on the relationship between psychology and social context. The role of social 
context is crucial here. Hannah/Meryl and Truman share a specific context for their 
relationship that has been honed and developed over time: each knows, or can at least 
reasonably guess at, how the other will react to certain situations. This is confirmed in the 
film when, as the couple approaches the bridge and Truman stares tensely at the water, 
Hannah says, “Oh Truman…You knew this would happen. You know you can’t drive 
over water.” Hannah knows about Truman’s fear of water, and her knowledge of her TV 
husband’s psychology informs her reactions to him. In other, more serene moments in 
their relationship, this shared context allows Hannah a sense of safety, as well as a 
measure of control and emotional distance. This is why she is able to step back from her 
interactions with Truman in order to deliver product pitches. When Truman begins to 
break from this shared context, however, it forces Hannah to break out as well, losing, in 
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the process, her emotional distance. Her fervor comes about at least partly as a result of 
this loss of emotional distance and control. 
While this loss of control is, for Hannah, frightening, it is exactly what Truman is 
seeking in his quest to escape from his televised environment. The film explicates both 
the inter-personal context shared by Truman and Hannah/Meryl and Truman’s persistent 
desire to escape this particular social context in an extended flashback scene embedded in 
the “Truman Show” program. The flashback begins with Truman and Marlon, as college 
students, dressed in marching band uniforms.  As Marlon tries to get Truman’s attention 
by playing a trumpet into his ear, Truman’s glance is arrested by a young woman, who 
turns out to be Sylvia playing the part of “Lauren” in the show, sitting cross-legged under 
a tree, the camera performing a slow zoom to suggest Truman’s growing interest. As 
Truman and Sylvia/Lauren exchange glances, Hannah/Meryl, dressed in a cheerleader’s 
uniform, stumbles into Truman, blurting out, “Excuse me! Hi! I’m so sorry I fell on you 
like that! I’ve just been such a klutz all day!” It is clear from her greeting (She tells 
Truman, “I’m Meryl.”) that this is the first time that Hannah/Meryl and Truman have met 
(and we can assume, based on the contrivances we’ve seen the show’s crew pull off so 
far, that Hannah has been instructed to run into Truman like this), and yet even at this 
germinal stage in their relationship, the film emphasizes the couple’s conventional 
familiarity. The school uniforms that Truman, Louis/Marlon, and Hannah/Meryl wear 
emphasize the characters’ adherence to prescribed routines, particularly since both 
marching band and cheerleading are activities that require tightly scripted choreography. 
The uniforms’ style is almost garishly conventional, especially in the case of 
Hannah/Meryl, who wears a sweater top in a faded tan color that appears straight out of 
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somebody’s stereotype of a 1950s sitcom. The camera noticeably avoids focusing on 
Hannah/Meryl’s face, taking a distanced perspective on her and Truman’s interactions, 
while simultaneously reverting to close-ups of both Sylvia’s face and Truman’s face 
when he is staring at Sylvia. At these moments, Carrey looks in the direction of the 
camera with a deep, piercing glare, one that contrasts noticeably with the wide-grinned 
mugging he brings to the performance during Truman’s routine, day-to-day interactions. 
This scene emphasizes Sylvia’s role in the film as an embodiment of a potential world of 
experience for Truman outside of his conventional life. The emphasis placed on 
Truman’s (and Sylvia’s) eyes suggests a raw, deep feeling that is absent from Truman’s 
comparatively mechanical flirting with Meryl, which Carrey even performs with a slight 
eye roll, in order to suggest Truman’s lack of engagement. 
 Sylvia, as the outsider who makes it into the world of “The Truman Show,” 
bumps up against Truman’s limited perspective while simultaneously drawing him out of 
it. When, in the flashback scene, she does meet Truman face-to-face in the college 
library, the pair’s interaction initially emphasizes Truman’s psychological status as an 
individual caught up in and attached, emotionally, to Seahaven, the world that has been 
constructed for him. Noticing Sylvia’s books, he mentions that she is studying Japanese 
and that her name (the name that we can assume has been given to her by the show’s 
producers) is “Lauren,” facts that Sylvia hesitates before confirming. It is clear here that 
Sylvia, uninterested in maintaining the illusions of “The Truman Show,” invests these so-
called “facts” with little valence, but that to Truman, such information is very real. 
Sylvia’s dual identity, as both Lauren and Sylvia, lends her a detachment from Truman’s 
world and mindset, much as in the case of Hannah/Meryl, the difference here being, of 
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course, that Sylvia is trying to draw Truman out of the world of Seahaven, while Hannah 
attempts to keep him confined there. 
 More importantly, Truman and Sylvia’s discussion illustrates the way in which 
the psychological context provided for Truman by his upbringing in Seahaven shapes his 
experience. When Sylvia tells Truman, “I’m not allowed to talk you,” Truman playfully 
replies, “Yeah, well, I can understand; I’m a pretty dangerous character.” He then 
proceeds to try to ask Sylvia on a date, assuming that her reluctance to talk to him was 
simply a way of playing hard-to-get. Carrey, in this scene, adopts the wide-eyed look of a 
placative animal, emphasizing Truman’s boyish, rapt fascination with Sylvia. She clearly 
represents to him a world apart from his own, but his ignorance of this world renders him 
utterly fascinated by this mysterious young woman. He treats the conversation, 
accordingly, as an occasion for light-hearted flirting. Sylvia, on the other hand, with her 
sharp, piercing eyes, is clearly engaged in the conversation at another level, fascinated by 
Truman, but fascinated only from her position as somebody who knows who he is and 
what he is up against. Where Truman, because of his cognitive limitations, is left in an 
enrapturing fog of mystery, Sylvia, precisely because of what she does know, responds to 
Truman’s fascination with empathy, acting on a romantic, yet detached and almost 
maternal desire to save Truman from forces which he doesn’t even know exist.  
Truman eventually notices that Sylvia is wearing a pin emblazoned with the 
question: “HOW’S IT GOING TO END?” He comments, “I like your pin. I was 
wondering that myself.” The pin is an apt embodiment of the pair’s feelings. Both 
Truman and Sylvia know that the pronoun “it” refers to “The Truman Show”; the 
difference is that Sylvia knows that the show is a constructed world within a larger one, 
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whereas for Truman, the show is the world, the only thing he has known up to this point 
in his life. The scene in the library ends with Sylvia telling Truman, “If we don’t go now, 
it won’t happen. So what do you want to do?” She leaves the referent of “it” vague, 
further adding to Truman’s sense of mystery. As she completes this line, the camera 
performs an extreme close-up shot that emphasizes Sylvia’s eyes while cutting the rest of 
her face out of the frame. The shot simultaneously conveys Sylvia’s intensity while 
implying Truman’s intense, focused glare, suggesting that this question, and this moment, 
represent a key turning point for Truman.  
 
Memories of Truman 
It is clear that Truman’s vision of Sylvia’s eyes persists in his memory, for when 
the extended flashback ends, the film cuts back to a scene of Truman, alone in his 
basement, staring wistfully at Sylvia’s sweater, which he has apparently held onto even 
though he has not seen Sylvia for years. He looks closely at her “HOW’S IT GOING TO 
END?” button, which is still pinned to the old sweater, then pulls out a framed picture of 
Hannah/Meryl, which he turns around and pulls the backing out of, revealing a different 
picture of a woman’s face. This picture is composed of various parts of fashion 
magazines that Truman has cut out and pasted together. Truman pulls out several images 
of eyes that he has cut from magazines, putting them onto the composite image of the 
woman’s face, muttering “Close, but no cigar,” until he finds a pair of eyes with which he 
appears satisfied. The juxtaposition of this scene with the flashback to Truman’s 
interaction with Sylvia (particularly the camera’s close focus on Sylvia’s eyes) makes it 
clear that Truman is trying to recreate Sylvia’s image. Significantly, he hides the picture 
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of the recreated Sylvia on the other side of Meryl’s picture. Whereas Meryl appears on 
the front side of the picture frame, smiling and composed in the midst of the frame’s 
decorative appearance, Sylvia appears on the opposite side, in a secret compartment, 
represented only through Truman’s imaginative recreation. The picture frame acts as a 
visual metaphor for the emerging duality of Truman’s psychology; he is caught in the 
contrived, pre-fabricated world of his life with Meryl, the world that is made visible to 
him, but he seeks the hidden world outside of this life, a world embodied, both for him 
and for the film’s viewers, by Sylvia. 
The metaphorical significance of Truman’s magazine composite also operates on 
a more psychologically revealing level. Truman composes the image in order to visually 
represent Sylvia, who exists, for him, only as an ineffable memory, eternally present as 
an abstract idea yet perpetually absent to Truman in any physical sense. All that Truman 
can do to represent Sylvia, who is outside of Seahaven for the entirety of the film’s real-
time chronology, is to compile scraps and fragments of images that he has obtained from 
within Seahaven. Based on the context established by the film, and given the amount of 
control that the producers of “The Truman Show” exercise over Truman’s world, we can 
presume that the magazines that Truman uses to recreate Sylvia’s image are ones that 
have been allowed on to the set by those same producers.27 Just as he wants to represent 
Sylvia on the page, Truman wants to obtain a mental image of the world beyond the 
limitations of the show’s set. He can only try to imagine this world, however, by 
observing what goes on inside the cloistered setting of Seahaven.  
27 For more detailed analyses of the significance of the producers’ control and surveillance of Truman, see 
Dusty Lavoie, “Escaping the Panopticon: Utopia, Hegemony, and Performance in Peter Weir’s The Truman 
Show” and J. MacGregor Wise, “Mapping the Culture of Control: Seeing Through The Truman Show.” 
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It is important to keep in mind here that Truman is aware, throughout nearly the 
entirety of the film, that something is not quite right in his world, as indicated by the 
satellite camera that comes crashing to Earth in front of Truman early in the film’s 
runtime. In fact, Truman’s extended flashback scene with Sylvia suggests that even 
before the film’s real-time chronology has begun, he has been suspicious about the nature 
of Seahaven, haunted by the mystery of who Lauren Garland is and what lies beyond the 
frothy ocean. Whatever his suspicions, however, Truman is only aware that something is 
wrong, unaware of precisely what the problem is, as evidenced by his vague explanation 
to Marlon that “the world revolves around me somehow,” or the fact that he maintains at 
least enough trust in Meryl to confront her with his suspicions (emphasis added). 
Truman’s awareness is so limited precisely because he is able to piece together his vision 
of the true nature of Seahaven only through clues gathered from within that world, such 
as the lines of traffic that spontaneously appear when he tries to drive out of town, or the 
car that drives by his house on a repeating loop. 
Dusty Lavoie, writing on the film’s representation of media misrepresentation, 
writes that “the film’s diegetic audience is essentially encouraged to misread Truman’s 
unknowingness as a utopian ideal: ignorance is bliss” (55). Certainly, the show’s 
audience members, as depicted in the film, actively root for and identify with Truman, 
pulling for him to succeed in a series of cut-away shots that display their rapt attention to 
the program. I want to emphasize, however, that although the producers of “The Truman 
Show” want the program’s audience to believe in the image of Truman’s happy life, that 
audience actually roots for Truman, during the film’s climactic ending scenes, to get out 
of Seahaven and discover the outside world, not to accept the blissful ignorance of his 
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televised lifestyle. More importantly, Truman is only partially ignorant. Even though he 
isn’t sure exactly what is wrong with his world, he does realize that something is amiss, 
and it is this partial knowledge that fills him with so much suspicion and paranoia. Rather 
than ignorance being bliss, Truman finds that partial knowledge is a cause of anxiety. I 
point this out in order to emphasize evidence for my argument that the film is less 
interested in portraying Truman’s story as a search for truth than it is in depicting the 
changes in conscious experience that accompany his movement from one version of the 
truth to another. Truman is beset with anxiety the more he feels that other people know 
something that he doesn’t, or that there is some way of thinking about the world, 
embodied by the mysterious Sylvia, that is inaccessible to him. 
This sense of the relativity of truth is accentuated in the film’s ending scenes, 
which support a reading of the film that sees Truman’s story not so much as a quest for 
some kind of truth beyond the appearances that make up everyday life as one for personal 
growth, a journey away from the routine and familiar and into the unfamiliar. One of the 
most striking aspects of the film’s ending is how un-dramatic it is, at least from Truman’s 
perspective, and how much the ending’s lack of dramatic climax undercuts the desires of 
the producers of “The Truman Show” to effect a big “TV moment” for their program’s 
finale. The main action of the ending scenes consists of Truman getting on to a boat and 
sailing out to sea, apparently uncertain of precisely what he will find, but driven to seek 
what lies beyond his home. As Truman rides out to sea, Christof instructs his crew to 
have the TV cameras get a shot of Truman’s face, remarking “That’s our hero shot.” 
Clearly, he is interested in mining Truman’s escape for dramatic potential and turning the 
story into a television drama, with Truman in the lead part. Christof is apparently 
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successful in this goal, as multiple cut-away shots show fans of “The Truman Show” 
watching the program at home and in a bar, hanging on Truman’s every move. 
However, while the show’s production team engages the viewing audience so 
effectively by molding Truman’s actions into a narrative arc (as they have apparently 
been doing for the entire thirty-year duration of Truman’s life), Truman’s actual 
encounter with the edge of Seahaven is rendered, at the non-diegetic level, far more anti-
climactic. As Truman’s boat approaches the edge of the ocean, the film shows him, in 
what is clearly (based on the black edging around the frame) a shot from one of the film’s 
diegetic television cameras, staring purposefully out to sea, in a shot clearly reminiscent 
of Christof’s “hero shot.” A dramatic soundtrack continues to play as the film cuts to a 
non-diegetic camera filming Truman’s boat while it continues to sail. The non-diegetic 
camera remains notably still, not even following the boat, creating a sense of distance 
from the onscreen action. This sense of distance is accentuated when the boat, reaching 
its destination, crashes into the wall of the “Truman Show” set (which is painted to look 
like the sky). Rather than portray this as a dramatic moment, the film’s non-diegetic crew 
renders it simply and naturalistically. The soundtrack comes to a sudden halt, while the 
bow of the ship creates a small hole in the set wall. While Truman’s successful journey to 
the edge of Seaheaven is, for the audience of “The Truman Show,” a major triumph, it 
appears, for Truman himself, as a simpler, more fundamental turning point in his life. 
This simplicity persists in Truman’s final farewell to Seahaven and to the TV 
audience watching him at home. As Truman prepares to walk through a door in the wall 
of the show’s set, Christof interrupts him by telling him, presumably through a gigantic 
loudspeaker contained on-set, “Truman, you can speak. We can hear you.” As Christof 
139 
 
speaks, the film cuts to a shot of a sunny, slightly cloudy sky, suggesting that Christof’s 
voice is being projected from the heavens and furthering what several critics have pointed 
out are obvious signs that Christof is meant to function as a God-figure to Truman.28 
Christof chummily implores Truman, “Say something, goddammit! You’re on 
television,” once again emphasizing Truman’s role in the television broadcast over his 
personal experience. Truman replies, “In case I don’t see ya’, good afternoon, good 
evening, and goodnight.” Viewers should recognize this line from one of the film’s very 
first scenes, as Truman uses it to greet his next-door neighbors before heading to work 
one morning. Carrey even punctuates both readings of the line with similar movements, 
affecting a big, contrived-looking grin and tilting his head to the side after delivering it. 
Truman’s repetition of this line encourages viewers to treat his exit as a self-aware 
gesture of playful defiance, as he is clearly playing with Christof’s expectations, uttering 
the same line with which he has probably opened his day for about the last decade or so, 
even as Christof clearly expects him to produce some kind of grand exit or gesture that 
will provide a fitting coda to the thirty-year run time of “The Truman Show.”  
The simplicity of Truman’s gesture emphasizes the lack of any “grand truth” to be 
found in the show’s ending and suggests that both “The Truman Show” program and The 
Truman Show film are not large-scale philosophical statements so much as depictions of 
one character’s changing conscious experience, his movement from mental isolation and 
familiar social contexts to something less familiar and less known. The film emphasizes 
the unimportance of the “true” nature of Truman’s world by conspicuously avoiding any 
shots of his life outside of Seahaven, instead ending with Truman walking through the 
door, followed by shots of the audience of “The Truman Show” celebrating its hero’s 
28 Most notably, Verarde reads the film as a “Gnostic fairy tale.”  
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apparent triumph before two audience members end the film by changing the television 
channel. The actual content of Truman’s experience outside of Seahaven is unimportant 
to the story that the film wants to tell; what matters is the personal, psychological journey 
that Truman has gone through, from mental stability to destabilizing anxiety and, finally, 
acceptance as he moves through the door, knowing that he won’t know what is on the 
other side until he gets there. 
The film is able to foreground this psychological journey by externalizing 
Truman’s psychology. By turning the entire town of Seahaven and the entire set of “The 
Truman Show” into visual and spatial analogues for the limits of Truman’s 
consciousness, the film is able to present his psychological transformation in physical 
form, rendering this rocky journey from staid familiarity to the raw emotion that he feels 
in the midst of the crashing sea waves. As Truman’s experience on the waves mirrors the 
tumultuous disruptions overtaking his consciousness, the walls of the film’s massive 
television set reflect his mental isolation, that singular set of cognitive limitations that 
Truman, and no other person in the film, is beset by. While it can be easy to read the set 
of “The Truman Show” as a fake world against which to contrast the “real world” 
outside, it more accurately represents, as I’ve argued here, the particular, individualized 
social and psychological contexts that define Truman as a character. By journeying 
outside of these contexts, Truman is escaping not only Seahaven, but his own, outmoded 
mind. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation has argued that one unique, and prevalent, conception of 
consciousness in contemporary literature is a model of the mind as operating with a high 
degree of independence and isolation from social and physical surroundings. The four 
works that I have analyzed each portray their protagonist’s consciousness as having just 
this kind of autonomy. Consequently, consciousness becomes, in these works, its own 
private world, distinctly individualized to extreme degrees. This is not to suggest that 
these novels portray consciousness as somehow completely separate from the world. 
After all, all conscious thought must be about something or some things, and those things 
must necessarily exist in the world. These works do, however, suggest a degree of 
independence for character consciousness that exceeds common novelistic conventions. 
While the mind and its surroundings are clearly symbiotic, they are also conceptually 
separate, with the mind able to process information freely and independently, leaving 
characters in mental worlds of their own making.  
 These works each suggest similar, yet crucially distinct points of view on their 
characters’ cognitive independence. David Markson’s novels develop the most balanced 
presentation of this conceptual separation. His unique prose forms enact a mind/world 
distinction through their typographical presentation, as his late novels are, I argue, 
divided into separate sections for the abstract world of fictional consciousness and the 
concrete world of non-fictional environments. Nicholson Baker’s The Mezzanine 
 
 
develops the most optimistic outlook for mind/world separation, portraying the 
idiosyncrasy of its protagonist’s thoughts as a means to develop a personalized vision of 
the world that celebrates the quotidian objects populating everyday life in an American 
office. David Foster Wallace’s Oblivion, on the other hand, reads as a dark shadow 
version of The Mezzanine, portraying its characters’ cognitive independence as means of 
alienating them not only from their peers, but from any deeper sense of meaning and 
purpose in their lives. Finally, The Truman Show demonstrates how this cognitive 
independence can function in film form, using mise-en-scène, acting, and plot elements 
to portray its protagonist’s mental separateness from his friends, family, and 
acquaintances. The film portrays Truman’s separateness as a mode of paranoia, and his 
mental isolation leaves him wondering whom, if anyone, he can truly trust. 
 In each of these works, characters’ cognitive independence leads to different 
results. In The Mezzanine, Howie’s mental flights of fancy lead him towards the view that 
he can mechanize, or automate, his own consciousness. For Markson, the separateness of 
consciousness and history actually accentuate their symbiosis, and his novels’ plots (such 
as they are) are built on the ways in which individual lives intertwine with, and are in fact 
inseparable from, historical milieu. Wallace views the mind as something of a prison, 
inherently isolated from all else. His fiction and his own public statements demonstrate 
his commitment to portraying solipsism as an inescapable facet of human mental life. 
Finally, The Truman Show’s portrayal of paranoia ends on an optimistic note, as the film 
becomes a story that is, I argue, less about discovering truth than it is about its 
protagonist’s capacity to transform his own conscious experience from rote routine to raw 
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emotionality. In the film, as in all of the works I have analyzed, it is the vision of 
consciousness as a distinct entity that makes this transformation possible. 
 One of the limitations of this study is its close focus on contemporary American 
fiction. Other time periods and cultures are likely to provide fruitful areas of inquiry in 
the study of fictional conceptions of the mind/world relationship. For example, modernist 
fiction’s close focus on consciousness would make it ideal subject for the approach I have 
used here. I would argue, however, that major modernist works do present a different 
take on the mind/world division that I analyze here. For example, Joyce’s Ulysses 
famously incorporates a multitude of voices and registers, evoking the melding of 
multiple conscious agents, as opposed to the sustained focus on individual consciousness 
found in the works of Baker and Wallace. Virginia Woolf’s The Waves, to take another 
example, focuses closely on individual minds, but does so in the process of alternating 
between various characters’ perspectives, emphasizing the connections between minds, 
rather than the separateness of the mind and the social world that exists in Wallace’s 
stories. Such distinctions would make these modernist works worth studying for the 
unique properties they bring to the art of depicting mind/world relationships. 
 It is important to remember, of course, that the works of Baker, Wallace, and 
Markson are parts of a historical continuum of writers who experiment with the structure 
and form of fiction in order to emphasize particular elements of conscious experience. As 
I have argued, the specific element that these writers emphasize is the mind’s capacity to 
process experience with some degree of independence from its surroundings. Such 
emphases evoke a model of the mind as not only abstract (as it is in much other 
literature), but independent and/or isolated. These writers tell a particular story of the 
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mind, one which, as compelling as it is, has its own limitations and inconsistencies. 
Whatever these limitations may be, however, we can rest assured that stories about minds 
will continue to proliferate in the American canon. This project presents one way to 
narrate the American mind, but it is far from the final word.
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